Few questions in political argument generate more heat per unit of light than the question whether China is socialist. It is asked in classrooms and comment threads, in seminar rooms and in the opinion pages, and it is usually answered within a sentence, with a confidence that the underlying material does not justify. The confidence is the first thing to discard. China presents the analyst with an economy in which most people sell their labour power for wages, in which a substantial class owns productive assets and appropriates the surplus those assets help to create, and in which production is organised overwhelmingly for exchange and for the expansion of capital. The same economy is governed by a party that calls itself communist, retains public ownership of land, banking, energy and other commanding sectors, and exercises a degree of direction over investment, and of authority over private capital, that has no real parallel among states everyone agrees to call capitalist. Both halves of that description are true. Any answer that proceeds by denying one of them is not an answer but a refusal.

A desk with the criteria table, notebooks on modes of production and a marked-up manuscript, Insight Crunch

The reason the argument never settles is that the disputants are rarely disagreeing about what the Chinese economy contains. They are disagreeing about which test decides what the economy is. Apply the criteria Marx himself used to identify a capitalist mode of production, generalised commodity production, wage labour as the dominant relation, a class living from the appropriation of surplus value, production oriented to accumulation, and the verdict follows at once. Apply instead the criteria that emphasise public ownership of banking, land and the other commanding sectors, together with a state that directs investment and disciplines capital, and a different verdict follows with equal ease. The dispute is therefore best understood as a dispute about criteria that has been conducted, unhelpfully, as though it were a dispute about facts. This article names that structure the criterion split, sets out each test and what it yields, and then isolates the one question underneath the terminology that is genuinely empirical: whether the state directs capital in pursuit of objectives capital would not choose, or serves accumulation while retaining the power to discipline individual capitals. That question, unlike the label, can in principle be answered, and the serious literature on all sides is really arguing about it.

A word about what kind of article this is. It addresses a question in political economy, the classification of a social formation, and not the character of a government. It names no serving official, evaluates no policy, endorses none and criticises none, and it refers to no passing event, dispute or international controversy, because none of those is its subject. Official doctrine enters only as doctrine, cited with the dates of the formulations that state it, in the same way that any body of theory is cited: as a set of claims to be examined, not as an authority to be obeyed or a target to be struck. The economy under discussion is described structurally, in terms of relations and mechanisms that change slowly, rather than through data points that would date the analysis on arrival. Readers who want a verdict on a government will not find one here, and readers who want the tradition that produced the question can find it in the series study of Marxism in China complete guide. What follows is an attempt to make one famous question answerable by first making it precise.

A dispute between tests, not between observers

Stand back from the controversy and its shape is odd. The participants on every side command large bodies of scholarship, cite many of the same features of the same economy, and yet announce incompatible conclusions with undiminished certainty. One literature points to the wage relation and the billionaire lists and considers the matter closed. Another points to the state banks and the planning instruments and considers the matter equally closed. A third concludes that both are describing a formation for which the inherited vocabulary has no exact term. The oddity dissolves once the tests are made explicit, because the conclusions are not competing descriptions of one measurement. They are the outputs of different measurements, each internally consistent, applied to a formation that happens to score differently on different instruments. Thermometers and barometers do not contradict each other when they return different numbers about the same afternoon.

Is China still socialist?

it depends on the criterion. On Marx’s economic criteria, generalised wage labour, a capitalist class, and production for accumulation, the economy is capitalist. On criteria emphasising public ownership of commanding sectors and state direction of investment, it is not straightforwardly so. Serious Marxists disagree.

Why does one economy attract opposite labels from serious scholars?

Because the labels are conclusions of tests, and the tests differ in what they treat as decisive. A scholar who defines a mode of production by its dominant relation of production will put the wage relation first. A scholar who defines a social formation by who commands its strategic resources will weigh command of banking and land more heavily.

Each can process the other’s evidence calmly, because the evidence was never the point of disagreement. The disagreement lives one level up, in the choice of instrument, and it stays invisible until somebody writes the instruments down side by side.

Writing the instruments down is therefore not a preliminary to the argument. It is most of the argument. Once the six tests used in this article are stated plainly, commodity labour power, a capitalist class, production for accumulation, ownership of commanding sectors, direction of investment, and authority over capital, a striking amount of the controversy rearranges itself into order. The first three tests yield the same answer in every serious treatment, whatever the author’s final label. The last three yield answers that are also broadly agreed as descriptions; what is contested is their weight. The famous question turns out to contain very little factual dispute and a great deal of unacknowledged weighting, and a weighting dispute can be argued about rationally in a way that a shouting match between labels cannot. That rearrangement is the contribution this article tries to make, and it follows a pattern this series has met before, in the articles on the working class and on the crisis of capitalism, where an apparently factual quarrel likewise resolved into a quarrel about which test to apply.

There is a further reason the labels resist settlement, and it is worth naming at the outset because it explains the temperature of the debate. The word socialist is not a neutral classifier in the way that the word sedimentary is for a geologist. It carries a verdict inside it. To call the Chinese formation socialist is heard, by friends and enemies alike, as either a vindication or an indictment of socialism itself, depending on the hearer’s prior commitments, and to call it capitalist is heard the same way in mirror image. Participants therefore defend their test choice as though a moral position depended on it, because in the surrounding culture one does. The analytical task is to lower the temperature by separating the classification from the verdict: an economy can be classified without being praised or blamed, and the classification, whichever way it falls, settles nothing by itself about whether the formation is admirable, durable or just. Those are further questions, and several of them lie outside this article’s remit entirely.

Before the verdict, the criteria

Every classification in the Marxist tradition begins, explicitly or not, from a definition of a mode of production, and the definition is relational. A mode of production is not a list of institutions, a level of technology, a share of output or a form of government. It is a structured relation between the people who work and the conditions under which they work: who owns the means of production, on what terms the direct producers gain access to them, in what form the surplus above subsistence is extracted, and by whom it is appropriated. Feudalism, on this approach, is not defined by the presence of castles or by a particular century, but by a relation in which peasants in possession of their plots render surplus to a lord by customary or coercive obligation. Capitalism, likewise, is no more defined by markets, money or merchants, all of which are far older than capitalism, but by a relation in which producers, having no productive property of their own, must sell their capacity to work to those who own the means of production. The fullest statement of the approach is the series article on the mode of production explained, and readers who keep that relational definition in view will find the Chinese case considerably less mysterious than the headlines suggest.

What makes a test a Marxist test rather than a partisan one?

A test earns the description when it is drawn from the theory’s own account of how modes of production are individuated, when it can be applied to any formation including ones the analyst favours, and when its result is allowed to stand even where it embarrasses the analyst’s allegiances.

A test that is selected after the verdict, because it delivers the verdict, is not a test at all but a rationalisation wearing a test’s clothing. Much of the published controversy consists of rationalisations of exactly that kind, issued from every camp, and the reader’s first skill is learning to tell the difference between an instrument and an alibi.

Two consequences follow from the relational definition, and both matter for everything that follows. The first is that identification runs by the dominant relation, not by the mere presence of a relation. Capitalist economies contain pockets of household production, self employment, cooperative enterprise and state provision without ceasing to be capitalist, just as feudal economies contained markets and wage payments at their margins without ceasing to be feudal. Presence proves little; dominance is the question, and dominance is a matter of which relation organises the reproduction of the whole. The second consequence is that political forms and economic relations, while connected, are not the same variable. States of very different characters have presided over capitalist relations, and the tradition has always known this: the analysis of Bonapartism in Marx’s own political writing is precisely an analysis of a state acquiring autonomy from the class whose relations it nonetheless secures. Whoever argues from the character of a government directly to the character of an economy has skipped the step where the theory does its work.

It is also worth disposing, early, of the idea that the classification can be read off from quantities: from the share of output produced by state firms, the share of employment in the private sector, the number of billionaires or the weight of planning documents. Quantities of that sort describe the terrain on which relations operate, and several of them figure in this article as background, but no threshold on any of them appears anywhere in the theory as the line between modes of production. A formation does not become socialist when state output crosses some percentage, any more than it becomes capitalist when the first wage is paid. The tests that follow are therefore qualitative and structural. They ask what relations exist, whether those relations dominate, and how the surplus moves. Readers accustomed to arguments conducted by statistic may find the procedure unfamiliar, but it is the procedure the theory itself prescribes, and it has the incidental virtue of being conductible without the contested figures that the protocol for this subject rightly forbids.

What Marx actually used as tests

Marx never supplied a checklist, and it would falsify his method to pretend otherwise. What he supplied, across the first volume of Capital and the manuscripts around it, is an account of the capital relation precise enough that a checklist can be honestly derived from it. The derivation runs as follows. Capital exists as a social relation when money is advanced to purchase two kinds of commodity: means of production, and labour power itself. Labour power becomes a commodity when its owner is free in the celebrated double sense, free to sell it because no lord or commune owns the person, and free of any independent access to means of production, so that selling it is the condition of living. Where that double freedom is the normal condition of the working population, where the owners of the means of production confront the owners of labour power as distinct and reproducing classes, and where production is undertaken for the expansion of value rather than for use or for customary obligation, there the capitalist mode of production exists, whatever the flag, the party or the proclaimed intention of the government. Where labour power is not generally a commodity, because producers retain access to land or tools, or because labour is allocated by plan, custom or coercion rather than purchased, some other mode, or some mixture, is present.

Three features of this derivation deserve emphasis before it is applied. First, it is a test about relations between people, conducted through things. The question is never whether factories, markets or money exist, but whether the specific social relation between the seller and the buyer of labour power organises production as a whole. Second, the test is indifferent to the juridical form of ownership at the margin. What matters is the effective relation: a manager who directs production on behalf of an owner, a collective that behaves toward its workers exactly as a private employer behaves, or a state bureau that hires, fires and sets wages under the discipline of accumulation, all raise the same analytical question, which the tradition debated furiously in the Soviet case. Third, the test is symmetric. It applies to formations the analyst admires and to formations the analyst deplores, and its inventor applied it without tenderness to projects carried out in his own name by later generations. A criterion that only ever convicts one’s enemies is not a criterion.

How can a reader tell when labour power has become a commodity?

By asking what a person without property must do in order to live. If the normal answer is to find an employer, accept a wage, and submit to direction during working hours, labour power is being bought and sold as a commodity, whatever else is also true of the economy.

If the normal answer is instead to work an allotted plot, draw an assigned post, or rely on a customary entitlement, the commodity form has not generalised. The test is conducted at the level of the typical biography, not at the level of the exceptional contract, and it is deliberately crude: modes of production announce themselves in what ordinary people must do on ordinary mornings.

The first test: labour power as a commodity

Applied to the Chinese formation, the first test returns the clearest answer of the six. The overwhelming majority of the working population gains its living by selling labour power to employers who direct its use: to private firms domestic and foreign, to joint ventures, to firms owned by various levels of the state, and to public institutions operating with hired staff. The labour market is not a marginal institution tolerated at the edges of a planned core. It is the normal mechanism by which labour is allocated across industry, construction, services and much of agriculture’s commercial fringe, and it has been so since the reforms of the reform era dismantled the older system under which urban workers were assigned to enterprises for life and rural labour was bound to the collectives. That older system, whatever its other features, did not rest on a labour market; the present one does, and the change is precisely the kind of change the first test is designed to register. A worker’s access to subsistence runs through an employment contract, wages are the typical form of income, hiring and dismissal are ordinary events, and unemployment is a recognised condition rather than an impossibility by definition.

The internal structure of that labour market has features the literature describes in detail, and two of them matter for classification. The first is the scale of recruitment from the countryside. A very large share of the industrial and service workforce consists of people whose household registration ties them to villages where their families retain contracted land, and who therefore sell their labour power in the cities while retaining a partial, family mediated foothold in agriculture. Scholars disagree about how to characterise this arrangement, some treating the retained land right as a subsidy that cheapens labour power, others as a remnant of a different relation persisting inside the dominant one, but the disagreement is about interpretation, not about the existence of the wage relation itself. The worker at the factory gate is selling labour power; the village plot behind the worker modifies the terms of the sale without abolishing its character. The second feature is segmentation: labour markets are divided by registration status, by region and by sector, so that the same capacity to work commands different wages and different protections in different segments. Segmentation complicates the picture of a single national labour market, but a segmented market is still a market, as the history of every capitalist economy, with its own divisions of craft, race, gender and citizenship, abundantly shows.

Against this finding, the defences offered in the literature are instructive because they concede the fact while contesting its weight. It is said that employment in state owned firms carries securities that private employment lacks, which is true in the literature’s description and irrelevant to the test, since the test asks whether labour power is sold, not whether its sale is comfortable. It is said that the party and the official union federation stand inside the employment relation as moderating powers, which is again a claim about the terms of the relation rather than its existence. And it is said that the ultimate purpose of the arrangement is transitional, a stage on a road whose destination differs from its present condition, which is a claim about the future that the first test, being a test of what exists, cannot process. On the evidence the test is built to examine, the answer is not in doubt among scholars who accept the test, including many who reject the conclusion others draw from it. Labour power in this formation is a commodity, generally and normally, and the economy therefore passes, or fails, depending on one’s vocabulary, the first and most fundamental of Marx’s criteria for a capitalist mode of production.

The second test: a class that owns and appropriates

The second test asks whether there exists a class whose members own means of production as private property, direct production through the employment of others, and appropriate the surplus value that production generates. The question is about a class, not about wealthy individuals, and the distinction matters. Rich individuals exist in every complex society, officials grow comfortable in every state, and a scattering of fortunes proves nothing about the structure of production. A capitalist class exists when ownership of productive assets is a reproducible social position: when capitals are accumulated, inherited, diversified and defended as a category; when their owners’ income derives systematically from the labour of employees; and when the reproduction of the economy runs through their investment decisions in significant part. By that standard the literature is again close to unanimous about the description, however it divides about the label. Private ownership of firms extends across manufacturing, construction, property development, much of the service economy and the commanding reaches of the technology sector. The owners of the largest private fortunes are a recognised social category, discussed as such in scholarship and in the country’s own sociological literature, and the stratum beneath them, the owners of the innumerable medium and small capitals on which the economy’s employment largely rests, is broader still.

What separates a capitalist class from a scattering of rich individuals?

Reproduction and function. A rich individual consumes a fortune; a class reproduces its position across generations and performs a function in the circuit of production, advancing money, hiring labour, appropriating surplus and reinvesting under competitive pressure. The Chinese case meets the class standard because private capitals are not decorative holdings at the margin of a planned economy.

They organise a large share of production and employment, their owners’ decisions about investment and hiring are among the mechanisms through which the economy moves, and the position of owner is heritable, saleable and cumulative in the ordinary capitalist manner. Where a category of people stands in that relation to production, the theory has a name for it, and the name is not a compliment or an insult but a classification.

Two complications are raised against this finding, and both deserve their full weight because they return later in the argument. The first is the presence of capitalists inside the ruling party itself, a development the party regularised by doctrinal decision at the start of the century, when entrepreneurs became eligible for membership under a formulation about the representativeness of the party. For the classification question this fact cuts in an unexpected direction. It does not blur the existence of the class; it confirms the class’s social weight, since a purely decorative stratum would not require doctrinal accommodation. What it complicates is the political question, because a capitalist class some of whose members sit inside the governing party is differently situated from one standing outside and below a hostile state, and the difference matters greatly when the argument turns to direction and service. The second complication runs the other way: the largest concentrations of productive wealth in several strategic sectors are not private at all, but held by the state, and the men and women who direct those concentrations are appointed officials rather than owners. Whether that fact defeats the second test depends on how the test is specified. Specified as a question about whether a capitalist class exists, it does not: the class exists, substantially, alongside the state sector. Put as a question about the ruling class in the classical sense, it raises the genuinely hard problem that sections below take up. Much confusion in the controversy comes from sliding between those two specifications without announcing the move.

It is also part of the record that the class in question was, in historical terms, made rather than found. The private sector of the reform era grew from township and village enterprises, from individual businesses licensed at the margins, from the corporatisation and partial privatisation of state firms, and from foreign investment admitted under changing rules, and each of those channels has its own scholarly literature. The detail matters for one reason: a class that was permitted and in part engineered into existence by state decision is a class whose existence is entangled with state power from birth, which is precisely the condition that makes the Chinese case resistant to templates drawn from the history of bourgeoisies that fought their way up against reluctant states. The European bourgeoisie of the classical texts made itself against the old order. The Chinese capitalist class was, in significant measure, authorised by the existing order as an instrument of development, and it has never had to become, and has never shown signs of becoming, a class that rules in its own name through its own political instruments. Whether a capitalist class that does not rule can preside over a formation that is nonetheless capitalist is one of the deepest questions in the file, and it is a question about the relation between class and state, not about the existence of either.

The third test: production for accumulation

The third test asks what production is for. In the capitalist mode as Marx analysed it, the circuit of production is governed by the expansion of value: money is advanced in order to return enlarged, and the enlargement, accumulation, is not one motive among others but the compulsion under which every individual capital operates, enforced by competition. A firm that does not accumulate is eventually displaced by firms that do, and an economy organised on this principle develops its famous dynamism and its famous instabilities together, as twin children of the same compulsion. The test for the Chinese formation is whether its production is oriented in this way: whether enterprises, private and state owned alike, operate under the imperative to expand, compete and realise profit, and whether the economy’s motion is intelligible as the aggregate outcome of that imperative. The scholarly literature, again across its divisions, describes an economy in which the answer is substantially yes. Enterprises sell into markets, domestic and foreign, in which prices and demand discipline their decisions. State owned firms were corporatised during the reform decades and instructed to operate as commercial entities answerable for profit and loss, and the large literature on their behaviour debates how completely that instruction took effect, not whether it was issued. Investment chases return across sectors and provinces, capital migrates toward higher yields, overcapacity appears in industry after industry in the pattern familiar from every accumulation driven economy, and the system’s crises and corrections take recognisably capitalist forms: property cycles, local government debt incurred in the competition for growth, industrial gluts worked off through export drives and write downs.

Why does production for accumulation matter more than the existence of profit?

Profit can appear in societies that are not capitalist at all, in the margins of feudal economies, in the accounts of state monopolies, in the surplus of a temple estate. What distinguishes the capitalist mode is not that somebody makes a gain but that gain making becomes the organising compulsion of production as a whole.

Enterprises which fail to expand are selected against, and the entire economy is set in motion by the race to accumulate. The test therefore examines the system’s dynamics rather than its bookkeeping. Where firms must grow or die, where investment is allocated by expected return, and where the state’s own enterprises are judged by commercial performance, the accumulation imperative is in command, and it is in command regardless of the juridical identity of the firms it commands.

Against the third test’s verdict, two arguments are regularly entered, and both will matter later. The first observes that the state regularly overrides the accumulation imperative for particular capitals and particular sectors, directing credit toward strategic purposes, sustaining employment in declining industries, and compelling mergers or closures that no profit calculation would have chosen. This is true as description, and it is the raw material of the sixth test below; but overriding an imperative in cases is different from abolishing it as the economy’s default setting, and the literature that presses this point usually concedes that the override is exercised upon a machinery of accumulation that otherwise runs on its own logic. The second argument is doctrinal: that within the official self understanding, accumulation is a means and not an end, subordinated in principle to development goals set by the party. A theory of modes of production, however, classifies by operative relations rather than by declared purposes, for the same reason that it does not classify medieval production by the theology its lords professed. Purposes belong to the political analysis, where they are genuinely important. The third test, confined to its own question, finds an economy whose production is organised for accumulation to a degree that no serious treatment denies, and it is on the accumulation test, as much as on the first two, that the capitalist reading of the formation principally rests.

What the three economic tests yield together

Pause and take stock, because the shape of the whole argument is visible at this point and it is not the shape the shouting suggests. Three of the six tests, the three that Marx’s own account of the capital relation puts first, return clear and substantially uncontested results. Labour power circulates as a commodity, as the rule and not the exception. A capitalist class exists, owns means of production, employs labour and appropriates surplus. Production is oriented to accumulation under competitive discipline. A reader who accepts those three findings and applies the classical definition will call the formation capitalist, and will be reasoning correctly from the premises. A reader who wishes to resist that conclusion cannot do so by disputing the findings, because the findings are the common property of the literature, asserted as confidently by the formation’s defenders in their descriptive chapters as by its critics. The resistance, where it is serious, takes a different form entirely: it disputes the sufficiency of the three tests. It argues that identification is incomplete until the political criteria are also examined, that title to the commanding sectors, and direction of the whole by a state standing above individual capitals change the character of the system even where wage labour and accumulation persist, and that the classical definition, framed for economies in which the state was comparatively passive, underdetermines the classification of a formation in which the state is an active economic sovereign. That is an argument about the test battery, not about the readings, and it is the argument the remaining sections exist to conduct fairly.

What do the economic tests settle, and what do they leave open?

They settle the character of the dominant production relation, which is the core of the classical definition, and they settle it in capitalism’s favour. They leave open everything that concerns the formation’s political economy: who commands the strategic heights, whether accumulation is steered or merely unleashed, and how a state able to discipline capital should be understood.

Whether such a state is best understood as capital’s instrument, its manager or its master is among the questions left open. Those open questions are not footnotes to the classification. For several of the positions examined below, they are the classification, and the reader should resist any summary, including summaries of this article, that treats the first three tests as the whole of the matter.

The criteria table

The six tests, their yields and their partisan affinities can now be set out in the form this series uses for its findable artifacts. The criteria table is not a scorecard from which a total can be computed, because the entire dispute is about how the rows should be weighted, and a table that pretended otherwise would smuggle a verdict into its arithmetic. It is instead a map of where agreement ends and weighting begins. Read it row by row, and notice that the first three rows command assent across the literature while the last three rows divide it, not over what they describe but over what their descriptions are worth.

Criterion What the criterion tests What the evidence indicates Which position it supports
Commodity labour power Whether most people live by selling their labour power Labour markets allocate labour across the economy; wage employment is the normal condition The capitalist reading
A capitalist class Whether owners of means of production appropriate surplus as a reproducing class Private capitals organise much production and employment; the owner’s position passes by inheritance and grows by accumulation The capitalist reading
Production for accumulation Whether enterprises operate under the compulsion to expand or be displaced Competition, profit discipline and accumulation dynamics govern private and state firms alike The capitalist reading
Ownership of commanding sectors Whether land, banking, energy and strategic industry are publicly held The commanding sectors are held by the state, a degree of public ownership without parallel among agreed capitalist states The socialist reading
Direction of investment Whether investment priorities are set by public authority against private preference Credit and approval systems steer investment toward state chosen purposes, alongside market allocation The socialist and distinct formation readings
Authority over capital Whether the state can and does discipline individual capitals, including large ones The state has repeatedly subordinated particular capitals and their owners to public purposes The socialist reading, and the real question below

How should the criteria table be read without flattening it?

As a map of a disagreement about weights, not as a league table awaiting a total. Each row records a finding that the literature largely shares; the columns record which camp draws comfort from the row. The reader who totals the rows into a score has missed the point, because the camps do not agree on the exchange rate.

For the capitalist reading the first three rows are the definition and the rest are scenery, while for the socialist reading the last three rows describe the commanding heights from which the first three are administered. The table’s use is diagnostic. It shows a newcomer exactly where to press each side: ask the first camp why command of the heights is scenery, and ask the second why the wage relation is not decisive.

The fourth test: ownership of the commanding sectors

The phrase commanding heights entered the Marxist vocabulary in the period of the New Economic Policy, when Lenin argued that a workers’ state retreating before the market could nonetheless retain the heights of the economy, large industry, banking, transport and the monopoly of foreign trade, and thereby retain command of the whole. The fourth test applies that old idea as a criterion: whatever the relations prevailing at the economy’s base, does public ownership hold the sectors from which the whole can be directed? In the Chinese formation the answer, as a matter of structure, is yes to a degree that distinguishes it sharply from the economies of the capitalist West. Land is not privately owned at all: urban land belongs to the state and rural land to the collectives, with use rights contracted, traded and mortgaged within that public frame. The banking system is dominated by state owned banks, and the central bank operates as an arm of the state rather than as an independent monetary authority of the Western type. Energy, telecommunications, railways, steel and defence industry are held predominantly by state owned enterprises answerable to state asset agencies. Foreign exchange and the capital account are administered rather than free. A formation in which the ground itself, the credit system and the strategic industries are publicly held is not, its defenders insist, adequately described by a vocabulary built for economies in which all of those are private, and the insistence has genuine force: ownership of the heights is not a detail, because it determines who can say no to whom when purposes collide.

Which sectors count as commanding, and on what grounds?

A sector is commanding when control of it confers leverage over the rest of the economy: when its outputs are universal inputs, as with energy and transport; when it allocates the means of expansion, as with banking and land; or when its loss would compromise the state’s independent capacity to act, as with defence industry.

The grounds are functional rather than ceremonial. By that standard the Chinese state’s holdings are not a miscellaneous portfolio of firms that happen to be public. They are concentrated precisely where the leverage lies, which is why the fourth test carries the weight it does in the socialist reading, and why critics of that reading are driven to argue, not that the holdings are small, but that holdings without a corresponding transformation of the production relation are a form of state property compatible with capitalism, a claim the Soviet debate rehearsed for decades.

Land and banking: the two structural facts

Two of the commanding holdings deserve a section of their own, because they are the facts most often omitted from popular versions of the debate and the facts that most complicate a straightforward capitalist classification. The first is land. In no agreed capitalist economy is the entire land stock publicly owned, and the consequences of public land ownership ramify through everything else. Urban development proceeds by the grant of use rights from the state, which captures for public authorities a large part of the increase in land value that development creates, and finances local government in part from that capture. Rural land, held by the collectives and contracted to households, cannot be sold into private ownership, which places a floor, however eroded the literature judges it to be, under the rural population’s separation from the means of production: the migrant worker’s household retains a claim on land that the classical proletarian of Marx’s account, free in the double sense, precisely lacked. Analysts who stress this fact argue that the second freedom, freedom from any access to means of production, is incompletely realised in the Chinese case, and that the incompleteness is structural rather than transitional. Analysts who minimise it reply that the contracted plot functions in practice as a welfare supplement and a dormitory economy’s subsidy rather than as a means of production its holder could actually live from, and that a right one cannot sell, mortgage freely or consolidate is ownership in a heavily qualified sense. Both descriptions are available in the scholarship; the classification weight assigned to them is, once again, the criterion split at work.

The second structural fact is the credit system. An economy’s banks decide, in the aggregate, which futures get financed, and in this formation that decision runs through institutions the state owns and directs. Credit allocation has been used across the reform decades as an instrument of macroeconomic management and industrial strategy: expanding lending to favoured sectors, contracting it in overheated ones, sustaining state enterprises through periods when commercial logic would have closed them, and underwriting the infrastructure programmes that private finance, left to itself, would not have undertaken on the same scale or schedule. The critical literature reads the same facts almost in reverse, treating directed credit as the mechanism by which losses are socialised, inefficient incumbents are preserved and the bill for the growth model is deferred into the banking system. The two readings disagree about the wisdom and the eventual cost of the arrangement while agreeing about its existence and its scale, and for the classification question the existence is what matters: a state that owns the credit system possesses an instrument over accumulation that no merely regulatory state commands, and any adequate account of the formation has to find a place for that instrument, whether as evidence of socialism, of state capitalism, or of a formation the older terms fit badly.

The fifth test: direction of investment

Ownership of the heights is a fact about stocks; the fifth test concerns flows. Who decides what gets built, expanded, pioneered or abandoned? In the textbook capitalist economy, investment is decided by the owners of capital in pursuit of return, coordinated after the fact by markets, and the state’s role is confined to the rules of the game and the occasional correction of its failures. In the textbook planned economy, the plan decides investment, and enterprises execute. The Chinese formation fits neither textbook, and describing its actual mechanism is more useful than forcing it into either. Alongside market allocation, which governs the great mass of smaller investment decisions, there stands an apparatus of direction: planning agencies that designate strategic sectors and discourage or prohibit investment in others; approval and registration systems through which large projects pass; a credit system that can be opened or closed to whole industries by administrative decision; industrial guidance catalogues that sort activities into the encouraged, the restricted and the eliminated; and periodic campaigns of consolidation in which capacity in disfavoured sectors is ordered closed. The literature on the system is large and disagrees mainly about its effectiveness, some scholars emphasising the state’s demonstrated capacity to conjure entire industries into being, in shipbuilding, in high speed rail, in renewable energy equipment, others emphasising the waste, duplication and local defiance that accompany every directive when it meets the incentives of local officials and firms. For the fifth test, effectiveness is secondary. The primary finding is that investment in this formation is substantially directed as well as substantially market allocated, in proportions that vary by sector and period, and that the directing hand belongs to a public authority pursuing purposes it states in its own documents.

What would count as evidence that investment is directed?

Direction is shown where the pattern of investment diverges systematically from the pattern that expected private return would have produced, in the direction of publicly stated purposes. Investment flowing into low return strategic sectors because credit was supplied on instruction, capacity extinguished by order while still profitable, infrastructure built ahead of demand: these are direction’s signatures.

The schedules involved are often ones no private consortium would have financed on its own account. The Chinese record, as the literature describes it, displays all three signatures repeatedly, which is why the fifth test is generally conceded even by scholars who deny that direction settles the classification. What they deny is the inference from direction to socialism, pointing out that states in agreed capitalist economies have also directed investment in wartime and in developmental drives, and the argument then becomes one about degree, permanence and purpose.

That rejoinder deserves its full force, because it identifies the real weakness of the fifth test used alone. Direction is a matter of degree, and degrees do not draw the bright line a classification wants. The French indicative planning of the postwar decades directed investment; the Korean developmental state directed it more coercively still; nobody in the Marxist tradition classified either formation as socialist on that account, because the direction was exercised over an economy whose heights, land and commanding sectors were privately held and whose directing state was understood, by the analysts of the time, to be organising a national capitalism. The Chinese case differs from those in the conjunction of direction with public ownership of the heights and with the sixth test’s authority over capital, and the socialist reading is at its strongest when it argues from the conjunction rather than from any single row of the table. Conjunctions, however, are exactly what a criterion based classification handles awkwardly, since the theory supplies no rule for how many political criteria outweigh how many economic ones. The awkwardness is not a debating point. It is the deep reason the controversy survives every attempt to settle it by evidence, and it is why this article insists that the productive question lies elsewhere, in the direction or service problem to which the argument now turns.

The sixth test: authority over capital

The sixth test is the most concrete of the political criteria and the one on which the socialist reading ultimately stakes its case. It asks whether the state stands in a relation of authority over capital as a whole and over individual capitals in particular: whether it can, and demonstrably does, subordinate the interests of particular capitals, including very large ones, to purposes of its own, up to and including the destruction of business models, the removal of owners from control, the redirection of entire industries and the public humbling of the most prominent private fortunes. In the classical capitalist formation as the theory describes it, the relation runs the other way. Individual capitals may fall, but capital as a system disciplines governments: through investment strikes, capital flight, bond markets, the dependence of employment and revenue on private profitability, and the thousand daily vetoes that a propertied class exercises without ever needing to conspire. A state that attempts sustained policies against the interests of capital in general finds the economy itself enlisted against it. The test, then, is comparative and relational: in which direction does the discipline run when purposes collide?

The Chinese literature describes a formation in which, on this test, the discipline runs from the state toward capital to a degree that startles analysts formed on Western cases. Private firms operate inside a regulatory and political environment whose terms the party state sets and can revise unilaterally. Party organisations are established within companies, including large private and foreign invested ones, as a matter of organisational policy. The state has, at intervals described across the scholarship, halted major financial listings on the eve of their completion, subjected whole sectors such as private tutoring and platform technology to restructuring that erased large fractions of their market value, compelled the country’s most celebrated entrepreneurs to withdraw from public prominence, and imposed on the property sector a deleveraging discipline that broke some of its largest firms, in each case for reasons stated in the language of public purpose: financial stability, educational equity, common prosperity, the prevention of disorderly expansion. The owners affected did not veto these decisions, could not organise politically against them, and possessed no institutional channel through which capital as a class could answer back. Whatever else such episodes show, they show a locus of authority standing above capital and capable of injuring it gravely in the pursuit of ends capital did not choose.

What does it mean, concretely, to discipline a capital?

It means that a particular capital’s plans, valuation or existence can be terminated or transformed by public decision, against its owners’ interests and without their consent, and that this possibility is not an emergency exception but a standing feature of the environment in which all capitals operate.

Every state disciplines capitals at the margin, through taxation, regulation and law. The sixth test is met in its strong form when the discipline extends to the largest capitals, is exercised for purposes originating outside the accumulation process, and encounters no effective collective resistance from capital as a class. The Chinese case, on the literature’s description, meets that strong form, and meeting it is the single fact that the purely economic classification has the greatest difficulty digesting, because a bourgeoisie that can be disciplined at will by an authority it does not control is a bourgeoisie in an historically unusual position.

The capitalist reading has an answer to the sixth test, and it is not a weak one. It observes that capitalist states have disciplined capitals before, in wartime mobilisation, in postwar nationalisations, in antitrust breakups and in financial rescues imposed on humiliated banks, without the formations ceasing to be capitalist; that discipline exercised to preserve the system as a whole, to prune its excesses and secure its long term stability, is a service to capital in general even when it injures capitals in particular; and that the relevant question is therefore not whether the state can strike individual firms but whether its purposes, taken as a whole, run against accumulation or in harness with it. A state that disciplines property developers to prevent a financial collapse, on this reading, is doing for the system what the system’s own actors could not do for themselves, and the surgeon’s knife is not evidence that the patient is a different species. The exchange between the two readings at exactly this point, discipline as mastery versus discipline as management, is the sharpest form of the real question, and it cannot be settled by accumulating episodes, because both sides can process every episode. It can only be settled, if at all, by the pattern of purposes across the whole record, which is the subject of the next two sections.

Direction or service: the question underneath

Strip the controversy of its labels and one question remains standing, the question this article has called the real one. Does the state direct capital in pursuit of objectives that capital would not choose for itself, objectives originating in a project external to accumulation, or does it serve accumulation, managing its conditions, correcting its failures and disciplining its excesses, while retaining an autonomy of manoeuvre that capitalist states also possess in varying degree? The two answers correspond to two different formations wearing similar clothes. On the first answer, the economy’s commanding intelligence sits outside the capital relation, and the wage labour and markets of the base are instruments, tolerated and used within a project whose goals are set elsewhere; the formation is then something for which socialism, transitional socialism or some new term must be found. On the second answer, the commanding intelligence is the collective interest of capital itself, organised politically with unusual coherence and unusual freedom from the short term vetoes that fragment it elsewhere; the formation is then a variety of capitalism, distinguished by the strength and centralisation of its state rather than by its mode of production. Every serious participant in the debate is, at bottom, answering this question, and the interminable quarrel about labels is the shadow cast by their disagreement about it.

The question is empirical in a way the label dispute is not, and saying why clarifies what an answer would require. Direction and service differ in their observable implications. A state that directs capital toward external objectives will, over a long period and across many sectors, repeatedly impose outcomes that reduce the profitability of capital in general or frustrate its preferred allocation, in the service of goals that resist redescription as accumulation’s own long term interest without emptying that phrase of meaning. A state that serves accumulation will discipline particular capitals freely, sometimes brutally, but its interventions will cluster around the system’s needs: financial stability, infrastructure, labour discipline, technological upgrading, the management of crises, and its purposes, however statist their language, will prove translatable into the requirements of expanded reproduction. The two hypotheses therefore predict different patterns across the same record, which is the mark of a genuine empirical dispute. They also explain why the dispute is hard: the translation exercise is always available to the service reading, since almost any public purpose, poverty reduction, national strength, social stability, can be redescribed as a condition of durable accumulation, and the direction reading must show not merely that the state pursues public purposes but that it pursues them past the point where the redescription remains plausible.

How could the direction question be answered in principle?

By assembling the cases in which state objectives and private profitability diverged, and examining their pattern rather than their drama. Single episodes prove little, because both hypotheses predict episodic discipline. The pattern across many cases, not the drama of any single episode, is the unit of evidence that discriminates.

The discriminating evidence is distributional and cumulative: how often the state imposed losses on capital in general rather than on a few capitals; whether the purposes served had beneficiaries outside the circuit of accumulation; whether the discipline survived its costs to growth and revenue; and whether, when the purposes of the party and the requirements of accumulation came into sustained conflict, it was accumulation that yielded. A literature that organised itself around those questions, case by case and sector by sector, would be answering the real question, and parts of the scholarship on both sides have begun, usually without announcing it, to do exactly that.

There is a temptation, which the reader should refuse, to treat the direction question as a polite synonym for asking whether the government is sincere, or whether its stated goals are its real ones. Sincerity is unobservable and irrelevant. States in the Marxist analysis are not moral persons whose intentions classify their economies; they are institutional complexes whose behaviour has patterns, and it is the patterns that discriminate between the hypotheses. A state might proclaim the purest socialist intentions and preside over an economy every one of whose mechanisms serves accumulation; another might speak the language of the market and yet, by the structure of its holdings and the pattern of its interventions, bend capital persistently toward ends it did not set. The analysis must therefore be conducted entirely in terms of structures and records, which is also the only register in which this article, bound by its remit to describe a formation rather than to judge a government, is entitled to operate. The direction question survives that restriction intact, because it was never a question about intentions. It is a question about which logic, in the last instance, the institutions obey when the two logics conflict.

The pattern that would discriminate

Because both hypotheses are elastic, it is worth specifying, more concretely than is customary, what each predicts, so that the reader can hold the literature to account against the specification. The direction hypothesis predicts, first, that the state will maintain loss making or low return activities for extended periods when they serve stated public purposes, employment stability, regional balance, strategic capacity, and will do so knowingly, absorbing the fiscal cost rather than disguising it. It predicts, second, that the commanding sectors will be used as instruments of policy even at the price of their own commercial performance, banks directed to lend where return is doubtful, energy priced for social rather than commercial ends. It predicts, third, that when private capital’s expansion threatens stated social purposes, in housing costs, in educational access, in the concentration of wealth, the response will restrict the expansion itself rather than merely taxing its proceeds. And it predicts, fourth, that the hierarchy of purposes will be stable across changes of circumstance, because a project external to accumulation does not dissolve when accumulation becomes difficult.

The service hypothesis predicts a recognisably different pattern. It predicts that discipline will fall on capitals whose behaviour endangers the system, the over leveraged, the fraudulent, the politically embarrassing, while the conditions for accumulation in general, property security for compliant capital, labour market flexibility, integration into world markets, are protected and deepened. It predicts that loss making state activities will be periodically restructured toward commercial performance, with the social purposes reassigned to the budget where they can be costed and controlled. It predicts that interventions will be timed to crises and cycles rather than to a steady external project, intensifying when stability is threatened and relaxing when growth falters. And it predicts that where a stated social purpose and the requirements of accumulation conflict over long periods, the purpose will be redefined, deferred or quietly subordinated, because the state’s own revenue, employment and legitimacy depend on the accumulation it would have to frustrate.

What pattern of cases would show service rather than direction?

A record in which every major intervention, however severe for the firms it struck, can be located within the needs of the system as a whole: stability preserved, excess pruned, strategic capacity upgraded, labour kept available and orderly, and in which no purpose external to accumulation was ever pursued at accumulation’s sustained expense.

The service reading does not require a weak state or a servile one. It requires only that the state’s strength be exercised, in the pattern of its decisions, as the organising intelligence of capital rather than as an authority with ends of its own that outrank capital’s reproduction. Readers who keep that specification in mind will find that much of the empirical literature, on both sides, is more decisive than its authors’ labels suggest, because the cases are often agreed even where the totals are not.

Between the two patterns lies the terrain on which the honest scholarship of the subject actually works, and its findings are untidy in the way of real findings. Studies of particular sectors find direction in some and service in others. Studies of particular periods find the balance shifting, with phases in which the market logic was deliberately unleashed and phases in which it was reined in, and the same author may describe the state as capital’s manager in one chapter and as its master in the next without quite noticing the transition. The untidiness is itself evidence, though of what is disputed: the direction reading treats it as the texture of a long transition in which two logics genuinely contend, while the service reading treats it as the normal oscillation of a developmental capitalism between liberalisation and control. What the untidiness rules out is the confident one word answer, from any quarter, and it is the principal reason this article refuses to issue one. A formation in which the two logics contend at this scale, over this duration, with this much at stake, is a formation that the inherited vocabulary was not built to name, and the four positions examined below are best understood as four strategies for coping with that fact.

The positive standard: associated producers

One further criterion deserves a section before the positions are heard, because it is the criterion least often applied and the one that cuts deepest against every party to the dispute. Marx’s characterisation of socialism was not exhausted by the absence of capitalism’s features. In the Critique of the Gotha Programme and elsewhere, the positive standard is the association of free producers: production carried on by workers who collectively control the means of production they work with, appropriate the surplus as a community, and subordinate the economy’s direction to decisions they actually make. Even the first phase of the new society, in that account, retains defects of distribution, payment by labour contribution rather than by need, but its defining mark is not a distribution rule. It is the location of control. The producers themselves, organised as an association, stand where the capitalist and the planning bureau both stood in the two systems Marx criticised: in command of the conditions and purposes of their own labour.

Applied to the Chinese formation, this standard returns a finding that none of the four positions disputes and all of them find inconvenient. The direct producers exercise no command over the instruments of their own labour, do not appoint or remove those who direct their enterprises, and do not decide the disposition of the surplus their labour creates, in either the private or the state sector. In private firms the point is definitional. In state firms, ownership by the whole people is mediated through layers of appointment and administration in which the workforce as such has no governing role, a fact the critical literature inside and outside the Marxist tradition has documented in studies of enterprise governance, and which defenders of the socialist reading generally answer by relocating the criterion, arguing that control exercised by a party claiming to represent the producers is control by the producers in the politically relevant sense. That relocation is itself one of the oldest moves in the tradition’s internal arguments, having been contested in the Soviet case by critics who held that representation without the represented holding power is a form of words. The reader does not need to settle that ancient quarrel to see the standard’s effect on the present one: measured by the positive criterion, the formation is not socialist in Marx’s sense at all, and the socialist reading survives only by resting its case on the ownership and direction criteria instead. The criterion split thus has a third axis, control by producers, on which the verdict is not split but negative, and any complete account of the debate must record that the most demanding Marxist test is the one the formation’s defenders least often choose to sit.

The doctrine in its own terms

No account of the debate is complete that does not state, fairly and as doctrine, the self understanding of the formation’s governing party, since that self understanding is one of the positions in the field and the one with the largest institutional weight behind it. The doctrine, in its developed form, holds that the country is in the primary stage of socialism, a formulation adopted at the party’s Thirteenth Congress in 1987, which teaches that an underdeveloped economy must pass through a prolonged stage in which the productive forces are built up by every effective means, including markets, private enterprise and foreign capital, before the material premises of a fuller socialism exist. On this account the presence of capitalist forms is not an embarrassment to be explained away but a predicted and necessary feature of the stage, and their presence therefore cannot be used as evidence against the classification, any more than the presence of markets under the New Economic Policy refuted the character claimed for the Soviet state of that period. The doctrine further holds, in the formulation adopted at the Fourteenth Congress in 1992 and written into the party’s programme thereafter, that the economic system to be built is a socialist market economy, in which market allocation operates under the macro direction of a state whose commanding sectors remain publicly owned, and in which the market is an instrument of the plan’s purposes rather than a replacement for them. The full exposition of this doctrinal structure belongs to the series article on socialism with Chinese characteristics, and only its bearing on the classification question is pursued here.

What does the doctrine claim, stated as doctrine?

It claims that classification follows the dominant character of the system taken as a whole, and that the dominant character is fixed by public ownership of the commanding heights and by the party’s direction of development. Markets and private capital, in the primary stage, are instruments within that dominance rather than rivals to it.

The stage, the doctrine adds, will be long, so the coexistence of socialist command with capitalist forms is the expected condition of the epoch rather than a contradiction to be resolved. Stated thus, as its proponents state it, the doctrine is not a refusal to face the economic tests. It is a rival specification of which tests decide, together with a theory of stages that assigns the economic tests a subordinate place for the duration of the stage.

Two features of the doctrine matter for the assessment that follows. The first is that it concedes, in its own vocabulary, most of what the economic tests find. The primary stage theory does not deny wage labour, private accumulation or the existence of a capitalist stratum; it predicts them, and even assigns them a progressive function for the stage’s duration. The dispute between the doctrine and the capitalist reading is therefore not about the facts of the base but about whether a stage theory can hold those facts inside a socialist classification, which is a question about the theory of stages, not about China alone. The second feature is that the doctrine’s decisive claims are about the commanding sectors and about direction, which is to say it rests its case on exactly the rows of the criteria table where the evidence is most genuinely contestable in weight. A critic who wants to engage the doctrine seriously must therefore fight on the political criteria, and a defender who wants to sustain it must show that command and direction are real and effective, not merely proclaimed. Both obligations are frequently shirked in the polemical literature, where the doctrine is either quoted as though quotation were proof or dismissed as though a self description could never also be an analysis. It can be either, and in this case it is a structured theoretical position with a history, internal logic and identifiable weak points, of which the weakest, as its critics inside the tradition have long observed, is the absence of any stated criterion by which the primary stage would be known to have ended.

Position one: the socialist reading in its proponents’ terms

The first of the four positions holds that the formation is socialist, and it must be heard in the strongest form its proponents give it, not in the caricature its opponents prefer. In that form, the argument runs as follows. A mode of production is a system, and a system is characterised by its commanding relations, not by an inventory of every relation it contains. The commanding relations of this formation are public: the land is publicly owned, the credit system is publicly owned, the strategic industries are publicly owned, and above the whole stands a party state that sets the parameters within which markets operate, decides which sectors shall exist and on what terms, and has demonstrated across four decades that private capital exists on licence, revocable and revisable, rather than as a sovereign social power. Within that command structure, markets and private firms are instruments, adopted for their dynamism and contained by the structure that adopted them, as a state might use a tool it remains free to lay down. The wage labour and accumulation that the economic tests detect are therefore real but subordinate, features of the instrument rather than of the hand, and to classify the formation by them is to mistake the tool for the workman. Proponents add that the formation’s trajectory confirms the reading: the commanding heights have not been surrendered across the reform decades but retained and in places extended, the party has repeatedly reasserted control when market logic threatened stated social purposes, and the development achieved has been directed toward national strength and the reduction of poverty on a scale that no merely capitalist formation of comparable starting point has matched under state direction of this explicitness. Scholars who defend versions of this reading include Marxist economists within China who elaborate the doctrine theoretically, among them Cheng Enfu and the school around the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences’ Marxist institutes, and sympathetic analysts abroad, of whom the Italian philosopher Domenico Losurdo, in his writings on China and on the history of the communist movement, gave the position one of its most uncompromising statements.

The position’s strength is that it takes the political criteria seriously as criteria, and refuses the assumption, smuggled into much Western commentary, that state ownership and state direction are decorative superstructure on an economic base that decides everything by itself. Its corresponding weakness is the one the positive standard exposed: it must treat control by the producers as dispensable, relocating the essence of socialism from the association of the workers to the ownership form of the state and the intentions of the party, and that relocation, however defended, is a substantial revision of the classical standard rather than an application of it. The position also carries a burden about the future that its stage theory makes explicit: if the primary stage is defined by the underdevelopment of the productive forces, then the stage must end as development proceeds, and the doctrine owes an account of what changes then, of which relations are scheduled for transformation and by what signs the schedule will be known. Proponents regard the demand for such an account as premature. Critics regard its absence as the tell that the stage is not a stage but a permanent settlement described in the language of transition. The argument between those judgements is genuine, and it is one of the places where the debate about China becomes a debate about Marxism’s theory of history itself.

The strongest objection, stated whole

The checkpoint of fairness in this controversy is whether the socialist reading can be stated at the strength its own proponents give it when they are arguing among themselves, and the answer this article is required to give is a full one. Stated whole, the reading runs as follows. The state retains ownership of banking, energy, land and the other commanding sectors of the economy, and these are not passive holdings: through them the state sets investment priorities that private capital would not choose, financing infrastructure, strategic industry and regional development on scales and schedules dictated by public purpose rather than by expected return. The same state has repeatedly disciplined individual capitals, including the largest in the country, breaking business models, halting listings, restructuring entire sectors and removing celebrated owners from prominence when their activities conflicted with public purposes, which is the reverse of the relation that obtains in capitalist states, where capital disciplines governments through the investment strike, the bond market and the threat of flight. A mode of production, the proponents conclude, cannot be identified by the presence of wage labour alone, because wage labour has existed in many formations, as a subordinate relation in the ancient world, at the margins of feudalism, inside the state sectors of avowedly socialist economies; what identifies a formation is the locus of command over its surplus and its strategic resources, and in this formation that locus is public and political, not private and accumulative. To call such a system capitalist because its subordinate instruments include markets and wage contracts is, on this reading, to classify by the tool kit rather than by the hand, and to render the concept of a mode of production incapable of registering the most important economic fact about the country, which is who is in command of it.

The answer available within the Marxist tradition is the one this article has been building since its second section, and it should be given without flinching. Marx identified modes of production by their relations of production, by the specific way in which producers are connected to the means of production and the surplus is extracted, and not by the locus of political authority above those relations. On that identification, a state may be as commanding as it pleases, may own the heights, direct the flows and discipline the owners, and the formation beneath it remains capitalist for exactly as long as the direct producers must sell their labour power to capitals that appropriate their surplus under the compulsion to accumulate. Political command, however real, changes who administers the system and to what public purposes its surplus is partly diverted; it does not, by itself, change the relation that defines the mode, any more than the absolutist state’s command over a feudal economy made that economy something other than feudal. The tradition’s own history supports the distinction, since the analysis of states enjoying substantial autonomy from the dominant class, Bonapartist France being the canonical case, was developed precisely to explain how political command and economic relation can come apart.

Where does the answer to the strongest objection stop?

It stops at a concession, and the concession must be recorded as plainly as the answer. The capacity to discipline capital, to subordinate the largest capitals to public purposes and to make that subordination stick, is a real difference between this formation and the capitalist states of the classical analysis, and the purely economic criteria do not capture it.

A classification that registers only waged labour and the accumulation imperative will describe the base of the Chinese economy accurately and its political economy inadequately, and the inadequacy is not a detail, because the discipline in question bears on everything from the system’s stability to its capacity for long term projects. The criterion split is therefore not dissolved by the answer. It is located: the economic criteria decide the mode of production question as Marx posed it, and they do not decide the further question of what kind of state commands the formation and to what ends, which is where the socialist reading’s evidence genuinely lives.

Position two: the capitalist reading in its proponents’ terms

The second position holds that the formation is capitalist, and in its strongest form it is austere. It begins from the relational definition and declines to be moved from it. The direct producers hold no productive property and must sell their labour power; a class of private owners appropriates surplus value and accumulates; the state sector itself operates through wage labour and commercial discipline; therefore the mode of production is capitalist, and every other feature of the formation, however interesting, belongs to the analysis of its state form, its development strategy or its ideology, not to its classification. Proponents of this reading, among them the economist Minqi Li, whose account of the reforms as a capitalist restoration is the most systematic statement of the position, argue that the transition was completed across the reform decades as the old system of assigned labour and planned allocation was dismantled and the capital relation generalised. David Harvey, in his history of neoliberalism, reached a compatible conclusion from a different direction, treating the Chinese reforms as a form of neoliberalisation with distinctive national characteristics, in which the party state constructed markets and a propertied class while retaining instruments of control that Western neoliberal states had surrendered. The management scholar Yasheng Huang, writing from outside the Marxist tradition, supplied the position with an influential periodisation, arguing that the capitalism of the earlier reform phase was entrepreneurial and rural while that of the later phase became state led and urban, a distinction the Marxist proponents of the capitalist reading have absorbed as evidence that the state’s role, however variable, has been exercised within a capitalist logic rather than against it.

What is the strongest form of the capitalist reading?

Its strongest form is the claim that the debate dissolves once the definition is honoured. On that claim there is no deep puzzle here: a capitalist economy administered by an unusually strong and interventionist state, of a kind the tradition has analysed in other settings.

The appearance of mystery, on this view, is manufactured by treating the state’s self description and its ownership portfolio as classification evidence, when the theory directs attention to the production relation. The form is strong because it is economical, because it explains the economy’s dynamics, its crises, its inequalities of condition and its integration into the world market with a single hypothesis, and because it predicts correctly that the system’s behaviour under stress will be the behaviour of a capitalist economy, which its proponents argue the record of boom, glut, property cycle and correction confirms in detail.

The position’s weakness is the mirror of the first position’s strength. It must treat the sixth test, the demonstrated authority of the state over capital in general, as a variation within the normal range of capitalist statecraft, and there are points in the record where that treatment strains. Capitalist states have broken firms and humbled magnates, but the tradition’s own theory of the capitalist state describes a state structurally dependent on the accumulation it regulates, constrained to maintain the confidence of the class it does not control. A state that can erase a large fraction of a major sector’s value by administrative decision, repeatedly and without electoral or market punishment, sits awkwardly inside that description, and the capitalist reading’s attempts to accommodate it, by analogy with wartime controls or developmental states, concede by their effort that something in the formation exceeds the template. The position also faces a question about its own criterion of rule: if a capitalist class exists but does not rule, and a party state rules but is not, on the analysis, a committee of that class, then the classical correspondence between economic and political dominance is broken, and the reading owes an account of the state that its austere form prefers not to give. That account, when given, usually reintroduces through the back door the direction question the position had declared dissolved: the state is said to serve accumulation as a whole, which is a claim about purposes and patterns, exactly the terrain of the real question.

Position three: the state as collective capitalist

The third position accepts the capitalist verdict and contests its usual implication, holding that the formation is state capitalist: that the state itself functions as a collective capitalist, confronting the working population as a single employer owner, extracting surplus through the wage relation and accumulating under the pressure of competition, military and economic, with other capitals on the world scale. The framework was developed for the Soviet case, above all in Tony Cliff’s analysis of Russia, which argued that a bureaucracy that owns the means of production collectively, hires labour power, and accumulates under external compulsion reproduces the capital relation with the state substituted for the individual capitalist, and its genealogy and rivals are treated in the series article on Trotskyism vs Stalinism. Kindred analyses were produced independently by the Johnson Forest Tendency around C. L. R. James and Raya Dunayevskaya, for whom the state capitalist character of the Soviet formation was the key to its politics. Applied to China, the framework has the immediate attraction of dissolving the debate’s central anomaly: the authority of the state over private capital ceases to be a puzzle, because on this reading the state is not an external arbiter standing above capital but the largest capital itself, disciplining private competitors and subordinates from within the same logic, and the commanding sectors are not socialism’s heights but the core assets of the collective firm.

What does the state capitalist reading add that the capitalist reading lacks?

An account of the state. Where the austere capitalist reading treats the party state as an unusually strong administrator of a system it did not create, this reading gives the state a determinate economic character and a motive: it accumulates because it competes.

It competes with private capitals at home for the surplus and with rival powers abroad for position, and its interventions, its disciplines and its development drives are the strategies of a collective capital securing its reproduction. The reading thereby explains the conjunction that defeats the other positions taken singly: wage labour and accumulation at the base, command and discipline at the summit, without granting the summit a purpose external to the system. Its price is a revision of the classical picture of the capitalist class, since the collective capitalist is a bureaucracy rather than a propertied bourgeoisie, and its critics have always pressed the question whether a class that cannot bequeath its position or sell its assets is a capitalist class in anything but metaphor.

The Chinese application of the framework divides its own proponents, which is worth recording because it shows the framework doing real work rather than serving as a label of disapproval. Some analysts in the Cliff tradition treat the reform era as the completion of a state capitalism that existed, in their account, from the revolution onward, the market reforms merely decentralising the collective capital’s operations and admitting private capitals as auxiliaries. Others treat the earlier period as a different, non capitalist formation and the reforms as the transition into state capitalism, which relocates the argument to the character of the pre reform economy, a question this article’s remit excludes. What unites the variants is the insistence that the classification be decided by waged labour and the accumulation compulsion for the system as a whole, including inside the state sector itself: the worker in the state factory sells labour power, the factory’s surplus is appropriated by an authority the worker does not control, and the authority accumulates under competitive pressure. If those are the facts, the state capitalist reading asks, what work is the word socialist doing in the description, other than recording the self image of the accumulating authority? The question is pointed, and the socialist reading’s replies to it, that the surplus is disposed by a public power for public ends and is therefore not capital in the defining sense, return the argument once more to the direction question, where the state capitalist reading must show that the ends served are accumulation’s own. On that terrain the reading is at its most and least comfortable: most, because the economy’s dynamism and its crises speak its language; least, because the episodes of discipline against major capitals require it to describe the collective capital as injuring its own members for the whole’s sake, which is coherent but begins to resemble the service hypothesis wearing a sterner expression.

Position four: a formation the old categories miss

The fourth position declines the choice among the inherited labels and holds that the formation is a distinct type, requiring categories of its own. It is the least unified of the four, since its proponents agree mainly on the inadequacy of the alternatives, but its strongest representatives share an argument: that the conjunction found in this economy, generalised market relations and wage labour, combined with a party state that owns the commanding heights, directs investment and stands in authority over capital, is not a transitional mixture on the way to one of the classical types but a stable and reproduced system with its own logic, which will be misunderstood for exactly as long as it is forced into vocabularies designed for other systems. The economist Branko Milanovic, in his comparative study of contemporary capitalisms, gave the position a widely cited form by describing the Chinese system as political capitalism: a formation in which a technically proficient and autonomous state deploys markets and a private sector as instruments of growth and power, while the rule of law remains subordinate to political decision, and in which the contradictions are not those of liberal capitalism but of the political type itself, above all the tension between the state’s autonomy and its need for the prosperity only markets deliver. Giovanni Arrighi, in his late work on China and the world economy, argued from a different tradition that the Chinese development might represent a market society of the kind Adam Smith envisaged rather than a capitalism of the kind that developed in the West, with accumulation subordinated to national development and the state retaining the social controls that Western capitalism dissolved, a reading its critics found romantic and its admirers found prophetic in roughly equal measure. Within Chinese scholarship itself, proposals for indigenous categories have multiplied across the reform decades, and the scholarly literature on the political economy of the system, including work on what some analysts call party state capitalism, treats the fusion of party, state and capital as the formation’s defining institution rather than as an anomaly to be explained away.

When is a new category a finding and when is it an evasion?

A new category is a finding when the old ones demonstrably fail: when applying them forces the analyst to describe central, permanent features of the system as exceptions, transitions or disguises, decade after decade, until the exceptions are the system.

It is an evasion when it functions to spare the analyst a verdict, relabelling the difficulty instead of analysing it, and multiplying terms until each formation has a private vocabulary and comparison becomes impossible. The fourth position therefore carries a burden the others do not: it must show not only that the old labels chafe but that its new one does analytical work, identifying the formation’s laws of motion, its characteristic crises and its likely trajectory better than the labels it replaces. Some of its versions meet that burden in part. None has yet displaced the older vocabulary in the wider literature, which continues to conduct the argument in the terms of the first three positions while conceding, in its careful moments, that the fourth may be right.

The New Left: a voice inside the debate’s home country

One strand of the controversy is easily missed from outside, because it is conducted within the formation’s own intellectual world and in its own vocabulary: the current known in the scholarship as the Chinese New Left. Its emergence in the intellectual debates of the nineteen nineties, as the social costs of market reform became impossible to ignore, gave the classification question a domestic form. The New Left critics, of whom the literary and intellectual historian Wang Hui is the most internationally read, argued that the reform process had generated inequalities and dislocations that the official vocabulary of stages could not honestly describe, and that the revolutionary heritage of the twentieth century, its commitments to equality and to the political standing of ordinary people, remained a resource for criticising the present rather than a relic to be discarded. Against them stood liberal intellectuals who held that the country’s problems flowed from the incompleteness of the market transition and the survival of the old system’s controls, so that the debate inside the country reproduced, in a displaced form, the debate outside it: what was the character of the formation, and was its remedy more market or less.

What does the New Left defend, and what does it criticise?

It defends the egalitarian and participatory promises of the revolutionary tradition, and it criticises the conversion of those promises into a legitimation for market outcomes the tradition would have condemned. It refuses both available comforts, declining the socialist label its own critique of inequality forbids.

Nor will it call the formation simply capitalist, because it insists that the state’s capacities and the heritage’s surviving institutions distinguish the case from any ordinary capitalism and might yet be turned to different ends. The New Left thus occupies, from inside, the ground of the fourth position, while sharing the second position’s diagnosis of the base. That combination, uncomfortable in every camp, is one of the reasons the current is treated as a distinct voice in the literature rather than as a footnote to the official doctrine it opposes or the liberalism it opposes equally.

For the purposes of this article the New Left matters for a further reason: it demonstrates that the criterion split is not an artefact of foreign observation. The same economy, described by scholars who share a language, a history and a political culture with the formation itself, generates the same structured disagreement, between those who weigh the base and those who weigh the command, those who stress the heritage and those who stress the market’s accomplished facts. A dispute that reproduces itself inside and outside the society, across opposed political commitments, is unlikely to be a product of propaganda in any direction. It is the signature of a genuinely hard case, in which the object under examination combines features that the available theories expected to find apart. Hard cases are where classifications earn their keep, and the Chinese case has been earning, for Marxist classification theory, the way a difficult patient earns for medicine: by refusing every diagnosis in ways that teach the diagnosticians what their categories had assumed without noticing.

The Soviet mirror

None of this is happening for the first time. The Chinese question is the second great performance of an argument whose first performance concerned the Soviet Union, and the parallel is exact enough to be instructive in detail. There too an economy of wage labour, money and accumulation in state owned industry was governed by a party claiming to build socialism. There too the disputants divided by criterion: those who held that nationalised property and planning settled the classification, those who held that the wage relation and the bureaucracy’s appropriation of the surplus settled it the other way, those who constructed intermediate categories, degenerated workers’ state, bureaucratic collectivism, state capitalism, to hold the case. And there too the argument was never settled by evidence, because the evidence was largely common property; it was settled, insofar as it ended at all, by the disappearance of its object. The series treatment of that earlier controversy is the article asking was the USSR socialist, and the reader who studies the two debates together will notice that the Chinese debate has inherited not only the Soviet debate’s positions but its argumentative moves, its canonical texts and even its insults, redeployed with local materials.

Why did the Soviet question produce the same split two generations earlier?

Because the formation presented the same conjunction: a production relation that the economic tests classified one way, and a political structure, public ownership of the heights under a party state claiming a transitional mission, that the political tests classified the other.

The split is therefore not a Chinese peculiarity or a Soviet one. It is what reliably happens when the tradition’s two families of criteria, developed for economies in which they pointed the same way, are applied to a formation in which they point apart. The recurrence is the strongest single evidence that the difficulty lies in the test battery rather than in the observers, and it is the reason this article treats the criterion split, rather than any verdict, as the finding worth carrying away from the Chinese case.

The parallel also carries a warning, and the warning is part of the record rather than a flourish. In the Soviet debate, the classification question absorbed energies that might have gone to questions the classification could not answer: how the formation actually worked, what its dynamics and rigidities were, where its breaking points lay. Analysts who had settled the label often behaved as though they had settled the analysis, and were repeatedly surprised by an object that declined to behave as its label promised. The Chinese debate shows the same absorption at work. Enormous ingenuity is spent on the adjective, while the mechanisms, the credit system’s behaviour, the local state’s fiscal incentives, the labour regime’s segmentation, the commanding sectors’ governance, reward study in their own right and repay it regardless of the adjective eventually chosen. This article has organised itself around criteria partly in homage to that lesson: a reader who finishes it knowing the six tests, the direction question and the four positions knows something usable about the formation, whereas a reader who finishes it merely licensed to pronounce a label knows a word.

What the four positions agree on

It is a service to the reader, amid the controversy, to inventory the common ground, because it is larger than the polemics suggest and because the inventory disciplines every camp. All four positions agree that wage labour is the ordinary condition of working life and that labour power is bought and sold in markets. All four agree that a private capitalist class exists and is substantial, that its members appropriate surplus and accumulate, and that its political standing is unlike that of any Western bourgeoisie. All four agree that the commanding sectors, land, banking, energy and the strategic industries, are publicly owned, and that the state directs investment substantially and disciplines capital demonstrably. All four agree that the direct producers do not govern the enterprises in which they work, in either sector. And all four agree, when pressed in their scholarly rather than their polemical modes, that the disagreement among them is about the weight of these findings, not about their existence. A controversy with that much common ground is not a controversy about China in the first instance. It is a controversy about Marxism: about what its central concept, a mode of production, is a concept of, and about whether the concept was built for a world in which economies came with their states attached in the classical way.

That last observation deserves to be dwelt on, because it explains the debate’s otherwise puzzling intensity among people with no stake in the country itself. The Chinese formation is the largest single test case that Marx’s theory of modes of production has ever confronted, by population, by output and by duration. If the classical criteria classify it cleanly, the theory is vindicated in its strong form. If they do not, the theory must either be revised, by admitting political criteria into the definition of a mode, or be supplemented, by conceding that formations can be durably hybrid in ways the classical sequence did not foresee. Every participant understands, at some level, that the adjective attached to one country is a proxy for the fate of the framework, and argues accordingly. The reader who grasps this will read the literature more shrewdly, discounting the passages where a theory is being defended under the flag of a country, and attending to the passages, which exist in all four positions at their best, where the country is allowed to talk back to the theory.

Burdens of proof: who has to show what

A fair way to organise a dispute that evidence alone has not settled is to assign the burdens explicitly, and the exercise clarifies the present one. The socialist reading bears the burden of the positive standard: it must explain why control by the producers, which the classical texts treat as the substance of the new society, may be replaced by ownership through the state and direction by the party without the concept changing its meaning, or it must concede that its socialism is a doctrine of ownership and command rather than of association. It bears a second burden about the stage: to specify, at least in principle, what would count as the primary stage ending, since a stage without exit conditions is indistinguishable from a permanent arrangement. The capitalist reading, for its part, must answer the sixth test: it must give an account of a state that disciplines capital in general, repeatedly and effectively, within a theory that describes the capitalist state as structurally dependent on capital’s confidence, and the account must be better than an analogy to wartime. A further burden concerns rule: to explain the political order that corresponds to its economic verdict, when the class it identifies as dominant does not govern and does not seek to. The third reading carries the burden of the class concept: to show that a bureaucracy which cannot bequeath or sell its holdings can nonetheless be a capitalist class in a sense that does analytical work, or to rebuild the concept honestly around control rather than title. And the fourth position bears the burden of fertility: to show that its new category generates findings the old ones missed, rather than merely registering discomfort with them.

Stated in that form, the dispute looks less like a brawl and more like a research programme with four open files, and that is in fact what the best of the literature resembles. Each burden corresponds to work actually being done somewhere in the scholarship: enterprise governance studies bearing on the first, state theory bearing on the second, the comparative study of bureaucracies bearing on the third, and the political economy of the formation’s specific mechanisms bearing on the fourth. A reader equipped with the burdens can also perform the most useful operation in this whole controversy, which is to notice when a participant answers a burden belonging to a different position than the one under attack. Defenders of the socialist reading, pressed on producers’ control, reply with the commanding heights; critics of the capitalist reading, pressed on the wage relation, reply with the discipline episodes. Each reply is a true fact addressed to a question nobody asked, and the exchange can continue indefinitely in that form, as in large part it has. The criteria table exists to prevent exactly that manoeuvre, by fixing in advance which fact answers which question.

Why this question, of all questions, will not close

Most classification disputes in social science die of indifference. This one is fed by three sources that show no sign of drying up. The first is scale: the formation in question encompasses a fifth of humanity and a share of world production large enough that its classification changes the meaning of the statistics everyone else cites, about how much of the world lives under which system, so that scholars with no China specialism find their own work quietly depending on the answer. The second is the stake the answer carries for the reputation of the two great labels themselves. For admirers of the formation’s development record, its classification as socialist transfers the record’s credit to socialism; for admirers who deplore its inequalities, the classification as capitalist quarantines the blame. For critics the transfers run in reverse. The question is thus a valve through which arguments about other things, the viability of planning, the record of markets, the fate of the left, are conducted at high pressure, and valves of that kind are not closed by monographs. The third source is the genuine theoretical difficulty documented throughout this article: the object combines, durably and at scale, features that the founding theory expected to exclude one another. A question that is simultaneously a proxy war and a real problem will outlast several generations of its participants, and the reader should approach the literature in that expectation, valuing the contributions that clarify the problem over those that merely win the round.

There is also a sociology to the controversy’s reproduction that the literature on the debate itself has begun to note. Positions on the Chinese classification function as badges within scholarly and political communities, signalling allegiances that extend far beyond the case: to a tradition, a journal, a party history, a judgement on the twentieth century. A scholar’s answer is therefore read, by those who know the field, as a compressed autobiography, and changing it costs more than changing an opinion about a tariff. This is said not in cynicism but in explanation of a datum that otherwise puzzles newcomers, the remarkable stability of the positions across decades in which the formation itself has changed enormously. The economy of the nineteen eighties, small scale, rural, tentative in its markets, and the economy of the platform giants and global supply chains are in many respects different objects, yet the four positions persist through the transformation with their personnel and their arguments largely intact, each finding in every phase the evidence its criterion instructs it to find. A test battery that returns the same verdict on a changing object may be detecting something deep and constant, the production relation beneath the flux, or it may be demonstrating the battery’s insensitivity, and the two possibilities are, characteristically, exactly what the camps dispute.

Markets: instrument, environment, or master

The doctrine’s central theoretical claim about markets is that they are instruments: neutral mechanisms of allocation that take their character from the system that wields them, as a knife takes its moral character from the hand. The claim has a distinguished lineage in the tradition’s debates about the New Economic Policy and about market socialism, and it is the premise on which the entire primary stage construction rests, since if markets carried capitalism inside them as a germ, their prolonged use would not build socialism but rebuild its opposite. Against the claim stands the argument, made by critics from several directions, that a market is not a tool but an environment: that generalised market relations generate their own imperatives, their own classes and their own criteria of success, which colonise the purposes of whoever deploys them, so that the hand ends by serving the knife. The history of the reform decades is the largest body of evidence ever assembled on this question, and it is read by the two sides as decisively settling it in opposite directions. The instrument reading points to the state’s retained command, its capacity to open and close markets, to license and to forbid, as proof that the mechanism remained subordinate to the wielder. The environment reading points to the transformation of the wielder: to a party that recruits entrepreneurs, a bureaucracy enmeshed in the growth it administers, a society whose values and hierarchies have been remade around wealth, as proof that the mechanism educated its user. Both readings are argued from the record in good faith by serious scholars, and the reader will notice that the dispute is the direction question again, wearing the market as its costume: to ask whether the market is instrument or environment is to ask whether the state directs the economy’s logic or is progressively directed by it.

A clarifying distinction, available in the literature and worth the reader’s attention, separates three claims that the polemic habitually fuses. The first claim is that markets can allocate: that prices coordinate dispersed activity better than commands for a wide class of goods. Almost nobody in the contemporary debate denies this, and the formation’s own doctrine asserts it. The second claim is that markets can be bounded: that a state with the commanding heights and the credit system can set the perimeter within which allocation occurs, deciding which things are commodities at all, land, labour’s protections, education, health, and which are not. This is the contested middle ground, and the evidence is genuinely mixed, since the perimeter has been drawn and redrawn, in both directions, across the reform period. The third holds that markets can be transcended in stages while being used: that a formation can employ the mechanism for a historical period and then, at a higher level of development, retire it without the mechanism having transformed the formation’s class structure beyond recall. This is the doctrine’s real wager, and it is the claim for which the evidence is necessarily incomplete, since the experiment is the one still running. Much sterile argument results from refuting the first claim when the third was asserted, or defending the second when the first was attacked. The criteria discipline applies here too: specify which claim, then ask what would count.

The plan as a surviving instrument

Popular description usually narrates the reform as the replacement of plan by market, and the narration is wrong in a way that matters for classification. What the record shows, as the institutional literature describes it, is the transformation of planning from a comprehensive system of command allocation into a layered apparatus of guidance, targets, approvals and strategic projects that coexists with market allocation and periodically overrides it. The five year plans persist as documents of intention and coordination; industrial policy designates sectors for promotion and for extinction; the investment approval system gives public authority a gate through which large commitments must pass; state owned enterprises in the commanding sectors receive objectives that mix commercial and strategic terms; and the party’s personnel system, appointing the managers of the largest firms and the governors of the financial institutions, binds the whole apparatus to a single centre of decision in a way that no merely regulatory state replicates. Scholars of the system disagree about the apparatus’s coherence, some describing a fragmented authoritarianism in which ministries, provinces and firms bargain the directives into new shapes, others describing a disciplined hierarchy capable of remarkable concerted action when the centre insists. For the classification question, the disagreement is tolerable, because both descriptions agree on the fact that distinguishes the case: the plan survives as an instrument of command over the economy’s direction, weakened and transformed from its Mao era form, but not abolished, and coexisting with markets in a combination that neither the classical planned economy nor the classical capitalist economy exhibits.

The survival matters because it bears on the fifth test’s interpretation. Direction of investment in this formation is not an occasional intervention into an otherwise self regulating market order, of the kind familiar from Western industrial policy. It is a standing institutional capacity, staffed, funded and legally entrenched, whose outputs, the catalogues, the approvals, the credit quotas, the sector campaigns, are part of the environment every investor must price in. The capitalist reading is of course aware of the apparatus and has its answer ready: that planning instruments are compatible with capitalism, as the experience of several East Asian developmental states demonstrated, and that the question remains the character of the relations the apparatus administers. The answer is fair, and it returns the argument to the conjunction problem: plan plus private heights is one thing, plan plus public heights plus discipline over capital is, the socialist reading insists, another. What the plan’s survival rules out is only the crudest version of the capitalist reading, in which the formation is described as a market economy with a communist flag. Whatever the formation is, it is a system in which a party state plans, directs and commands as a matter of institutional routine, and any label that causes a reader to forget that fact has failed descriptively before it begins analytically.

Competition among capitals: the compulsion examined

The third test’s finding, that production is oriented to accumulation, rests on the mechanism of competition, and the mechanism deserves a closer look because its operation in this formation has features the literature treats as diagnostic. Competition among Chinese capitals is, by every account, ferocious: in industry after industry, entry is rapid, margins are thin, price wars are endemic and the landscape is littered with the capacity that each investment wave overbuilt. Local governments, whose revenues and whose officials’ careers depend on growth within their jurisdictions, sponsor and protect their own champions, multiplying the competitors and intensifying the race, a phenomenon the literature discusses under the heading of local state competition. The result is an accumulation dynamic with a recognisably capitalist physiology: overproduction relative to solvent demand, downward pressure on wages and conditions at the competitive margin, a constant hunt for export markets to absorb the surplus capacity, and periodic shakeouts in which the weaker capitals are absorbed or extinguished. Analysts of the capitalist reading treat this physiology as close to a proof, since it is the physiology Marx described as the consequence of many capitals confronting one another, and it arises here not from any doctrinal commitment to markets but from the structure of decentralised accumulation itself.

The socialist reading’s response to the physiology is one of its more interesting moves, and it should be stated fairly. It concedes the phenomenon and disputes its level. Competition among capitals, on this response, is real but contained: it operates within sectors and regions, at the level of the individual enterprise, while, for the formation as a whole, the commanding heights, the credit system and the planning apparatus stand outside the competition and govern its terms. The analogy offered is to a league whose matches are fiercely contested while the league itself, its rules, its membership and its purposes, is administered by an authority the players do not control. The analogy’s force depends on whether the administrator is genuinely external to the game or is better understood as the game’s most successful player wearing a referee’s shirt, which is, once more, the direction question. What the exchange establishes, for present purposes, is that the third test’s finding is not in dispute between the serious positions: the compulsion to accumulate operates, visibly and consequentially, across the formation’s productive economy. The dispute is whether a compulsion that operates inside a commanded perimeter classifies the whole. A reader who sees that the same fact is common ground and contested moral at once has understood the controversy’s grammar, and will not be fooled by presentations, common in the polemical literature, in which one side’s fact is brandished as though the other side had never seen it.

The wage relation from the inside

Tests conducted from above, in terms of structures and sectors, can miss what a relation feels like as a daily practice, and the tradition has always insisted that the daily practice is where the relation lives. Consider, then, the wage relation as it is actually transacted in this formation, in the form the labour literature documents. A worker presents at a factory, a construction site, a logistics depot, a restaurant, and offers the only commodity the worker owns. An employer, private or state, purchases its use for a wage, directs its expenditure in detail during the purchased hours, and appropriates the product entire. The wage is set by a market in which the worker’s alternatives are other employers or return to a village whose contracted land cannot support a modern household, and it is bargained, where it is bargained at all, under conditions of pronounced asymmetry that the literature on the labour regime describes without much disagreement across its political divisions. Overtime is extensive and in many sectors structurally expected. Social insurance attaches to employment and registration in ways that leave the migrant workforce partially covered. Independent organisation of workers outside the official union federation is not permitted, and the federation itself is integrated into the party state rather than standing as an adversarial representative of the sellers of labour power. None of these features is unique to this formation; most have close analogues in the history of every industrialising capitalism, and several are milder than their analogues in the classical cases. Their cumulative significance for the first test is nonetheless plain: the lived relation between the Chinese worker and the purchaser of the worker’s labour power is the capital relation as the theory defines it, transacted daily by hundreds of millions of people, and any classification that cannot look that fact in the face has purchased its label at the price of the evidence.

The defenders of the socialist reading do not, in their serious form, deny the description. They contextualise it. The wage relation, they argue, is the inherited form of labour’s organisation in the primary stage, retained because the productive forces do not yet permit its supersession, and softened by the commanding structure within which it operates: by the public ownership that prevents the full subordination of the state to the employers’ interests, by the poverty reduction that the system’s growth has financed, by the absence of a hereditary propertied class entrenched in the state itself. Each element of the contextualisation is arguable, and the poverty reduction in particular is a fact of world historical scale that the literature across its divisions records, always in the directional terms this article’s protocol requires. But contextualisation answers a question about justification and trajectory, not the question the first test asks, which is what relation presently organises production. The tradition’s own method, applied to formations its analysts favoured, has always separated those questions, most famously when Marx examined the cooperative factories of his own century and found them valuable as demonstrations while noting that they reproduced, within themselves, the defects of the system they opposed. The wage relation in this formation is not a survival awaiting extinction on any schedule its defenders have specified. It is the operating system of the economy, and the classification debate is honest exactly to the extent that every position begins by saying so.

Surplus: where it goes and who decides

Follow the surplus, the classical instruction runs, and the formation will confess its character. The instruction is harder to execute than to quote, because in this economy the surplus is generated in one set of institutions and disposed of through several, and the classification dispute can be restated, with some precision, as a dispute about which part of the journey defines the whole. At the point of production, the appropriation is conventional: the enterprise, private or state owned, retains the difference between its revenues and its costs, of which the wage bill is the largest, and that difference is surplus value in the theory’s terms, extracted from the labour of the workforce. In the private sector the journey from there is also conventional: the surplus accrues to the owners, is consumed, reinvested, financialised or expatriated within the limits the capital controls set, and constitutes the material basis of the capitalist class identified by the second test. In the state sector the journey diverges. The surplus of the state enterprises is claimed, in varying proportions the literature describes, by the state as owner: through profit remittance, taxation and the direction of retained earnings toward state chosen investment, so that a substantial river of surplus flows into public hands and is allocated by political decision toward infrastructure, strategic industry, regional transfer and the other purposes of the development programme. The financial system extends the same pattern to the private economy’s savings, since the household deposits gathered by the state banks are lent under guidance that reflects public priorities, and the interest margin between deposit and lending rates operates, as several analysts have noted, as a quiet levy on households for the benefit of the favoured borrowers.

Here, then, is the formation’s surplus circuit in neutral description: extracted capitalistically at the point of production, across both sectors; appropriated privately in one sector and publicly in the other; and, across the economy as a whole, steered in significant part by a political authority that taxes, remits, directs credit and invests on a scale that makes it the largest single disposer of the social surplus. Each position fastens on the segment of the circuit its criterion privileges. The capitalist reading fastens on the extraction, and asks what difference the destination makes to the relation that produced the surplus. The socialist reading fastens on the disposition, and asks what difference the extraction’s form makes when its fruits are commanded publicly. That reading fastens on the unity of the circuit under a single accumulating authority. The fourth position fastens on the circuit’s very doubleness, its two destinations under one steering hand, as the signature of a formation that is neither. The reader who has followed the surplus has now seen the whole controversy in one diagram, and will understand why this article keeps returning to the same conclusion in different vocabularies: the dispute is real, it is structured, it is about criteria and weights, and the only dishonest way to conduct it is to exhibit one segment of the circuit as though it were the whole.

Self-description and its limits

One of the misreadings catalogued below is the idea that the question is settled by what the governing party calls the system, and it is worth a section of its own because the error is committed in both directions. The first direction treats the self description as authoritative: the party says the formation is socialist, the party governs the formation, therefore the formation is socialist. The second direction dismisses the self description as worthless, a propaganda artefact to be discounted to zero, and proceeds as though the doctrine’s claims contained no information at all. Both are failures of method. A self description is evidence, of a specific kind: it is evidence of how the formation’s directing authority understands itself, of the standards by which that authority wishes to be judged, and, less obviously, of the constraints under which it operates, since a doctrine publicly professed creates expectations its professors must manage and standards its critics, including its domestic critics, can invoke against it. The Chinese doctrine, as the earlier section recorded, is not a bare label but a structured theory with a stage construction, an account of markets and a specification of the commanding relations, and as a theory it can be examined, found coherent or incoherent, confirmed or embarrassed by the record, like any other theory in this article. What it cannot be is a verdict in its own case. Marxism’s method, applied to every other formation in history, treats the ruling ideas of an epoch as material to be explained rather than as explanations to be accepted, and the tradition’s analysts would be the first to insist that the method does not suspend itself when the ruling ideas are Marxist. The doctrine therefore enters this article as a position, the first of the four, argued at its strongest and answered at its weakest points, neither enthroned nor trashed. That is the treatment the brief for this subject prescribes, and it is also, not coincidentally, the treatment the doctrine’s own theorists claim to welcome, since a doctrine confident of its analysis should prefer examination to incense.

The transition claim examined: what a stage would have to be

The doctrine’s stage construction is the load bearing wall of the socialist reading, and it deserves the compliment of a serious examination. A stage, in the tradition’s theory of history, is not a waiting room. It is a determinate configuration of relations with its own logic and its own contradictions, which prepares, by its operation, the conditions of the configuration that succeeds it. The feudal stage, in the classical account, gestated the bourgeoisie and the market inside itself until the new relations burst the old shell. If the primary stage of socialism is a stage in that sense, it should be possible to specify the mechanism by which its operation generates the relations of the fuller socialism it precedes: which of its institutions are the embryo of the successor, which of its tendencies point beyond wage labour and accumulation, and by what signs an observer would know the gestation was advancing rather than the configuration merely persisting. That specification is what the doctrine’s critics, including critics who share its allegiances, have repeatedly requested, and the request has never been satisfactorily answered. The doctrine specifies the stage’s beginning, in productive forces still undeveloped, and its expected duration, long, and its permissible instruments, all of them, but the mechanism of exit, the process by which a formation of generalised wage labour and private accumulation transforms itself into an association of producers, is described only in the most general terms of development and eventual abundance.

The absence matters for classification in a precise way. A transition is a relation between two states, and a formation that can specify neither the destination’s arrival conditions nor the mechanism of approach is, for analytical purposes, a state rather than a transition, whatever its self description. The point is not verbal. The Soviet debate contained the identical structure: a formation declared transitional for seventy years, in which the transitional features, wage labour, money, accumulation, hierarchy of management, proved to be the permanent features, and in which the promised withering of the state and the commodity form receded at exactly the rate at which they were approached. Analysts who lived through that debate’s end draw the moral that a transition must be audited by its movement, not its manifesto: is the wage relation shrinking or entrenching, is the producers’ control growing or formalising, is the surplus’s disposition becoming more social in substance or only in rhetoric? Applied to the Chinese case, the audit returns the mixed and shifting answers the literature records, phases of market deepening and phases of reassertion, and the mixture is precisely what prevents the stage construction from settling the classification. A stage that can move in both directions is a description of the present with a hope attached, and hopes, however sincerely held by the authorities who hold them, are not criteria. This is the hardest of the burdens assigned earlier to the socialist reading, and it is only fair to record that the burden is not China’s alone: every actually existing socialism of the twentieth century carried it, and none discharged it, which is why the tradition’s critics came to suspect that the difficulty lay in the construction itself.

Integration into the world market: the external test

The six criteria are domestic, and a seventh consideration, external rather than domestic, presses on the debate from the side of the world economy. The Chinese formation is not an autarky conducting an experiment behind walls. It is the largest trading economy in the world, a central node of global supply chains, a host to enormous foreign investment and an investor on every continent, and its domestic accumulation is geared, at many points, to the demands and disciplines of the world market. The capitalist reading draws the obvious conclusion: a formation whose firms compete on world markets, whose workers produce for export under the same cost disciplines as any capitalist producer, whose currency and credit are entangled with global finance, is a component of the capitalist world economy, and its classification should follow its function in that whole. The argument has a distinguished ancestry in the tradition, since the analysis of imperialism always treated national formations as moments of a world system rather than as self contained specimens, and a specimen jar is exactly what the domestic criteria risk making of the case.

The replies available to the other positions are instructive in their variety. The socialist reading replies that integration is instrumental and managed: that the capital account remains administered, that foreign capital operates inside perimeters the state sets, that the formation engages the world market as a sovereign power using trade for development rather than as a subordinate economy shaped by it, and that the Soviet precedent, in which a socialist formation traded with the capitalist world without thereby becoming capitalist, establishes the distinction in principle. The fourth position replies that the integration is precisely what makes the formation historically novel: a party state commanding a domestic economy deeply fused with global capitalism, exporting through it, importing its technology and its disciplines, and yet retaining the instruments of command that classical formations surrendered to the world market’s logic, so that the old question of whether the world system permits national exceptions has been posed again in its sharpest form. The state capitalist reading, characteristically, treats the integration as its confirming evidence, since its original framework explained the Soviet bureaucracy’s accumulation drive by military and economic competition with rival powers, and a formation competing on world markets for technology, share and position is, on that framework, behaving exactly as a collective capital must. The external consideration thus discriminates less than the domestic ones, since every position can metabolise it, but it performs one service no reader should skip: it destroys the picture, still common in popular treatment, of the Chinese economy as a sealed experiment whose classification is a domestic affair. The formation, whatever its correct label, exists as a working part of the world economy, and the labels, when they are finally attached, will describe a component of a system and not a world of its own.

The party inside the firm

One institution of the formation has no real precedent in the history of capitalism and deserves examination on its own, because it sits at the exact junction of the economic and political criteria: the organisation of the ruling party inside the enterprise. Party branches exist throughout the state sector as a matter of course, and across the reform decades their establishment within private and foreign invested firms has been promoted as organisational policy, so that the largest private companies maintain party committees alongside their boards, and the charters of listed firms have been amended, in cases the literature discusses, to give the party organisation a formal role in corporate governance. The institution’s functions vary from the ceremonial to the consequential, and the scholarship disputes its weight, some analysts treating it as a channel of surveillance and ideological presence with limited effect on commercial decisions, others as a genuine second hierarchy inside the firm, capable of bearing on appointments, investments and strategy, and all agreeing that its existence is a standing reminder to every management that the firm operates inside a political order with its own purposes. For the classification debate, the institution is a Rorschach. To the socialist reading it is the organisational form of the commanding heights at the point of production, the mechanism by which public purpose enters the firm’s counsels. To the capitalist reading it is a tax on capital’s autonomy that capital pays for its licence, comparable in function, if not in form, to the accommodations firms make with powerful states everywhere. To the fourth position it is the signature institution of the hybrid, the place where the fusion of party, state and capital stops being a metaphor.

What can be said without taking sides is that the institution complicates the classical picture of the bourgeoisie’s relation to production in a way the literature has not fully digested. In the classical analysis, the capitalist’s command over the firm is the private face of the capital relation, and the state’s interventions arrive from outside it. A firm containing, as a matter of constitutional routine, an organisation answerable to a hierarchy external to the firm and committed to purposes beyond the firm’s accumulation is a firm in which the capital relation operates under a resident supervision. Whether the supervision is a leash, a partnership or a fiction is the direction question at the scale of the enterprise, and it is being answered, in practice, firm by firm and decision by decision, in a record that future scholarship will mine. The reader should note the pattern this section shares with its predecessors: at every level of the formation, from the world market to the workshop, the same structure recurs, a capitalist mechanism operating inside a political command that claims authority over it, and the same question recurs with it, whether the command directs the mechanism or the mechanism has quietly become the command’s own way of life. A classification that cannot be settled at any single level because the same undecided relation repeats at every level is not a failure of the analysts. It is information about the object.

The commanding heights in perspective: a retreat that stayed

The fourth test invoked Lenin’s metaphor of the commanding heights, and the metaphor’s own history carries an irony the debate rarely pauses over. The heights doctrine was formulated for a retreat: the New Economic Policy conceded the lowlands of the economy, peasant agriculture, small trade, small manufacture, to market relations, and justified the concession by the retention of the heights, from which the state would command the whole and, in time, advance again. The advance, in the Soviet case, took the form of the heights being used to abolish the lowlands’ market relations altogether in the collectivisation and the plans. In the Chinese case the geometry has been inverted across a longer duration. The market lowlands were not conceded in retreat but constructed in advance, deliberately, as the engine of development, and the heights were retained not as the platform for abolishing them but as the instrument for governing them, with no announced schedule on which the relation between heights and lowlands is to be transformed. A metaphor built for a temporary disposition has thus become the description of a permanent architecture, and the architecture’s permanence is one of the facts the fourth position rests on. Systems reveal their character partly by which of their features prove temporary and which prove load bearing, and by that test the Chinese formation’s load bearing features are the conjunction itself: market lowlands of extraordinary dynamism, commanded heights of extraordinary concentration, and a party whose authority joins them.

The perspective also disciplines a temptation in the socialist reading, which speaks of the heights as though holding them were the same as using them for the transition the doctrine projects. Holding is a fact; using is a pattern; and the pattern, as the direction sections argued, is exactly what is contested. The heights have been used, uncontroversially, for development: for the infrastructure, the industrial capacity, the strategic reserves and the crisis firepower that the record displays. They have been used, also uncontroversially, for control: to keep the commanding decisions of the economy inside a political hierarchy. Whether they have been used for transition, in the doctrine’s own sense of movement toward a society of associated producers, is the question on which the record is thinnest, since the institutional embryos of such a society, workplaces under their producers’ government, a surplus disposed by the associated producers themselves, are not among the heights’ constructions. The critic of the doctrine presses the point home: a retreat that stayed, governed by heights that command everything except a direction of travel toward the doctrine’s own destination, begins to look less like a stage of the journey than like a settlement at the journey’s most defensible point. The defender replies that the journey’s timetable was always generational and that the heights are the precondition of any future advance, not its substitute. Both statements can be true of the same architecture, which is why the architecture’s classification remains, at the end of the longest analysis, a matter of which criterion the analyst refuses to surrender.

What each position predicts, and how the predictions have fared

A position that predicts nothing is a label in search of an argument, and one way to grade the four positions, fairer than trading facts, is to ask what each led its holders to expect and how the expectations have worn. The capitalist reading, in its restorationist form, predicted convergence: that the logic of the market, once generalised, would press the formation toward the institutional shape of other capitalisms, weakening the party’s economic command, privatising the heights by degrees and generating, from the new propertied class, pressures for political forms that secure property against the state. That prediction has fared badly in its strong form. The heights have not been privatised, the party’s command has been reasserted in period after period, and the propertied class has shown no disposition to organise for political power, preferring accommodation and, at the margin, exit. Defenders of the reading reply that convergence was a vulgarisation of it, that the theory predicts the economy’s dynamics, its crises and its class relations, not a constitutional timetable, and on the dynamics their score is considerably better: the property cycles, the overaccumulation, the labour regime and the inequality structure have behaved as the reading’s framework leads one to expect. The socialist reading predicted that command of the heights would deliver development with a character distinguishable from capitalist development: sustained by public investment, directed to national purposes, and marked by the reduction of poverty as a state objective rather than a market residue. On the development facts, directionally described, its score is strong; on the distinguishing character, weaker, since the inequality, the labour regime and the accumulation dynamics that accompany the development are those its own criteria would once have identified as the marks of the opposite system. The state capitalist reading predicted that the formation would behave under stress as a competing capital behaves: defending its accumulation, disciplining its workforce, projecting its surplus outward. Its score is respectable on the external behaviour and thinner on the internal, where the state’s periodic sacrifices of accumulation to stability and social purpose require the reading’s characteristic translation work. The fourth position predicted only that the formation would persist in its hybridity and confound the others’ expectations in rotation, and on that modest prediction it has scored best of all, which is either its vindication or the demonstration that it is less a position than a refusal to have one, depending on the reader’s criterion for what a position is. The exercise does not settle the classification. It does something more useful for a newcomer: it shows that the four positions are live theories with different exposed surfaces, not four flags planted on the same hill.

The scholarly literatures and what each can see

The debate is conducted across several scholarly literatures that rarely cite one another, and part of the controversy’s sterility is a failure of translation among them. The Marxist theoretical literature, in which the classification question is at home, works with the criteria this article has used and is strong on the logic of the positions, but it often handles the Chinese material at a level of generality that specialists find weightless, reasoning about the formation from its categories with occasional illustrative facts. The China studies literature, by contrast, commands the institutional detail, the policy process, the local variation and the documentary record, and is correspondingly strong on mechanism, but it frequently treats the classification question as a distraction or a slogan, and its findings therefore accumulate without ever being brought to bear on the question they collectively answer. The political economy and development literatures stand between, strong on the comparative frame, the developmental state, the varieties of capitalism, and capable of placing the formation in a field of comparable cases, at the price of a vocabulary in which the Marxist question cannot even be posed, since their categories classify by policy regime rather than by production relation. Each literature can therefore see something the others miss, and the reader who wants the whole elephant must read across them, translating as they go: the theorist’s criterion into the specialist’s institution, the specialist’s mechanism into the comparativist’s pattern. The four positions map, roughly and with many exceptions, onto these literatures’ characteristic emphases, the capitalist and state capitalist readings drawing strength from the theoretical tradition’s criteria, the socialist reading from the doctrine’s own theoretical apparatus, the fourth position from the specialists’ and comparativists’ accumulating sense that the case is sui generis. A classification dispute that is also a dispute among disciplines about what kind of knowledge counts will not be settled inside any one of them, and the most promising work in the field, on the evidence of its reception across the boundaries, is the work that knows it.

Reading the dispute as a map of Marxism itself

There is a way of reading this controversy that treats it not as an obstacle to understanding but as an instrument of it: as a map, drawn inadvertently by its participants, of the Marxist tradition’s own internal divisions at the present stage of its history. Each position corresponds to a living current within the tradition, with its own ancestry and its own centre of gravity. The capitalist reading descends from the tradition’s classical orthodoxy about definitions, and its holders are typically those for whom the theory’s scientific character depends on holding its concepts to their strictest construction, so that a mode of production means what Capital meant by it and formations are classified without diplomatic adjustment. Genealogically, the state capitalist reading descends from the revolutionary opposition traditions of the twentieth century, for whom the great question was always the character of the states that ruled in Marxism’s name, and who bring to the Chinese case a set of instruments forged on the Soviet one and a principled refusal to take any ruling party’s self description at face value. The socialist reading descends, through the doctrine itself, from the tradition of the governing parties, for whom theory is a guide to a construction project measured in generations, and who experience the definitional strictness of the first current as a scholasticism that would have classified every real transition out of existence. The fourth position descends from the academic revision of the tradition, the generations of scholars formed after the Soviet collapse, for whom the classical sequence of modes is a research programme with known anomalies rather than a catechism, and who are readier than any of the others to let a recalcitrant case amend the theory.

Seen in that light, the debate’s intractability is overdetermined, because the participants are not only disagreeing about a country. They are re enacting, on the largest available stage, the tradition’s unresolved argument about what kind of theory Marxism is: a science of modes of production with strict criteria and a determinate sequence, or a method of historical analysis whose categories are instruments to be adapted to each object, or a doctrine of transition administered by its political bearers. The Chinese formation is unlikely to settle that argument, since the argument precedes it and will survive it, but the formation has done the argument one service that its participants rarely acknowledge: it has forced each current to state its criteria in public, under pressure from a case that punishes vagueness, and the statements, collected in this article’s criteria table and burden assignments, are the clearest available record of where the tradition’s theory of classification now stands. A student who masters the Chinese debate has, without necessarily intending it, mastered the contemporary state of Marxist theory’s central concept, which is one reason the subject rewards the attention this series gives it, and why the exam guides treat the question as a fixture rather than a fashion.

The household, the village and the boundary of the wage relation

The first test’s verdict, that labour power is generally a commodity, contains a qualification that the specialists insist on and that a complete account must register: the boundary of waged work in this formation runs through the household in a way that has no exact parallel in the classical cases. The migrant worker who staffs the factories and building sites is typically a member of a rural household holding contracted rights in collective land, and the household, not the individual, is the unit that allocates labour between the plot and the wage. Part of the family’s subsistence, its housing, its old age security and its children’s schooling base, is carried by the village side of the arrangement, while the cash income that raises the family’s standard and funds its ambitions is earned on the urban side. The literature has a long argument about what this means. One influential line, associated with scholars of the agrarian question, holds that the arrangement is a form of semi proletarianisation: the worker is not fully parted from productive property, so the wage can therefore fall below the full cost of reproducing labour power, since the village carries part of that cost, and capital receives the difference as a subsidy from the peasant economy, a mechanism with precedents in the labour reserves of colonial economies. The opposing line holds that the contracted plot is too small, too insecure in its returns and too dependent on family labour that has already left, to constitute a genuine alternative to the wage, so that the separation is effective and the village tie functions as a welfare residue and a retirement plan, not as productive property in any operative sense.

For the classification question, the argument matters less for its verdict than for its location. It is an argument about the completeness of the first test’s satisfaction, conducted entirely within the terms the test supplies, and both sides of it concede the test’s dominance: nobody in this literature claims that the village economy organises the formation, or that the typical worker could decline the wage relation and live from the plot at the standard the society now expects. What is claimed, at most, is that the separation of the producers from the means of production, which the classical proletarian embodied completely, is here partial and mediated by the household, and that the partiality has consequences, for the wage level, for the labour regime’s stability, for the politics of the countryside, that a complete account of the formation must carry. The reader should file the point where it belongs: as a refinement of the first test, not a refutation of it, and as a reminder that the criteria, honestly applied, return not only verdicts but textures. The same discipline applies to the formation’s other boundary cases, the vast informal economy of street trade and casual services, the surviving collective enterprises of some villages, the household workshops of the coastal countryside. Each is a relation that is not the capital relation, persisting inside a formation the capital relation dominates, and the theory has a word for their status: subordinate. Presence is not dominance, in this direction any more than in the other, and counting survivals on either side does not advance the criterion split.

Comparisons that mislead and comparisons that teach

Because the formation is hard to classify, it is constantly being classified by analogy, and the analogies deserve scrutiny, since each smuggles in a verdict. The comparison with the Soviet Union has been treated already: it teaches the most, because the conjunction of features is genuinely parallel, and misleads only when the later history of the Soviet case, its stagnation and collapse, is imported as a prophecy rather than used as a warning about what to examine. The comparison with the East Asian developmental states, Japan in its high growth decades, Korea and Taiwan under their authoritarian modernisers, teaches something real about the instruments: the directed credit, the industrial policy, the disciplined labour, the export drive are a recognisable regional repertoire, and the Chinese state deploys the repertoire at continental scale. It misleads at the level of the heights, since the developmental states directed economies whose commanding sectors were privately owned and whose parties claimed no transitional mission beyond development itself, and the analogy therefore dissolves precisely the features, public land, public banking, the doctrine of stages, that make the Chinese case a problem for classification rather than a large instance of a known type. The comparison with the social market economies of postwar Europe misleads almost entirely, since those formations combined private heights with democratic states and welfare settlements, sharing with the Chinese case little beyond the presence of both markets and a public sector, which is a resemblance at the level of ingredients rather than of structure. The comparison with the New Economic Policy, by contrast, teaches more than its brevity suggests, because it is the tradition’s own precedent for a formation avowedly between systems, and its history poses the question the Chinese doctrine has still to answer: whether a mixed formation under a communist party is a bridge or a residence, a question the NEP’s fate answered one way and the Chinese formation’s duration is answering, so far, the other.

The comparative exercise has a discipline of its own that the reader can apply to every new analogy the debate produces. Ask what the comparison is a comparison of: of instruments, of structures, of trajectories or of essences. Instruments travel and prove little. Structures classify and prove much, provided the comparison holds at the level of relations rather than of appearances. Trajectories prophesy and should be distrusted in proportion to their confidence. Essences merely rename the problem. The Chinese formation will continue to attract analogies because it is large, successful by several measures its rivals care about, and theoretically indigestible, and each analogy will arrive with a classification folded inside it. Unfolding the classification and examining it against the criteria, rather than against the analogy’s rhetorical warmth, is the skill this whole article exists to teach, and it transfers: the same discipline that protects a reader in the Chinese debate protects them in every debate where a label is doing the work of an analysis.

The formation under stress: crisis behaviour as evidence

Classifications are tested in crises, when a system’s priorities are revealed by what it protects first and what it sacrifices without hesitation. The Chinese formation has passed through several episodes of severe stress in the reform era, regional financial turbulence, a global financial crisis transmitted through collapsing export demand, recurrent property and debt strains generated by its own growth model, and the literature on its behaviour in those episodes is one of the more discriminating bodies of evidence in the file, because crisis behaviour is harder to fake than doctrine. The pattern the literature describes has a consistent signature. When stress arrives, the state’s instruments move first and fastest: the state banks expand credit on instruction, state enterprises are directed to sustain investment and employment, administrative guidance replaces market signals in the affected sectors, and the commanding heights are used, openly and at scale, as the economy’s stabiliser of last resort. Private capital is not consulted about the strategy; it is informed of it, and its role in the recovery is assigned. Whatever the long run costs of the method, and the literature debates them vigorously, in the form of debt accumulated in the state sector and in local government financing vehicles, the short run fact is that the formation possesses, and uses, a capacity for concerted economic command that no comparably sized capitalist economy has matched in the same episodes, where stimulus had to be negotiated through legislatures, central banks constrained by their mandates, and banking systems that were themselves the casualties.

Each position metabolises the crisis evidence in its characteristic way, and watching them do it is an education in the criterion split. The socialist reading exhibits the episodes as the heights justifying their retention: this, it says, is what public ownership of banking and industry is for, and a capitalist formation would have paid for its stability with unemployment and collapse on a scale the Chinese system avoided by command. The capitalist reading replies that the stabilisation was purchased by methods available to any state with a compliant banking system, that its costs were deferred rather than avoided, accumulating as debt inside the state sector where they will eventually present themselves, and that the protection of accumulation by extraordinary means is the oldest function of the capitalist state in crisis, from the lender of last resort onward. The state capitalist reading finds in the episodes its purest confirmation: the collective capital rescuing itself, socialising its losses through its own banking arm and disciplining its members into the recovery plan. The fourth position notes that the capacity itself, whoever it serves, is the formation’s distinguishing asset, and that a system which can suspend its market logic by administrative decision, at scale and at speed, and then restore it, is exhibiting a duality that neither classical type possesses in the same degree. The reader is not asked to choose among these metabolisms here. The reader is asked to notice that the crisis evidence, like every other body of evidence in this article, is common property that the criteria then divide, and that any participant who presents an episode of crisis command as a self interpreting proof has mistaken the controversy’s nature for the last time this article will need to correct it.

Terminological on the surface, empirical underneath

It is now possible to give a precise answer to the question the seeded debate always asks at this point: is the dispute terminological or empirical? The answer is that it is terminological at the level of the label and empirical at the level of the questions the label conceals, and that confusing the two levels is the master error of the popular controversy. At the level of the word itself, the dispute is indeed about words: about which criteria the word socialist shall be governed by, and no fact about the Chinese economy, present or future, can settle a question of governance for a word, because the parties have stipulated different governances and each stipulation is internally consistent. A disputant who demands that the other side produce the fact that settles the label is demanding something the structure of the disagreement makes impossible, and the demand’s impossibility explains the controversy’s peculiar atmosphere of mutual incredulity, in which each side experiences the other as either stupid or corrupt for failing to see what is plainly there. What is plainly there differs by stipulation. Underneath the label, however, lie the empirical questions this article has separated out, and they are as factual as any in social science: the pattern of the state’s interventions against the two hypotheses of direction and service; the completeness of the producers’ separation from the means of production at the household boundary; the behaviour of the commanding sectors under stress; the trajectory of the producers’ control, or its absence, across the formation’s development. On those questions evidence accumulates, positions can be embarrassed, and scholars do in fact change their minds at the margins, which is why the scholarly debate, unlike its popular shadow, is alive.

Which parts of this dispute would further facts leave untouched?

The choice of criteria themselves. Facts can establish that labour power is a commodity, that the heights are publicly held, that capital is disciplined and that producers do not govern their enterprises, and the parties in this article already agree on all of it.

What no further fact can establish is the exchange rate among the criteria: whether the wage relation outweighs the heights, whether command outweighs the accumulation dynamic, whether the absence of producers’ control is decisive or dispensable. That exchange rate is fixed by theoretical commitment, by what each analyst holds a mode of production essentially to be, and it will be revised, if it is revised, by theoretical argument about the concept and its history, not by the next monograph on the Chinese economy. Recognising which floor of the dispute one is standing on, the factual or the conceptual, is the beginning of competence in it.

There is a practical corollary for readers who meet this question in argument, in print or in person. When the dispute is at the label level, the productive move is to force the criteria into the open: to ask the confident classifier which test they are applying, and whether they would accept the same test applied to a formation they judge differently. The move dissolves most confident classifications within a minute, because most are criterion free, assembled from impressions, headlines and allegiance. When the argument turns empirical, the productive move is the opposite: to refuse the label entirely for the duration, and to argue the pattern of cases, the direction evidence, the surplus circuit, the crisis record, in the vocabulary of mechanisms. The two moves together constitute the method this article has tried to model, and they are worth more, in any examination room or editorial meeting where the question arises, than the most elegantly defended verdict. A verdict can be memorised and repeated. A method can be used on the next formation that refuses to fit, and the century promises several.

Five misreadings that keep the argument sterile

The brief for this subject lists five misreadings that recur in the coverage, and they are collected here with the corrections stated compactly, because a reader who can recognise the five on sight is vaccinated against most of what passes for debate on the question.

State ownership alone settles it

It does not, because ownership is a juridical form whose content depends on the relations it organises. State property has housed formations the tradition classified as capitalist, as transitional and as socialist, and the Soviet debate exhausted the arguments for treating the form as self interpreting. The question is never who holds the title in the abstract, but what relation the holding establishes between the producers, the surplus and the authority that directs both, which is why the fourth test, as framed here, examines the commanding sectors’ function in the whole and not a celebration of their existence.

Markets alone settle it

They do not, because markets are older than capitalism and compatible, as mechanisms of allocation, with several modes of production, a point the tradition’s own history, from the NEP debates to the market socialism literature, establishes beyond serious dispute. What markets cannot be combined with indefinitely, on the critics’ argument, is the claim that they leave the deploying system unchanged, and that argument, the environment argument of the earlier section, is a serious one. But it is an argument about dynamics and direction, not a classification by presence, and the presence of markets, even generalised markets, settles the question only when combined with the findings about labour power and accumulation that do the real work of the first and third tests.

The government’s word settles it

It does not, for the reasons the section on self description gave: a doctrine is a position in the debate, entitled to a hearing at its strongest, and disqualified, like every other position, from judging its own case. The correction cuts against both the credulity that quotes the doctrine as proof and the knowingness that discounts it as mere propaganda. A doctrine with a stage theory, an inventory of the commanding relations and a forty year record of institutional construction is evidence of a high order about the formation’s directing intelligence. It is not evidence that the intelligence’s self classification is correct, because self classifications, in the Marxist method, are among the things a formation produces that themselves require explanation.

Marxists agree about it

They do not, and the pretence that they do, common in coverage that quotes one Marxist as the voice of the tradition, conceals the article’s central finding. The disagreement among Marxists about this formation is no failure of nerve or of method in the tradition, still less a scandal to be hushed. It is the predictable result of applying a two family test battery to an object on which the families diverge, and it reproduces, with remarkable fidelity, the disagreement the same tradition had about the Soviet formation. A reader who knows that Marxists divide four ways on the question, along lines that map the tradition’s own currents, knows more than a reader who has been given any one of the four answers as the Marxist view.

The economic and political questions are one question

They are not, and their fusion is the misreading from which the other four draw their strength. The economic question, what relations organise production, extraction and accumulation, has the substantially settled answers the first three tests record. The political question, what authority commands the formation and toward what ends, has the genuinely open answer the direction problem poses. Fuse them, and the settled answers are dragged into the open question’s uncertainty, or the open answer is borrowed from the settled ones, according to taste. Separate them, and the debate becomes what this article has tried to make it: a short list of agreed findings, a table of criteria with their weights exposed, four positions with their burdens assigned, and one real question, direction or service, on which evidence can still bite. That separation is the criterion split’s practical gift, and it is available to any reader willing to do the unfashionable work of defining terms before defending them.

The development record as evidence, and its limits

No body of fact is quoted more often in the popular version of this debate, by the formation’s defenders, than its development record, and the record deserves a section that neither inflates nor belittles it. In the directional vocabulary the article’s protocol prescribes, the record is as follows. Across the reform decades the formation achieved the fastest sustained growth of a major economy in the modern record, industrialised at a scale that made it the world’s principal manufacturing power, urbanised a population counted in the hundreds of millions, and reduced extreme poverty from the condition of the great majority of its population to a marginal residue, a reduction that constitutes, in the global statistics of poverty, the largest single national contribution to the improvement of human material welfare in the period. Infrastructure, life expectancy, literacy and technical capacity were transformed alongside. These are the facts, stated without the figures the protocol forbids, and they are not in dispute among serious scholars of any position. The dispute is about their bearing, and the bearing is narrower than the quoting suggests. Development is a fact about an economy’s motion, not about its mode. Capitalist formations have developed, at their historical best, with comparable speed and comparable poverty reduction, as the East Asian cases show; formations claiming socialism have stagnated for decades, as the late Soviet case shows. A development record therefore cannot classify the formation that produced it, and the inference from success to socialism, or from success to capitalism, is a non sequitur in both directions.

What the record does bear on, powerfully, is the evaluation that surrounds the classification and constantly contaminates it. The formation’s defenders are entitled to point out that the system being classified, whatever its label, delivered material improvement to more people, faster, than any system its critics were administering in the same decades, and that a classification exercise which treats this as irrelevant to the argument’s stakes understands neither why the argument matters nor why the formation’s own population, in the survey evidence the literature discusses, largely regards the arrangement as legitimate. The critics are entitled to reply that development was purchased with the labour regime described earlier, with inequalities of wealth and condition that grew from negligible to comparable with the most unequal capitalist economies, and with the subordination of every other value to the growth imperative for two generations, so that the record is as much an indictment, by the standards of the doctrine in whose name it was compiled, as a vindication. Both entitlements are real, and neither touches the criteria. The reader who keeps the classification and the evaluation in separate compartments, as this article has tried to do throughout, will find the development record settling into its proper place: it is the reason the question is asked with such urgency, the reason the answer is fought over by people who care about more than taxonomy, and it is not, in itself, an answer to the question at all.

Inequality and the reproduction of the class structure

A formation’s class structure is not a snapshot but a process of reproduction, and examining how the Chinese class structure reproduces itself across generations adds a dimension the static tests miss. The literature describes the mechanisms in terms that will be familiar to any student of capitalist societies, operating alongside mechanisms that will not. On the familiar side: wealth converts into educational advantage through the market in tutoring, schooling access and metropolitan residence; educational advantage converts into position in the professional and managerial strata; property, above all urban housing accumulated during the decades of appreciation, transmits advantage across generations in the classic manner; and the children of the new propertied and professional classes are consolidating, in the second generation, a stratum whose life chances differ from those of the migrant workforce as sharply as in any capitalist society. Sociologists working inside the country have documented the hardening of these mechanisms and debated, in their own journals, whether the society’s mobility is declining as the structure settles. On the unfamiliar side stand the mechanisms that interrupt reproduction: the household registration system, which sorts life chances by birthplace in a manner no market society replicates exactly; the party’s personnel authority over the commanding appointments, which makes the summit of the economic structure a political allocation rather than a property inheritance; and the periodic campaigns of discipline, which have demonstrated that the largest fortunes exist without the security that elsewhere defines their class. The class structure therefore reproduces itself through a double machinery, part market and part political, and the doubleness is once again the formation’s signature at a new level.

For the classification, the reproduction evidence cuts in the now familiar pattern. The capitalist reading takes the market machinery of reproduction as the deep fact: a society in which advantage is heritable through property and education, in which a propertied class is consolidating across generations, is reproducing a capitalist class structure whatever the political interruptions at its summit, and the interruptions themselves, on this reading, are the growing pains of a bourgeois order whose state has not yet been fully subordinated to it, or, in the reading’s subtler form, the permanent technology by which this particular bourgeois order is kept politically harmless. The socialist reading takes the political machinery as the deep fact: a class whose reproduction can be interrupted at will by an authority outside it, whose summit positions are allocated politically, whose largest members can be unmade by decision, is not a ruling class in formation but a licensed stratum inside someone else’s structure, and the licensing authority’s continued willingness to interrupt is the commanding heights operating at the level of class formation itself. The fourth position, predictably, takes the doubleness as the finding: a class structure reproduced by two machineries obeying two logics is the social anatomy of the hybrid, and the interesting question is not which machinery is real, since both demonstrably are, but which is gaining on the other across the decades, a question the literature answers in both directions depending on the decade examined. The reader will by now be able to predict each camp’s move before it is made, which is the sign that the controversy’s grammar has been learned, and the grammar, rather than any verdict, is what this article exists to teach.

Inside the state sector: a different relation, or the same one?

The state sector employs a large share of the urban workforce and contains the commanding industries, and its internal relations are therefore a natural place to look for a relation that differs from the capital relation, if one exists anywhere in the formation. The examination, as the enterprise literature conducts it, returns a layered answer. At the level of the employment contract, the state firm hires labour power for a wage in the same labour market as the private firm, competes for workers on terms the market influences, and dismisses, restructures and relocates under pressures that include commercial performance. At the level of governance, the state firm differs: its senior managers are appointed through the party’s personnel system, often rotating between enterprise, ministry and province in a single career; its objectives are set in a mixture of commercial targets and strategic assignments; its access to credit runs through the state banks on terms that reflect policy as well as risk; and its surplus is disposed under the owner’s direction rather than the market’s. At the level of the workforce’s standing, the older literature recorded securities and statuses, the remnants of the iron rice bowl, that the reform decades largely commercialised away, leaving the state worker, in the contemporary descriptions, in a position closer to that of the private worker than the founding generation’s propaganda or its critics’ nostalgia suggests. The layered answer is thus that the state sector operates the wage relation inside a governance structure that is not the capital relation’s usual political form, and whether that combination amounts to a different relation or to the same relation differently administered is, once more and within the single firm, the criterion split in miniature.

The question has a theoretical pedigree that predates the Chinese case and illuminates it. The Yugoslav experiment with self management posed it in its purest form: enterprises owned socially, governed by their workers’ councils, trading in markets, and the tradition debated for decades whether the combination was socialism’s embryo or a group property formation reproducing capitalist dynamics through collective firms. The Chinese state firm is not self managed; its governance runs downward from the party state, not upward from the workforce, and the comparison therefore instructs by contrast. Where the Yugoslav firm at least posed the question of producers’ control institutionally, the Chinese state firm answers it in advance, in the negative, by its appointment structure, which is why the positive standard section of this article recorded its negative finding for both sectors alike. What the state firm offers the classification debate is not an alternative relation but a demonstration of how much of the capital relation’s operation, hiring, wage setting, surplus extraction, competitive discipline, is compatible with ownership and governance by a party state. The demonstration is the state capitalist reading’s favourite exhibit and the socialist reading’s standing embarrassment, and the embarrassment is instructive: a reading that rests socialism on the state sector must explain why the sector’s internal life is so readily described in the vocabulary of the system it is supposed to transcend, and the explanations offered, transitional necessity, the low development of the productive forces, the encirclement of the world market, are the primary stage theory’s general answers applied to the particular case, with the strengths and the exit problem already examined.

The regional mirror: the debate replicates in Vietnam

A useful control case exists, and the debate’s literature increasingly uses it as one. The Vietnamese formation undertook, a decade after the Chinese reforms began, a renovation programme of the same family: market allocation generalised, private enterprise licensed and then embraced, foreign investment courted, the commanding sectors and the land retained in public hands, the whole administered by a communist party whose doctrine describes the project as a socialist oriented market economy in a period of transition. The parallel is close enough that the two cases are routinely treated as one type in the comparative literature, and the classification debate has replicated itself in the Vietnamese case with an almost experimental fidelity: the same four positions, the same criteria, the same burdens, the same stalemate, conducted in a smaller literature with fewer geopolitical overtones. The replication is valuable evidence about the debate itself. It shows that the split over criteria is not generated by the peculiarities of the Chinese case, its scale, its antiquity in the argument, its geopolitical charge, since a case with none of those properties produces the identical structure of disagreement. What generates the split is the conjunction of features the two formations share: generalised wage labour and accumulation under a party state holding the commanding heights and professing a transition. Wherever that conjunction appears, the tradition’s two criterion families will divide over it, and the debate will reassemble itself with local personnel. A reader who has grasped the Chinese case therefore possesses the Vietnamese one without further study, and possesses, more importantly, the template for any future formation built on the same conjunction, which the comparative literature regards as a durable invention of the late twentieth century rather than an episode: the market economy under communist party command is a form that has now existed, in one country or another, for two generations, and the classical theory will have to make its peace with the form, by classification, by revision or by new categories, sooner or later.

The control case also sharpens the fourth position’s claim in a way worth recording. A hybrid that appears once might be a transition photographed mid passage. A hybrid that appears twice, in countries of different scale, culture and history, and persists in both across decades of transformation, begins to look like a type: a stable way of organising a modern economy that the classical sequence did not anticipate, reproduced because it solves, after its fashion, real problems of development and control that its rulers face. Types, within that theory, are what classifications exist to name, and the fourth position’s strongest argument has always been that the conjunction is a type wearing the disguise of a transition. The counter argument remains the one the burdens section assigned: that a type must have its laws of motion specified, its characteristic crises and its internal tendencies, before the name is earned, and on that work the fourth position’s literature is still thinner than its confidence. The Vietnamese mirror does not settle the matter. It doubles the evidence that the matter is real.

What the case does to the theory of transition

Step back from the classification and a larger significance comes into view, which the conclusion of this article should not leave unstated. The Marxist theory of history was built around transitions: from feudalism to capitalism above all, the long, violent, centuries deep process by which one mode of production gestated inside another and finally burst its shell. The theory of the socialist transition was written in that image, as the conscious counterpart of the earlier unconscious process, and it inherited the image’s assumptions: that a transition is a passage between two determinate states, that its direction can be known, that its duration, while not fixed, is a period and not an epoch, and that the features of the old society present inside it are survivals, doomed and diminishing. The Chinese formation, with its Vietnamese sibling, puts every one of those assumptions under pressure. Here is a proclaimed transition older than most of the people living inside it, whose old features, wage labour, markets, private accumulation, are not diminishing survivals but the system’s engines, whose new features, the commanding heights and the party’s direction, are not the destination’s embryos in any specified sense, and whose direction of travel is the very thing its analysts cannot agree on. Either the theory of transition must be revised to accommodate passages of this kind, indefinite, reversible in their phases, with the destination unspecified, or the case must be classified as no transition at all, which returns the argument to the other three positions. The tradition has faced such pressure before, when the expected transitions failed to arrive in the advanced West and arrived, unrecognisably, in the backward East, and it responded, at its best, by learning: by complicating its sequence, by theorising combined and uneven development, by admitting that history’s actual passages are stranger than its schema. The Chinese case is the present generation’s version of that pressure, and the quality of the tradition’s response to it, in the four positions’ best work rather than their polemical residue, will be a fair test of whether the theory remains a living instrument of analysis or has settled into a vocabulary of commemoration. That is the deepest reason the question in this article’s title matters, and it has nothing to do with the answer.

The bureaucracy question: an old argument in a new case

Behind the third position’s burden, the class status of the administering stratum, stands one of the twentieth century’s most consequential internal arguments, and the Chinese case has revived it in a form its original participants would recognise. When the Yugoslav dissident Milovan Djilas published his account of the new class in 1957, he argued that the party bureaucracy in the Soviet type formations had become a class in substance: it monopolised the administration of nationalised property, drew its privileges from that monopoly, and reproduced itself through its control of appointments, whatever the juridical position that it owned nothing. Trotsky, a generation earlier, had refused exactly that conclusion for the Soviet bureaucracy, calling it a caste rather than a class precisely because its members held no property they could bequeath, and staking his whole analysis of the Soviet formation on the distinction. The argument was never resolved, because it turned on the concept of class itself: whether class is defined by juridical property, by effective control of the surplus, or by position in the relations of production understood broadly enough to include administration. The Chinese formation presents the argument with a twist its originators did not face. The administering stratum here governs a formation in which a genuine propertied class also exists, outside the administration, accumulating in the open. The bureaucracy’s relation to that class, licensing it, disciplining it, recruiting from it and into it, intermarrying its careers with the careers of officials through the revolving doors the literature describes, has no Soviet precedent, because the Soviet bureaucracy faced no such partner. Analysts who import the Djilas framework must therefore modify it: the question is no longer whether the bureaucracy is a class by itself, but what kind of bloc is formed by an administering stratum and a propertied class that interpenetrate while remaining institutionally distinct, and whether that bloc, rather than either element, is the formation’s ruling power. The question is genuinely new, and here the Chinese case stops merely testing the inherited theory and starts demanding additions to it.

For the classification, the bureaucracy question’s importance is that it stands guard over the word ruling in every position’s argument. The capitalist reading needs the propertied class to rule, or its classification floats free of the political order. The socialist reading needs the party to rule on behalf of a class character it attributes to the party’s mission, the producers in whose name the heights are held. The state capitalist reading needs the bureaucracy to be the collective capitalist, ruling in its own accumulative interest. The fourth position needs the bloc, the fusion, to be the object. Each need corresponds to a different theory of what the administering stratum is, and the empirical literature on that stratum, its recruitment, its incomes, its family strategies, its relation to property at home and abroad, is therefore not a sociological garnish on the debate but one of its decisive fronts, on which positions can genuinely lose ground. A reader following the controversy in the journals should watch that front with particular care, because it is where the next real movement in the argument, if movement comes, is most likely to begin.

The perimeter: capital controls and the boundary of the system

A formation’s boundary is part of its structure, and the Chinese formation’s boundary with the world market is administered in ways that bear directly on the criteria. The capital account is not open: money crosses the border through channels the state supervises, in quantities it can throttle, for purposes it approves, and the right of exit that capital enjoys in the liberal economies, the right whose existence disciplines their governments, is here a licensed privilege rather than a structural fact. Foreign investment enters through gates that have widened and narrowed by sector and period according to public decision, and operates inside joint structures and regulatory perimeters set by the host. The exchange rate is managed. The consequence, for the classification debate, is that one of the classical mechanisms by which capital rules, the threat of departure, is blunted for the economy overall, whatever its force in particular cases. A government that cannot be punished by capital flight in the usual way is a government whose autonomy from capital has a material basis and not merely a constitutional one, and the socialist reading is entitled to exhibit the perimeter as part of its case: the heights include the walls. The capitalist reading’s reply is equally characteristic: that the perimeter is a technology of accumulation, not an alternative to it, since it exists to admit foreign capital on terms favourable to domestic development, to prevent the crises that open accounts invite, and to keep the national surplus invested at home, all purposes internal to a strategy of capitalist growth, and that a fence around a market does not make the market’s contents socialist. The state capitalist reading, once again, finds the perimeter congenial: a collective capital would naturally monopolise the foreign trade and investment of its territory, as the Soviet foreign trade monopoly did before it. The perimeter thus joins the long list of the formation’s features that every position can house, and its analytical yield is the by now familiar one: it establishes, beyond serious dispute, that the formation’s relation to the world market is politically administered to a degree the liberal capitalist economies do not attempt, and it leaves the weight of that fact exactly where the criteria dispute put it.

The sequence of the reforms as an argument

The order in which the formation was built is itself an exhibit in the debate, because each position reads the sequence as a signature. The reforms began in the countryside at the end of the nineteen seventies, with the dissolution of the collective farms into household production under contract, a change that released an enormous increase in agricultural output and labour, and that was, in form, a decollectivisation: the restoration of the family farm within public ownership of the land. They proceeded through the township and village enterprises, collectively owned in name, market driven in fact, which industrialised the countryside without at first creating a private capitalist class; through the special zones and the opening to foreign capital on the coast; through the corporatisation of the state industry in the nineteen nineties, which converted ministries’ bureaux into companies, shed labour on a vast scale and admitted private and foreign shareholders at the margins of the commanding firms; and into the new century with the regularisation of the private sector’s standing, the admission of entrepreneurs to the party and the construction of the financial and technological giants that dominate the formation’s present image. Read one way, the sequence is a ratchet: each stage generalised the market and the capital relation further, none was reversed, and the direction of travel across forty years is the strongest single argument that the formation’s destination is capitalism whatever its way stations are called. Read the other way, the sequence is a controlled burn: at every stage the party chose the next opening, retained the instruments to close it, closed or curtailed several when they threatened its purposes, in the retrenchments that followed the first inflationary years, in the recentralisation of the nineteen nineties, in the discipline campaigns of the platform era, and never surrendered a commanding height in any of them, which is the most powerful single argument for reading the openings as instruments of a command that persisted through them.

The sequence argument is worth dwelling on because it is the form in which most historically minded participants actually conduct the debate, and its logic exposes the controversy’s deepest layer. A sequence can be read as a ratchet only if its direction is intrinsic, only if each stage makes the next more likely and reversal less possible. It can be read as a controlled burn only if the controller’s purposes are external to the process and durable across it. The two readings therefore presuppose, respectively, the service hypothesis and the direction hypothesis in their temporal forms, and the sequence, like all the evidence assembled before it, divides on the same line. What the sequence adds to the static criteria is time, and time is the dimension in which the stage theory will eventually be judged, since a stage is a claim about time before it is anything else. The formation has now spent longer in its proclaimed transition than the Soviet formation spent in existence before its own transition was declared complete by its rulers, and longer than the entire lifespan of several of the modes the classical sequence recognises as epochs. Duration alone does not refute a stage, since the transition from feudalism to capitalism consumed centuries. But the feudal transition’s duration was filled with the visible gestation of the successor’s relations, and the demand that the primary stage exhibit its gestation, the growth within the present formation of the relations that are supposed to succeed it, remains the demand the doctrine’s critics press and its defenders defer. The sequence will settle the classification in the end, not by argument but by outcome, and the analysts of the four positions are, whether they admit it or not, placing bets on a history that is still running.

The question in the wider culture

Outside the scholarly literatures, the question leads a second life as a fixture of public argument, and its public career explains some of the pressure that distorts its scholarly one. In the public version, the question is rarely about criteria. It is a proxy in arguments about other allegiances: about whether markets or states deserve the credit for the formation’s development, about whether the critic’s own society should imitate or shun the model, about the moral standing of the two great labels in the century after their ruling careers. The public question also arrives wearing its answers in advance, since the outlets that pose it usually know which verdict their audiences require, and it generates the characteristic artefacts that public discussion of the subject keeps generating: does the country have billionaires, as though the existence of billionaires were a test no socialist formation could fail or pass interestingly; is the economy planned, as though planning and markets were exclusive substances rather than coexisting mechanisms; do Marxists think it is socialist, as though Marxists were a church with a catechism rather than the divided tradition this article has mapped. The public career matters to the scholar for one reason: it sets the terms in which the scholarly answer will be received and misquoted. A finding as structured as the criterion split, six tests, two families, four positions, one real question, will be flattened on contact with the public argument into whichever of its components serves the flattener’s purpose, the economic verdict exhibited by one camp as the article’s conclusion, the discipline evidence by the other. The defence against flattening is the discipline practised throughout this article: to state the structure so explicitly, and to repeat the separation of the questions so consistently, that the flattening has to be visible to be performed. Whether the defence succeeds is not in the author’s gift. The attempt is the professional obligation, and it is discharged by writing the article so that its parts cannot be honestly quoted against its whole.

Governing the heights: appointments, assets and mixed ownership

The commanding sectors are not merely owned; they are governed, and the machinery of their government is worth describing because it is the concrete form the fourth test’s abstraction takes. The largest state enterprises are held through state asset agencies that exercise the owner’s rights on the public’s behalf, appointing and evaluating senior management, approving major investments and mergers, and remitting or retaining profits according to public decision. The very largest, the firms the literature calls the central enterprises, in energy, telecommunications, transport, metals, banking and defence, answer to the central agency and through it to the government, and their chief executives hold administrative rank within the party state’s personnel system, moving between corporate, ministerial and provincial posts across a career in the pattern already noted. Party committees inside the enterprises hold a formal place in their governance, with the major decisions of the largest firms passing, by charter provision and by practice, through a structure in which the political authority is present before the commercial one concludes. The system’s defenders describe this machinery as the institutional guarantee that the heights serve public purposes; its critics describe it as the fusion of owner, regulator and ruling party in a single set of hands, with the conflicts of interest that fusion implies and the softness of budget discipline that has historically accompanied it. Both descriptions capture something, and for the classification the essential point is the machinery’s existence and reach: the commanding sectors are not a portfolio of shares held by a passive public owner but an administered system, directed through personnel, and the direction is exercised by the same authority that directs the rest of the formation.

Across the reform decades the boundary of the state sector has been repeatedly redrawn by a policy the literature groups under the name of mixed ownership: private and foreign capital admitted as minority partners in state firms, state capital taking stakes in private firms, listing of state enterprises’ subsidiaries on stock exchanges at home and abroad while control remains with the public parent. Each redrawing has been read by the camps in their characteristic ways. To the capitalist reading, mixed ownership is the mechanism by which the state sector is progressively commercialised and its governance assimilated to capital’s norms, the thin end of a privatisation conducted by dilution rather than by sale. To the socialist reading, the same mechanism is the heights extending their reach into the private economy, the state taking positions inside the commanding firms of the new sectors rather than surrendering the old ones, and the direction of the flow, public capital into private firms as much as private capital into public ones, is the opposite of a retreat. To the fourth position, mixed ownership is the hybrid institutionalising itself, dissolving the boundary whose existence the other positions’ arguments require, until the question of which sector a firm belongs to has no clean answer and the formation’s doubleness is inscribed in its share registers. The reader will recognise the pattern for the last time in this form: a mechanism, agreed by all, whose classification significance is assigned by the criteria each camp brought to it. The mechanism itself, the deliberate blurring of the public private boundary under continued public control of the commanding positions, is among the formation’s most distinctive inventions, and it is the feature a future theory of the formation, if the fourth position ever produces one, will probably take as its starting point.

Labour’s organisation: the federation and its limits

The institutional position of labour completes the structural description, and it bears on the positive standard and the first test alike. The official trade union federation is the sole legal centre of labour organisation, a mass organisation integrated into the party state’s structure, present in enterprises across both sectors in principle and unevenly in practice, and charged in its own statutes with the dual function of representing workers and sustaining production and social stability. Collective contracts are widespread in form; collective bargaining in the adversarial sense familiar from the liberal economies is not the system’s operating principle, and the strike, while not unknown in the record the labour literature documents, where waves of stoppages in particular industries and periods have won concessions and occasionally catalysed reforms of the bargaining machinery, occupies no protected place in the legal structure. The literature’s assessment of this arrangement divides along lines the reader can now predict. The critical assessment, common to the capitalist reading and to independent labour scholarship, holds that the sellers of labour power confront its purchasers without an organisation of their own, that the federation’s integration into the state disables it from the adversarial role, and that waged work in this formation is therefore transacted under a political asymmetry that belongs to the formation’s definition of itself. The defensive assessment, offered by the federation’s own theorists and the doctrine’s, holds that the unity of the union with the state expresses the identity of the workers’ long term interests with the development project the state directs, that adversarial organisation presupposes an antagonism the formation’s structure has superseded, and that the machinery of consultation, congresses and legal aid delivers representation in a form adapted to the system. Between the assessments lies a factual record, of wages bargained and unbargained, of disputes settled and suppressed, of a labour regime that has delivered rising incomes across the decades alongside pronounced insecurity at its migrant base, and the record, like all the rest, awaits the work of the criteria. For the classification, two points only are beyond the dispute. The first is that labour’s organisation is a state structure, which distinguishes the formation from the liberal capitalisms and aligns it with the Soviet precedent. The second is that this fact, like the others, classifies nothing by itself: it is compatible with the state capitalist reading’s account of a collective employer organising its own workforce’s representation, with the socialist reading’s account of a workers’ state expressing the class’s interests through its party, and with the fourth position’s account of a formation whose institutions decline to sit in the inherited columns. A reader who has come this far will not be surprised, and will perhaps take the absence of surprise as the measure of the article’s method: the facts are the facts, the criteria are the argument, and the honesty is in keeping the two apart.

What would settle it

The question that ends every honest treatment of a controversy is what would change the answer, and this controversy has a more interesting answer than most, because its parts settle at different speeds. The label will not be settled, for the reasons given: labels are governed by stipulated criteria, and the stipulations are theoretical commitments that facts do not reach. The direction question can be settled, progressively and in principle completely, by the accumulation of the patterned evidence the earlier sections specified: the distribution of the state’s interventions between the needs of accumulation and purposes external to it, audited across sectors and decades with the translation exercises disallowed in advance. That audit is a research programme rather than a thought, and parts of it are under way in the empirical literatures, whose findings have already forced adjustments at the margins of every position, the capitalist reading conceding the anomaly of the discipline episodes, the socialist reading conceding the absence of producers’ control, the state capitalist reading conceding the reality of purposes that resist translation into accumulation’s needs, the fourth position conceding the thinness of its positive theory. A controversy in which every camp is conceding something at the margins is not a stalemate, whatever its reputation. It is a science working at its normal pace on an object that is still moving.

What would a settlement of the direction question actually look like?

It would look like a ledger, not a slogan. On one side, the cases in which the state imposed sustained costs on accumulation for purposes that cannot be redescribed as accumulation’s own requirements without emptying the phrase: purposes whose beneficiaries stood outside the circuit, whose costs were absorbed repeatedly, whose pursuit survived changes of leadership and of economic weather.

On the other side, the cases in which stated purposes were deferred, diluted or abandoned when they collided with the requirements of growth, stability and revenue. A settlement would consist of the two columns, honestly compiled by scholars who had agreed the rules of compilation in advance, and read off in the pattern they form. Nobody has yet compiled that ledger to the standard the question deserves, and the reader who wonders why the controversy persists has, in that absence, the most concrete part of the explanation.

There is also a settlement of a different kind available to the individual reader, and it is the one this article recommends in place of a verdict. It consists of deciding, explicitly and for oneself, which criteria one accepts and why, and then holding the verdict that follows with the humility appropriate to a conclusion that another reasonable analyst, accepting other criteria with reasons as good, will not share. The reader who performs that operation has not evaded the question. They have answered it at the only level at which it admits of an answer that is more than a badge: the level of the tests. And they have acquired, in the process, the equipment to detect the operation’s absence in others, in the commentator who classifies without criteria, the partisan who exhibits one segment of the surplus circuit as the whole, the authority who quotes a doctrine as a verdict. In a controversy where the public forms are mostly debased, that equipment is the genuinely valuable takeaway, worth more than any of the four labels, including the one the reader finally chooses.

Is China still socialist? The question restated with its tests attached

The question with which this article began, is China still socialist, can now be restated in the form in which it deserves to be asked, with its tests attached and its levels separated. Economically, the formation’s dominant relation is the capital relation: labour power is a commodity, a capitalist class appropriates surplus, and production obeys the compulsion to accumulate, and on the criteria Marx used to identify a mode of production the economy is capitalist. Politically, the formation is commanded by a party state holding the heights, directing investment, administers the perimeter and disciplines capital, including its largest capitals, to a degree the classical capitalist state does not attempt, and on the criteria that privilege command, the formation is not straightforwardly capitalist either. By the positive standard of the associated producers, it is not socialist in the classical sense at all, since the producers govern neither the private nor the state workplace. Beneath the labels, the empirical question that remains genuinely open is whether the commanding state directs capital toward ends of its own or serves the accumulation it commands, and on that question the evidence is patterned, partial and still accumulating. Four positions organise the possible verdicts, each carrying assigned burdens that the scholarship is slowly working through. That restatement is longer than a yes or a no. It has the compensating virtue of being true, and of telling the reader exactly where the remaining ignorance lives and what it would take to reduce it.

This article has described a social formation and the debate about its classification. It has not evaluated a government, endorsed or criticised a policy, or pronounced on the merits of the system it describes, because those were never its questions, and the reader who has been attending to the distinctions it draws will understand why the restraint is not evasion but method. A question in political economy deserves an answer in political economy: criteria stated, evidence weighed, burdens assigned, and the open remainder honestly marked as open. The formation will go on being argued about, in the journals and far beyond them, and the argument will go on being, in its scholarly form, a place where the Marxist tradition tests and revises its central concepts against the largest case the modern world has offered it. To have made the argument’s structure visible, its agreements and its true points of division, is the whole ambition of the pages above, and the reader who now finds the shouting about the question slightly less intelligible than the question itself has received what the article had to give.

The word “still”: the question’s hidden premise

The question in the title contains a word that smuggles in a second controversy, and a complete treatment must unpack it. To ask whether the formation is still socialist is to presuppose that it once was, and that presupposition is itself one of the things the tradition argues about. The pre reform formation, the economy of the decades between the revolution and the late nineteen seventies, is the baseline every position silently adopts or contests. Its features are not in dispute at the descriptive level: private ownership of the means of production had been abolished in industry and commerce; agriculture was collectivised; labour was allocated by assignment rather than by market, the urban worker attached to a work unit that provided employment, housing and welfare as a single package; money and prices existed but allocation ran through the plan; and the surplus was disposed by the state in its entirety. On the economic tests of this article, that formation scores very differently from its successor: labour power was not generally a commodity, since it was not generally bought and sold; no private capitalist class existed; production was oriented to the plan’s targets rather than to accumulation through the market, though accumulation, in the form of a very high rate of investment squeezed from consumption, was the plan’s own overriding priority. A reader applying the first three tests to the baseline will therefore conclude that the pre reform economy was not capitalist, which is the strongest argument the word still has going for it.

But not capitalist is not the same as socialist, and the baseline debate is the Soviet debate’s twin: the same four strategies were deployed over the earlier formation, in its own time and in retrospect. The doctrine of the period classified it as socialist under construction, with the familiar stage structure. The Trotskyist traditions classified it variously, as a workers’ state in formation, as a deformed workers’ state on the Soviet model, or, in the state capitalist variant, as capitalist from the revolution onward, which empties the word still of content by denying there was ever anything to lose. The bureaucratic collectivist and new class analyses classified it as a third thing from the start. And the positive standard returns its by now familiar negative: the producers of the pre reform formation did not govern their workplaces either, since the plan’s authority ran downward through the same appointment structures, so that on the criterion of association the transition the word still implies, from socialism to something else, never began from socialism at all. The positions on the present formation therefore sort, on inspection, into pairs: those that accept the baseline as socialist and read the reforms as a fall or a stage within the story, and those that reject the baseline and treat the reforms as a change within a formation whose character was never what its doctrine claimed. The word still is thus not a neutral temporal marker. It is a compressed position on the character of the Mao era, and arguments about the present that proceed without unpacking it are liable to be, at their foundation, arguments about the past conducted by proxy. The reader should perform the unpacking reflexively whenever the question is posed in its standard form: ask the poser what they take the baseline to have been, and watch the real disagreement surface.

A short history of the question itself

The question has a biography, and tracing it briefly is a way of seeing how its meaning has migrated under the pressure of events. In the first reform decade, the question was asked mainly inside the tradition and mainly in its doctrinal form: whether the introduction of markets, household farming and foreign capital was compatible with the socialist character the party claimed, a question the doctrine answered with the primary stage construction described earlier, which was, among other things, an instrument for settling that internal argument by relocating the finish line. In the decade that followed, the question acquired its second life. The collapse of the Soviet formations transformed its stakes entirely: the Chinese formation was no longer one socialist state among several, conducting an experiment at the margin of a system, but the principal surviving case, and its classification became a verdict on whether anything of the twentieth century’s socialist project remained standing in the world. Analysts who had treated the question as a scholastic exercise found it promoted, by events, into the central exhibit of the age’s largest argument, and the literature of the nineteen nineties bears the marks of that promotion, in the confidence of the convergence predictions on one side and the defiance of the survival literature on the other. In the decades since, as the formation grew from a poor country conducting reforms into the world’s second economy and its largest manufacturer, the question migrated again: it is now asked less often in the tradition’s internal vocabulary and more often in the vocabulary of the wider culture examined earlier, as a way of asking who deserves the credit for the development record and what the record proves about the rival systems. Each migration changed what an answer would mean, which is a further reason the answers have not converged: the question being answered in the present decade is not quite the question the primary stage doctrine answered in its own, and participants arguing across the migrations are, without noticing, answering different questions with the same words. The criteria discipline is the only known prophylactic. State the question’s version, state the tests, and the biography becomes an asset rather than a confusion: the reader can see which of the question’s lives a given contribution belongs to, and grade it by the standards of that life rather than by the standards of another.

The local state as an economic actor

The formation’s central government commands the heights, but much of its accumulation is driven from below, by a tier of the state that the classical categories fit awkwardly: the local authorities, provinces, cities and counties, which behave in the literature’s description as developmental corporations in their own right. Their revenues depend on the growth of their jurisdictions; their officials’ careers are assessed, in the personnel system, substantially by that growth; and their instruments are formidable, since the urban land whose use rights they convey belongs to the public, and its conveyance finances their budgets, while their financing vehicles borrow against future land revenue to build the infrastructure that attracts the next round of investment. The result is a competition among local states that mirrors and amplifies the competition among capitals: jurisdictions bid for factories, construct industrial parks ahead of demand, protect local champions and resist the exit of local employers, generating at the level of the state itself the overcapacity and duplication that the accumulation test detects at the level of the firm. Scholars of the system have a vocabulary for this, speaking of local state corporatism and of a federalism adapted to market preservation, and the phenomenon is one of the best documented in the institutional literature.

For the classification debate, the local state is a solvent applied to every simple picture. Against the image of a single commanding intelligence directing the whole, it exhibits a state fragmented into competing accumulators, whose aggregate behaviour emerges from their rivalry as much as from the centre’s plan, and whose land finance binds the public finances themselves to the property market’s appreciation, so that the state’s own revenue rises and falls with the asset values its policies are supposed to discipline. Against the image of a merely regulatory capitalist state, it exhibits public authorities acting as direct economic protagonists, owning the land, borrowing for development, founding enterprises and vehicles, and standing inside the accumulation process as its most energetic participants rather than its referees. The four positions each take their portion. The capitalist reading sees in the local state the proof that accumulation’s logic has colonised the state itself, tier by tier. The socialist reading sees the centre’s periodic campaigns against local excess, its rotation and disciplining of officials, its reassertion of planning over the fragments, as the commanding structure correcting its own instruments. The fourth position sees a genuinely novel institutional animal, the entrepreneurial local state inside a commanded national frame, for which the inherited vocabulary of state and market has no drawer. The reader should note that the local state also complicates the direction question in a way the earlier sections’ framing, state versus capital, understated: here the state is not capital’s counterparty but one of its forms of organisation, and the question of whether capital is directed or served must be asked separately about a centre that commands and a periphery that competes, with the honest answer differing by tier.

The rural remainder: agriculture inside the formation

A third of the formation’s people still draw their living principally from the land, and the agrarian sector is the largest territory in the economy where the capital relation does not rule in its classical form, which makes it a necessary test of the dominance criterion on which the first three tests depend. The structure, as the agrarian literature describes it, is a deliberate hybrid. The land belongs to the village collectives; its use is contracted to households for long terms; the household farms its contracted plots with family labour, sells much of its output into markets, buys inputs and machinery services in markets, and increasingly rents in or rents out land use rights as its members divide their time between contracted land and waged work. Around this household core stand the sector’s other forms: specialised large growers operating consolidated rented land with hired labour, agribusiness firms integrating production and processing, cooperatives of varying substance, and state farms surviving at the margins. The sector’s product markets are commercial, its prices formed in trade that is now international, and its labour is the reservoir from which the industrial workforce has been drawn for two generations, a flow that continues to define the formation’s demography. Yet the core relation, the household working its own contracted land with its own labour, is not the capital relation: no labour power is sold within it, no surplus is extracted by an employer, and the means of production, while publicly owned in title, are in the household’s effective possession.

The classification significance of the rural remainder is a matter of weight, and the camps divide over it in their now familiar proportions. The doctrine treats the sector as the primary stage’s agrarian form, a transitional arrangement whose public land title keeps the door open to a cooperative future and whose household operation suits the productive forces of the present. The capitalist reading treats the sector as subordinate and diminishing, a pre capitalist remainder inside a formation whose commanding dynamics, industry, finance, urban property, world trade, are set elsewhere, and notes that the theory has always classified formations by their dominant relation rather than by the survival of older ones at the base of the food chain. The agrarian specialists enter a caution against both: that a remainder feeding and housing a third of the population, anchoring the household registration system and the migrant labour regime, and holding the society’s ultimate safety net in its contracted plots, is not a residual in the sense of a fading survival but a load bearing component of the formation’s specific architecture, whose removal or transformation would change the character of the whole. The caution is well taken, and it refines rather than refutes the dominance criterion: dominance is a claim about which relation sets the terms for the others, and the rural sector’s terms, its prices, its labour outflows, its land values at the urban fringe, its very household structure, are set by the urban industrial economy and its markets far more than the reverse. The village persists, but it persists inside a formation whose motion originates elsewhere, and the direction of determination, not the headcount of the sectors, is what the criterion asks about.

The moving frontier of the commanding heights

The fourth test contains a hidden variable that the debate rarely makes explicit: the identity of the commanding sectors changes as technology and the economy change, so the test must be reapplied to each era’s heights rather than to a fixed list inherited from the age of steel and rail. In the middle of the twentieth century the heights were unambiguous, coal, steel, heavy machinery, armaments, the railways and the power grid, and a state holding them held the economy’s commanding ground in a sense every analyst could verify. In the formation’s present structure the classical heights remain publicly held, but the economy’s commanding ground has partly migrated, toward telecommunications networks and the platforms that organise commerce and information, toward the manufacture of semiconductors and other strategic components, toward the financial technology through which payments and credit increasingly flow, and toward the data resources that the newest industries accumulate. The migration poses the fourth test’s question in a new form: does public command extend over the new heights, or has the frontier of command been outrun by the frontier of the economy, leaving the state entrenched on the old summits while the new ones are occupied by private capitals of unprecedented scale and social reach?

The literature’s description of the resulting contest is one of the most instructive parts of the whole file, because here the state’s behaviour can be observed adapting the old doctrine to the new terrain in real time, across the decades the scholarship covers. The pattern it describes is neither simple nationalisation nor simple licence. In sector after sector, the state first admitted private and foreign capital to build industries it could not build at the required speed, tolerated the rise of private giants inside perimeters it set, and then, as the sectors revealed their commanding character, extended its instruments over them: licensing regimes and security reviews, party organisations within the firms, state investment funds taking positions, golden share like arrangements and board presences in sensitive cases, data and content governance imposed as conditions of operation, and the periodic discipline campaigns already examined, which fell with particular weight on the platform and technology capitals. The camps read the pattern in their grammars. The socialist reading sees the heights doctrine operating as designed, the perimeter of command advancing over each new commanding sector as its importance declares itself, proof that the command is a living function rather than a legacy portfolio. The capitalist reading sees a state negotiating, from strength, with capitals it allowed to grow because it needed their dynamism, and extracting obedience as the price of their scale, which is what strong states have always extracted from the commanding firms of capitalist economies, from the railroad barons onward. The fourth position sees the frontier itself as the finding: a formation in which the location of economic command is permanently contested between a party state and its own licensed giants, with neither able to dispense with the other, is a formation whose central institution is the negotiation between them, and it should be theorised as such rather than as a way station between two purer types.

For the reader’s purposes, the section’s yield is a refinement of the fourth test that the criteria table’s static form conceals. Command of the heights is no possession to be verified once but a relation to be tracked, and its direction of travel is among the most informative series the debate possesses. A formation in which the perimeter of public command is advancing over each newly commanding sector differs, in a way the classification should register, from one in which the perimeter is fixed while the economy’s centre of gravity migrates beyond it, even if the two formations are identical in every snapshot. The dynamic version of the test therefore asks the analyst to plot the frontier across the decades: the admission of private capital into sector after sector, followed, at varying lags, by the arrival of the instruments of command. That plot, like the ledger of interventions proposed earlier, is compilable from the public record, and its shape, the lag’s length, the instruments’ depth, the sectors where the frontier never arrived, would tell a future reader more about the formation’s trajectory than any verdict pronounced in the present. It is a fitting place for the analytical part of this article to end: with the discovery that even its most static looking criterion conceals a question about time, and that the formation, at every level this article has examined, from the world market down to the workbench and out to the moving frontier of command, presents the same unfinished relation between a market economy and the political authority that claims to direct it.

Savings, finance and the quiet levy

The financial system is where the formation’s doubleness is transacted daily and in aggregate, and a section on its structure completes the circuit this article has been tracing. The system’s foundation is the household sector’s extraordinary propensity to save, held overwhelmingly as deposits in the state owned banks, in an environment where the menu of alternative assets has historically been narrow, the capital account administered, the stock markets volatile and supervised, and property the principal rival store of value. The banks intermediate the deposits toward the borrowers the credit system favours, state enterprises, infrastructure vehicles, priority industries, at interest rates that have been administered for much of the reform era in ways that held the return to depositors below what an open financial market would have paid. A substantial literature, much of it produced by economists sympathetic to further liberalisation, describes the resulting margin as a quiet levy: a transfer from household savers to the favoured borrowers and to the state that stands behind them, amounting in effect to a tax on the population’s thrift that financed a significant share of the investment drive without passing through any budget. The description is contested at the margins, other scholars noting the security and convenience the deposit system offered households in a developing economy and the losses savers in more liberal systems periodically suffer, but the mechanism itself, the channelling of the society’s savings through public institutions toward publicly chosen ends at publicly influenced prices, is not in dispute.

For the criteria, the financial circuit is the fifth test’s machinery laid bare, and it sharpens the direction question into its most measurable form. A state that merely regulated a financial system would set its rules and police its stability while the allocation of the society’s savings emerged from the decisions of savers, banks and borrowers pursuing their own returns. This formation’s state owns the principal channels, influences the price of credit at both ends, and directs the flow toward its priorities as a matter of routine, which is direction institutionalised rather than direction improvised. The capitalist reading’s response is the strongest version of its general case: that the levy and the direction are the technologies by which a late developing capitalism mobilises the capital it lacks, that Gerschenkron’s banks and ministries performed the same office for earlier latecomers, and that the system’s gradual liberalisation, the freeing of rates, the admission of private and foreign finance at the margins, the growth of bond and equity markets, shows the direction of travel, toward a financial order of the familiar capitalist kind with Chinese scale. The socialist reading answers that the liberalisation has been repeatedly paused, reversed in emphasis or fenced with new controls whenever it threatened the command structure, and that a technology retained under permanent public ownership, through every cycle of opening and correction, is not a scaffolding awaiting removal but the building’s frame. The reader will recognise, in this final instance, the article’s whole argument in miniature: a mechanism agreed by all, a trajectory read in opposite directions, and a classification that waits, as it has waited throughout, on the criteria the reader is willing to defend and on the pattern the coming decades inscribe in the record this one has assembled.

One formation or two?

A last analytical possibility deserves its paragraph before the verdicts are left behind, because it dissolves part of the problem rather than solving it, and dissolution is sometimes the correct operation. The tradition’s vocabulary distinguishes a mode of production, an abstract relation, from a social formation, the concrete society in which several relations coexist under the dominance of one. Every real society in the historical record has been a formation in that sense: feudal Europe contained commodity production and wage labour at its margins for centuries, and the capitalist formations of the classical period contained peasantries, household production and, in their colonies and their own Souths, relations of outright coercion. It is therefore no embarrassment to the classification enterprise that the Chinese formation contains a household agrarian sector, a private capitalist sector and a commanded state sector in one frame. The embarrassment, such as it is, concerns the dominance that is supposed to organise the coexistence. In the classical formations the dominant relation subordinated the others visibly, bending their laws to its own. In this formation the subordination runs in both directions at once: the market’s relations dominate the texture of daily production and exchange, while the political command dominates the heights, the perimeter and the terms on which the market itself exists. Two dominances, at two levels, each real, is the formation’s exact description, and the four positions can be reread, charitably, as four decisions about which level’s dominance a classification should record. The reader who has reached this point possesses the whole matter: the findings, the levels, the tests, the burdens, the open empirical question and the reason the label will not close. Nothing in the pages that remain, the guidance for students, teachers and researchers and the answers to the standard questions, adds a new finding. They exist to put the findings to work.

One consequence of the two levels doctrine is worth stating for the benefit of readers who meet the question in its compressed public forms. When a commentator announces that the formation is capitalist because its workers are wage labourers, and another announces that it is socialist because its banks are public, the two are not contradicting each other, because they are reporting different levels of the same object, and each report is, within its level, substantially accurate. The contradiction appears only when each claims that their level is the formation, entire and decisive. A classification worthy of the name must either argue for the priority of one level, with reasons drawn from the theory of modes of production, or decline to classify the whole and specify, instead, the level at which each of its judgements holds. This article has done the second while exhibiting the first being done, at their strongest, by the four positions. That division of labour between the article and its subject is deliberate, and it is the form that honesty takes in a case where the object itself is double.

For students and exam candidates

This question is a gift in an examination, provided you refuse to answer it in one word. Markers reward the candidate who converts the label dispute into a display of method: state the criteria before the verdict, give each of the four positions its strongest formulation with a named proponent attached, and reserve your conclusion for the direction problem, where judgement can actually be exercised. The worked structure is set out in the companion guide to Marxism in China exam answers, and the archive practice questions collected by the UPSC PYQ explorer show how often examiners return to classification questions in some form. Two errors lose the most marks: exhibiting one stretch of the surplus circuit as though it were the entire economy, and quoting the official doctrine as though quotation settled anything. Avoid both, specify your tests, concede what your chosen test cannot capture, and the answer writes itself at the standard the question deserves.

For teachers and seminar leaders

The criteria table in this article was built to be taught from. Few classroom artefacts demonstrate the relational definition as economically as this case, because the Chinese formation obliges students to operate the definition rather than recite it: they must decide what a test is, apply six of them to evidence they largely share, and discover that their disagreement has migrated from the facts to the weights, which is the most instructive migration a seminar can stage. A productive exercise is to assign each of the four positions to a group, require each group to state the burden its position carries, and then require it to answer the burden belonging to a different group, which exposes the controversy’s characteristic evasion in a single session. The table and the burden assignments transfer well into a durable study system; the Marxism study notes companion provides a ready structure for filing them alongside the Soviet case, where the same exercise can be run again with the added profit of historical distance.

For researchers, historians, and journalists

The formulation worth carrying away from this article is the direction versus service problem, because it is the question your sources are actually disagreeing about when they appear to be disagreeing about an adjective. Interviewers and analysts who press a source on the label obtain a badge; those who press on the pattern, on which purposes prevailed when purposes and profitability collided, on whether discipline fell on capitals or on capital, obtain information. The same discipline applies in print. A report that tells its readers which criteria a verdict rests on, and what evidence would change it, serves them better than a verdict delivered with the confidence the material cannot support, and the history of the Soviet debate stands as the permanent warning of what happens to a literature that settles labels instead of mechanisms: it is surprised by its object. The ledger proposed in the settlement section, interventions compiled under rules agreed in advance, is a project a serious research programme or a serious newsroom could actually undertake, and its absence from the record is the most concrete explanation available for the controversy’s longevity.

Frequently Asked Questions

Q: Is China still socialist?

The honest answer separates the word from the tests beneath it. Measured by the standards Marx applied to modes of production, wage labour as the normal condition, owners appropriating surplus, output driven by accumulation, the economy registers as capitalist. Measured by command over banking, land and strategic industry, and by a state able to bend private firms to public purposes, it registers as something no liberal capitalism resembles. The governing party’s own doctrine classifies the system as socialism in a long primary stage. Which description governs depends on which family of tests the reader accepts as decisive, and the article’s purpose is to make that dependence visible rather than to conceal it behind a verdict.

Q: What criteria decide whether a country is socialist?

Six tests organise the serious debate. Three are economic: whether most people live by the wage, whether a propertied class lives by appropriating what employees produce, and whether firms are driven to grow or go under. Three are political: whether the strategic sectors rest in public hands, whether investment follows public direction alongside market signals, and whether public authority can subordinate even the largest private fortunes to its own purposes. A seventh standard, the oldest in the tradition, asks whether working people themselves govern the places where they work. Every verdict in the literature is produced by selecting among these tests and weighting them, which is why stating one’s selection matters more than announcing one’s conclusion.

Q: Is labour power a commodity in China?

Yes, in the technical sense the theory gives the phrase. The typical route to a livelihood runs through an employment contract: a person offers the capacity to work, an employer purchases its use for a wage, directs it during the working day and keeps the product. That arrangement holds across private firms, foreign invested firms and state enterprises alike, and it has been the economy’s normal mechanism since the older system of lifetime assignment to a work unit was dismantled during the reform decades. Qualifications exist at the boundary, above all the rural household’s retained claim on contracted village land, which cushions the separation between workers and the means of production without abolishing it. Segmentation by registration status divides the labour market; it does not remove its character as a market.

Q: Is there a capitalist class in China?

By the standards the theory applies elsewhere, yes. A capitalist class is more than a collection of wealthy individuals: it is a reproducing stratum whose members own productive assets, employ the labour of others, draw income from the surplus those employees create, and pass the position of owner down or trade it in recognisable ways. Private owners in this economy organise a large share of production and hiring across manufacturing, construction, property and services, and their investment choices are among the mechanisms moving the whole system. Two features distinguish the class from its Western counterparts. It was licensed into existence by state decision rather than fighting its way up against a hostile order, and some of its members sit inside the governing party itself, which complicates every simple picture of how it might rule.

Q: What is the state capitalist analysis of China?

That analysis holds that the state itself performs the role of a collective capitalist. On this view, the bureaucracy confronting the workforce owns the commanding means of production as a body, hires labour power for wages, extracts the surplus centrally and accumulates under pressure of competition with rival powers abroad and private capitals at home. The framework was built for the Soviet case, most systematically by Tony Cliff, and its proponents argue that it alone explains the formation’s combination without remainder: markets and wage labour at the base, command and discipline at the summit, because the summit is not standing outside capital but constitutes its largest single concentration. Critics answer that a stratum unable to bequeath or sell its holdings lacks the defining property of a capitalist class, and that the label describes the summit’s power more vividly than it explains it.

Q: Does the state direct capital or serve it?

That is the empirical heart of the whole controversy, and it remains open. The direction hypothesis says public authority pursues goals, national development, strategic capacity, social stability, poverty reduction, that private profitability would not select, and imposes them on firms even at accumulation’s expense. The service hypothesis says interventions, however severe for individual companies, cluster around the system’s own needs, stability, infrastructure, orderly labour, technological upgrading, and that no purpose is pursued for long once it collides with growth and revenue. Both readings can process any single episode, a halted listing, a restructured sector, a rescued bank. They diverge over the pattern compiled across decades, and the ledger that would discriminate between them, interventions audited under rules fixed in advance, has yet to be compiled to the standard the question deserves.

Q: What is the New Left position in China?

The New Left is a current within the country’s own intellectual debate, named in the scholarly literature, whose best known voice is the historian Wang Hui. It emerged during the nineteen nineties as market reform’s social costs became undeniable, and it argues two things at once. Against the official vocabulary, it holds that talk of stages cannot honestly describe the inequality and commodification the reforms produced, and that the revolutionary tradition’s egalitarian promises remain a standard by which the present may be judged. Against liberal critics, it holds that completing the market transition is no remedy, and that the state’s surviving capacities distinguish the case from ordinary capitalism. The current therefore refuses both comfortable labels, sharing the capitalist diagnosis of the economic base while denying that the base exhausts the formation’s possibilities.

Q: Does state ownership make an economy socialist?

Not by itself, on the tradition’s own reasoning. Ownership is a legal form, and the same form has covered very different realities: the Soviet debate ran for decades precisely over whether nationalised property plus wage labour plus a directing bureaucracy amounted to socialism, a workers’ state of a degenerated kind, or a state capitalism. What decides the matter, for the classical criteria, is the relation the ownership establishes: who controls the enterprise in practice, who appropriates the surplus and by what right, and whether the people who work in it have any governing voice. Public title to the commanding sectors is a major fact about this formation, and it anchors the fourth of the six tests. Treating the title as the whole answer confuses a premise of the argument with its conclusion.

Q: Is this a terminological or an empirical dispute?

Both, at different levels, and keeping the levels apart is most of the skill the subject requires. The argument over the label is terminological, because each camp stipulates which criteria the word socialist obeys, and no discovery about the economy can overturn a stipulation. The arguments underneath are empirical and are slowly moving: whether interventions serve accumulation or override it, how complete the separation of workers from land really is, how the commanding sectors behave under stress, whether producers’ control is growing or merely formal. Scholars do concede ground on those questions, which is the sign of a living inquiry. The popular version of the debate stays sterile because it conducts the empirical argument as though it were about the label, and the label argument as though some fact must settle it.

Q: What would settle the question about China?

Nothing will settle the label, because labels follow criteria and criteria are chosen on theoretical grounds. The substantive questions beneath the label can be settled, and the article specifies how. Compile the record of collisions between public purposes and private profitability under rules agreed before the counting starts; audit whether the commanding sectors’ surpluses are disposed by mechanisms that answer to accumulation or to purposes outside it; track whether the producers’ practical control over their workplaces grows across the decades or remains a form of words. Findings of that kind would not end the argument about the adjective. They would do something better: they would relocate it onto ground where evidence governs, and they would tell every camp which of its claims had survived contact with the record it cites.

Q: How does the criterion split grade a verdict on the formation?

It grades a verdict by the tests the verdict can survive. A classification that announces its criteria, applies them symmetrically to formations its author favours and disfavours, and concedes what its chosen tests cannot capture earns a high grade whatever its conclusion. A classification assembled from impressions, one segment of the surplus circuit exhibited as the whole, or a doctrine quoted as though quotation were proof, earns a low grade whatever its conclusion. The split is the name for the discovery that the famous disagreement is between people applying different instruments rather than between people misreading the same facts. Once the instruments are on the table, a verdict can be marked like an examination answer: full credit for method, none for confidence unsupported by a stated test.

Q: What should a student separate between ownership of the commanding sectors and the relations of production?

Two questions that polemic habitually fuses. The first asks who holds title to the strategic heights: land, banking, energy, transport, the industries from which an economy can be steered. In this formation the answer is public, and it matters enormously for what the state can do. The second asks how production is organised at the point where people actually work: whether they live by selling their labour power, who directs their labour, who keeps the surplus. In this formation those answers describe the capital relation in both the private and the state workplace. Confusing the questions produces the two standard errors, inferring socialism from public title and inferring an ordinary capitalism from the wage relation while ignoring who holds the heights. Keeping them separate is the first operation the subject teaches.

Q: Why do the four positions reach different verdicts from the same evidence?

Because a verdict is a product of evidence and weights, and the camps share the evidence while assigning the weights differently. The scholar who takes the dominant production relation as decisive gives the first three tests the greatest weight and reaches the capitalist verdict. The scholar who holds that command over the whole defines the system gives the political tests decisive weight and reaches the socialist verdict, or, treating the state as itself the accumulator, the state capitalist one. The scholar who doubts the inherited battery reaches for new categories. None of these moves is a factual error, which is why fact checking the debate never ends it. The remedy is not more evidence poured into the same mould but an explicit argument about the mould itself: what classification is for, and which features of a formation it is obliged to privilege.

Q: How does the criteria table order the question?

The table arrays six tests in two families and records, for each, what the test examines, what the shared evidence indicates and which position draws support from the row. Its ordering does three kinds of work. It prevents the standard evasion in which a participant answers a question nobody asked, brandishing the commanding heights against the wage relation or the wage relation against the heights, by settling beforehand which fact answers which question. It shows a newcomer exactly where agreement ends, since the opening three rows are common ground across the literature, while the closing three divide it over weight rather than description. And it converts a shouting match between adjectives into an agenda: six findings, four positions, one open empirical problem about direction and service, each in its place.

Q: What separates describing a social formation from commenting on a government?

The object and the evidence. A social formation is described in terms of durable structures: who owns the means of production, how labour is engaged, where the surplus flows, which institutions direct investment. Such a description changes slowly, rests on the scholarly record, and can be true or false of a system regardless of who administers it this decade. A comment on a government evaluates the choices of identifiable office holders, their policies, their conduct toward groups and toward other states, matters that change with personnel and circumstance and that belong to political judgement. This article confines itself to the first object throughout: it names no serving official, assesses no policy and treats doctrine as a body of claims to be examined. The separation is not squeamishness. It is what allows an analysis to remain accurate, and readable, in any year.