Marxism in Latin America is usually introduced to English readers through its revolutionaries, as though the region had supplied the movement with faces and supplied nothing to its arguments. The record runs the other way. Across the twentieth century the region produced a body of Marxist theory with a reach well beyond its own borders: an account of communal landholding as a living basis for socialism, a theory of dependency that reorganised how the world economy was studied, a theology that took Marxist social analysis into the region’s churches, a mechanism of super-exploitation specified for dependent economies, and a concept, the coloniality of power, that reshaped debates far from its Peruvian origin. What generated this output was not a local talent for slogans. It was a problem. The categories of classical Marxism had been built from European industrial experience, and the societies to which Latin American Marxists applied them were societies whose exploited majorities were indigenous and rural, in which land and race organised exploitation as visibly as the factory wage, and in which formal independence had coexisted for a century with economic subordination. Theory had to change to fit, and the changes are the tradition.

A reading table with Spanish and Portuguese editions, the regional problems table and a map of the region, Insight Crunch

This guide treats Latin American Marxism as what it was: a regional tradition of theory, with its own founding problems, its own canonical disputes, its own instruments of diffusion, and its own catastrophe, when the military dictatorships of the 1960s and 1970s destroyed the institutions in which the tradition was housed and scattered its producers across two continents. It follows the series pattern for regional traditions. The tradition is organised by the problems it confronted rather than by the countries it passed through, because the problems crossed borders more readily than the parties did, and because a country by country summary, which is what most coverage offers, dissolves exactly the thing that makes the region’s Marxism a single object of study: the shared argument about whether a theory formed on European history could be made to work on societies that history had formed differently. Readers who want the individual cases in depth will find them in the cluster’s own articles, linked throughout; this guide’s work is the map, the claim, and the evidence for both.

Marxism in Latin America: the definition and its boundaries

Marxism in Latin America comprises the theoretical and political tradition developed across the region from the 1920s onward, characterised by the analysis of indigenous and agrarian social relations, by dependency theory, by liberation theology, and by a sustained argument between armed and electoral roads to power. Each element of that definition marks a boundary. The starting date excludes the region’s earlier socialist and anarchist movements, which belong to the tradition’s prehistory and are treated below as such, however much they formed the audiences the Marxist parties inherited. The emphasis on indigenous and agrarian relations marks what distinguishes the region’s theory from the European Marxism it received. The pairing of dependency and liberation theology names the two contributions that travelled furthest beyond the region. And the closing phrase names the argument that organised the tradition’s politics for half a century and that its survivors were still conducting when the dictatorships interrupted them.

What is distinctive about Latin American Marxism?

its central problem was applying class analysis to societies where the principal exploited populations were indigenous and rural rather than industrial. That produced distinctive theory on communal landholding, dependency, religion as a revolutionary force, and the choice between armed and electoral roads to power.

The definition also excludes two things that casual usage includes. It excludes the region’s experience of Marxism as a purely imported party doctrine, the catechism of stages and quotations that the Communist International distributed through its affiliated parties, because that material is part of the story only where Latin Americans argued with it, amended it, or broke from it. And it excludes the assumption that the tradition speaks with one voice. Peruvian, Brazilian, Chilean, Mexican, Argentine and Cuban Marxists disagreed with one another about nearly every question this guide covers, often more sharply than any of them disagreed with Moscow or with Paris. A regional tradition is not a regional consensus. It is a shared set of problems worked on in a shared set of institutions, journals, parties, exile circuits and prison cells, and the disagreements are evidence of the tradition’s life rather than exceptions to it. Where this guide reports a position, it reports whose position it was; where the tradition divided, the division is the finding.

The regional problems table: the tradition in one view

The fastest way to see the tradition whole is to list the problems that forced its theory into existence. Five recur across the region’s countries and decades, and each produced a distinctive body of work. The regional problems table sets them out with the theory each one generated and the article in this series where the full treatment lives. The table is this guide’s findable artifact, and the sections that follow can be read as its expansion, row by row, in roughly the order the rows appear.

Problem Why the region posed it Theory produced in response Treatment in this series
The indigenous question Conquest had made racial classification a structure of land and labour, and the largest exploited populations were indigenous communities rather than factory workers The communal argument: surviving indigenous communal forms as a living basis for socialist organisation Mariátegui and Marxism
The agrarian question Land concentration and semi-servile rural labour persisted a century after independence, and the peasantry was the majority nearly everywhere Analyses of latifundio, of communal tenure, and of the colonial economy as capitalist from its origin Anti-Colonial Marxism Case Studies
Dependency Formal independence coexisted with export economies whose commanding decisions were taken abroad Dependency theory and the mechanism of super-exploitation Dependency Theory in Latin America
The religious question The region’s popular classes were formed inside a Catholic culture that European anticlerical Marxism could neither ignore nor convert Liberation theology and the preferential option for the poor Liberation Theology and Marxism
The strategic question Small working classes, rural majorities and recurrent military intervention made the road to power a genuine theoretical problem The foco theory and the counter-argument for the democratic road Guerrilla vs Electoral Strategy

Two features of the table deserve emphasis before the detail begins. The first is that every row records a failure of fit between the inherited theory and the regional evidence, and a repair performed by the region’s own thinkers. European Marxism arrived with a proletariat at the centre of its analysis; the region’s largest exploited population worked the land under obligations that were not wages. European Marxism treated religion as a residue destined to fade; the region’s poor prayed, organised and eventually theorised inside their faith. European Marxism assumed that political independence and economic sovereignty arrived together; the region had possessed the first for a hundred years while lacking the second. The table is therefore also a record of what the theory had to learn.

The second feature is the table’s order. The rows run from the oldest problem to the most recent theory, and the order is an argument. The indigenous and agrarian questions were posed by the conquest and were waiting for the tradition when it formed in the 1920s. Dependency was theorised in the middle decades, once the region’s economists had measured the gap between independence and sovereignty. The religious and strategic questions belong to the period after 1959, when a revolution in the Caribbean forced every inherited assumption about agency and alliance back onto the table. A reader who holds the order holds the tradition’s biography in outline.

The fourth regional instance: the claim this guide defends

This series has now examined four regional traditions of Marxism outside Europe, and the comparison yields a finding that no single regional study could establish. Latin America, India, Japan and China each independently confronted the same question: whether a stage theory derived from European history, in which feudalism yields to capitalism and capitalism to socialism along a surveyed road, applied to societies whose histories had not followed that road. Each tradition produced a distinctive body of theory in response. The Japanese debate turned on whether the Meiji settlement had completed a bourgeois revolution. The Indian tradition turned on caste, on the Asiatic mode, and on whether a colonial economy could generate its own capitalism. The Chinese tradition turned on the peasantry as a revolutionary subject and on the stages of new democracy. The Latin American tradition turned on communal landholding, dependency and the coloniality of power. Latin America is therefore the fourth regional instance of a general phenomenon, and the phenomenon, not any one region’s peculiarities, is the finding: the applicability of stage theory is the common problem of Marxism outside Europe.

The claim matters because it reverses the usual direction of judgement. Regional Marxisms are conventionally graded as applications, faithful or deviant, of a theory whose centre sits elsewhere. The four-instance pattern suggests the opposite reading. The theory’s centre of gravity, once it travelled, was the question its European form had left unexamined, and the regions that confronted the question earliest and most honestly produced the tradition’s most durable work. Latin America’s contributions belong in that frame. The region was not a province of a European argument. It was one of four laboratories in which the argument was rebuilt, and on several questions, the indigenous question above all, it was the laboratory that reported first. The companion treatment of the Indian case, which confronted the same stage problem through caste and the colonial mode of production, is at Marxism in India: The Complete Guide, and the parallel is worth reading alongside this one, because the differences between the two answers measure how much of each tradition was made by its materials.

Before Marxism: the anarchist precedence

The standard account of the region’s left begins with the founding of communist parties in the 1920s, as though radical labour politics began when Moscow’s emissaries arrived. Labour historiography establishes the opposite. In the first decades of the twentieth century, the labour movements of the southern cone, of Brazil and of Mexico were dominated not by Marxists but by anarchists and anarcho-syndicalists, and Marxist parties displaced them only from the 1920s, incompletely and after prolonged rivalry. This precedence is a documented fact of the region’s labour history, and it inverts the usual story in ways that matter for everything that follows. The audiences, the strike repertoires, the newspapers and the martyrs that the communist parties inherited were largely anarchist creations, and the parties’ early polemics were directed less against employers than against the rival tradition that already held the workers’ allegiance.

Why did anarchism reach the region’s workers before Marxism did?

Anarchism travelled with the immigrants who staffed the region’s new industries. Spanish and Italian workers arriving in Buenos Aires, São Paulo and Valparaíso carried anarcho-syndicalist organisation in their luggage, and its federalism, its suspicion of parties and its general strike fitted port, rail and workshop conditions where Marxist parties barely existed.

The carriers mattered as much as the doctrine. The great migration from southern Europe to the Atlantic economies of South America brought hundreds of thousands of workers formed in the syndicalist cultures of Catalonia, Andalusia, Piedmont and Liguria, for whom the union was the revolutionary instrument and the political party an object of principled distrust. In Argentina the Federación Obrera Regional Argentina, founded at the opening of the century, organised across trades on an explicitly anarchist programme and led general strikes that paralysed Buenos Aires. In Brazil the Confederação Operária Brasileira performed the same role from 1906, and the São Paulo general strike of 1917 showed a movement capable of stopping an industrial city. In Chile the nitrate fields of the north and the ports of the centre sustained a militant syndicalism whose suppression, in episodes of which the 1907 killings at Iquique became the emblem, entered the labour movement’s memory as its founding sacrifice. In Mexico the Partido Liberal Mexicano of the Flores Magón brothers conducted an anarchist agitation against the Porfirian dictatorship from exile and border towns, and its risings preceded the revolution that began in 1910.

The precedence left permanent marks on the Marxist tradition that displaced it. Latin American Marxism grew up arguing against a rival that denied the state, distrusted parties and expected revolution from the union hall rather than the seizure of power, and the argument sharpened the region’s Marxists on questions their European counterparts could treat lazily: the relation between party and class, the role of organisation between strikes, the meaning of the general strike itself. It also left a residue inside the tradition. The region’s Marxism retained a libertarian undertow, visible in its recurring suspicion of bureaucratic orthodoxy and in the prestige of figures who, like the Peruvian founder treated below, read the anarchist and syndicalist classics seriously and borrowed their moral vocabulary of direct creation. When later generations of Latin American revolutionaries reached for theories of spontaneous insurgency, they were drawing on a deposit the anarchists had laid down two generations before.

Mexico: a revolution before its Marxism

Mexico gave the region its first great revolution of the twentieth century, and the sequence is theoretically significant: the upheaval began in 1910, before any significant Marxist organisation existed in the country, and the revolution’s own documents arrived at positions the Marxist tradition would later claim as its themes. The constitution of 1917 wrote land restitution and communal property into its famous Article 27, recognised labour rights in Article 123, and asserted national ownership of subsoil wealth against foreign companies, all under governments that were not Marxist and in several cases were hostile to the small communist movement the revolution’s turbulence called into being. A theory formed on European sequence, in which socialist organisation precedes and directs social revolution, had to digest a case in which the revolution came first and the organisation scrambled after it.

What did the Mexican Revolution hand to the region’s Marxists?

A demonstration that agrarian revolution could proceed without a Marxist party, a constitution that enacted communal land rights and labour protections under non-Marxist governments, and a standing question the whole region inherited: what a revolutionary party is for, in a country where the revolution has already happened without one.

The Mexican case also supplied the region’s Marxism with its first international organiser, and the connection runs through this series. The Communist Party of Mexico was founded in 1919, among the earliest in the region, and among its founders was Manabendra Nath Roy, the Indian revolutionary whose supplementary theses on the national and colonial questions, presented alongside Lenin’s at the Second Congress of the Communist International in 1920, made him one of the foundational theorists of anti-colonial Marxism. Roy had reached Mexico in flight from a wartime conspiracy trial, had been converted to Marxism in part by the revolution he watched around him, and carried the Mexican experience into the Comintern’s colonial debates. The region’s Marxism was therefore connected to the Indian tradition at the moment of its founding, by a person, a decade before either tradition had produced its characteristic theory. The four regional instances of this series were never as separate as their geographies suggest.

Who helped found the Mexican Communist Party?

An Indian revolutionary in exile. Manabendra Nath Roy arrived in Mexico fleeing prosecution, organised among the revolution’s radicals, and helped found the party in 1919 before travelling to Moscow, where his theses on the colonial question were debated beside Lenin’s at the Comintern’s Second Congress the following year.

The Mexican tradition that followed Roy’s departure developed its own character: a muralist and artistic avant-garde in the party’s orbit, a powerful teachers’ and peasants’ organisation, the ambivalent patronage of governments that alternately used and repressed it, and in Vicente Lombardo Toledano a labour leader of continental influence whose Marxism was always negotiated with the Mexican state’s own revolutionary nationalism. Mexico’s deeper gift to the regional tradition came later and was institutional rather than doctrinal. When the dictatorships of the southern cone and Brazil destroyed the universities and publishing houses of their own countries, Mexico received the exiles, and Mexican institutions, above all the great public university in the capital and the Fondo publishing house, gave the scattered tradition a home. The destruction and the refuge belong to later sections; the point here is that Mexico’s place in the tradition was set early, as the region’s revolutionary elder and its eventual sanctuary.

The party foundings: a decade of organisation

The 1920s converted the region’s scattered Marxist groups into parties, and the foundings followed a pattern that itself became a subject of theory. In Argentina a socialist international party formed in 1918 took the communist name within two years. In Uruguay the party dated from 1920. In Chile the Socialist Workers’ Party that Luis Emilio Recabarren had founded in 1912, after a formation that ran through the Democratic Party, the nitrate unions and a famous conversion to the Russian Revolution’s cause, adopted the communist name in 1922. Brazil’s party was founded in 1922 by a small group in Niterói and Rio de Janeiro, several of its founders former anarcho-syndicalists who had concluded that the union alone could not take power. Cuba’s first communist party dated from 1925, with the student Julio Antonio Mella among its founders. Peru’s Socialist Party was founded in 1928 by José Carlos Mariátegui and his circle, and took the communist name only after his death. Colombia’s party consolidated around 1930. By the decade’s end the map was covered, and covered in a specific way: small parties, rooted in ports, mines, railways and the artisan trades, led disproportionately by journalists and intellectuals, and affiliated to an International whose centre of information and discipline lay in Moscow.

The pattern contained the tradition’s future tensions in embryo. The parties were founded to apply a general line to national conditions, and the general line arrived as a periodisation: the region’s societies were classified from Moscow as semi-colonial and semi-feudal, their immediate task a bourgeois-democratic revolution in alliance with a progressive national bourgeoisie, their socialist stage postponed to a later period. Some of the region’s founders accepted the scheme as a framework and worked within it. The most original of them accepted the alliance policy and rejected the periodisation’s mechanical use, arguing that in his country the bourgeois stage had no bourgeoisie willing or able to perform it, and that the indigenous population’s communal institutions offered a ground for socialist construction which the periodisation had never imagined. The argument between the scheme and its regional critics, opened in the 1920s, is the argument this guide follows through dependency, the foco and the democratic road: at each stage, the question is whether the region’s evidence amends the inherited theory or merely illustrates it.

The colonial question in Moscow: the scheme meets the region

The Communist International’s classification of Latin America was settled at its Sixth Congress in 1928, whose colonial theses grouped the region with the semi-colonial world and prescribed the two-stage road. The classification was not foolish. The region’s economies were dominated by foreign capital in mining, oil, fruit and finance; its countrysides were ruled by landowners whose labour relations, from debt peonage to the enganche system of recruited indigenous labour, sat uneasily under the description of free wage labour; and its politics were punctuated by interventions, occupations and protectorates imposed by the United States. A theory that called such societies straightforwardly capitalist had explaining to do, and the feudal or semi-feudal label named something real about the hacienda’s internal order.

What did the Communist International misunderstand about the region?

Its classification treated the countryside’s coercive labour relations as survivals of a feudalism that had never existed in European form, and so misread economies that had been built for the world market from the conquest onward, exporting silver, sugar and coffee under labour regimes whose brutality served accumulation rather than preceding it.

What the classification missed was the direction of the region’s economic history. The hacienda did not precede the market; it was created by the market, and its labour regimes were tightened, not relaxed, when export demand rose. The Peruvian sierra’s gamonalismo, the Chilean inquilinaje, the Brazilian engenho and its successor plantations were components of commercial economies whose product crossed oceans. Later scholarship inside the tradition, the feudalism-versus-capitalism debate treated in its own section below, would establish the point in detail: Latin America had been incorporated into a capitalist world economy at the conquest, and its coercive labour forms were that incorporation’s instruments, not its prehistory. The Comintern’s scheme, by filing the region under a stage it had supposedly yet to leave, misdirected strategy toward alliances with a national bourgeoisie that the region’s own structure kept weak, dependent and inclined to compromise with the landowners and the foreign companies. The region’s Marxists spent decades arguing their way out of the filing error, and the argument produced much of their best theory.

The 1929 conference of Latin American communist parties in Buenos Aires displayed both the scheme’s authority and the first serious regional resistance to it. The Peruvian delegation’s theses on the race problem in Latin America, drafted under Mariátegui’s direction, argued that the indigenous question was at root a question of land, that the Indian’s oppression was the oppression of a class of dispossessed cultivators dressed in racial form, and that no solution was possible within the latifundio system. The theses were received coldly by the International’s South American bureau, which preferred a more orthodox treatment, and the exchange foreshadowed the Peruvian founder’s posthumous fate: canonised as a founder, disobeyed as a theorist. That double fate, honoured and shelved, recurs across the tradition’s history, and it is one reason the region’s theory must be read in its essays and books rather than in its parties’ resolutions.

Mariátegui and the Peruvian founding

The tradition’s first great original theorist worked in Lima, in a life compressed by illness into a decade of production, and died in 1930 at the age of thirty-five. José Carlos Mariátegui had formed himself as a journalist, spent formative years in Italy in the aftermath of the First World War, where he absorbed the council movement, the philosophy of Georges Sorel and the early writings of the Italian Marxists, and returned to Peru to found the journal Amauta in 1926, the Socialist Party in 1928, and to publish in the same year the book on which the tradition’s claim to originality first rests, the Siete ensayos de interpretación de la realidad peruana, the Seven Interpretive Essays on Peruvian Reality. The full treatment of his life and system is in this series, in the companion study of Mariátegui and Indo-American Marxism; this guide needs his founding moves, because the whole regional tradition can be read as an extended argument with them.

Why does a Peruvian essayist of the 1920s anchor a continental tradition?

Because he performed, first and most completely, the operation every regional Marxism in this series had to perform: he took a theory formed on European industry and rebuilt it on his own society’s evidence, finding in indigenous communal landholding a foundation for socialism that no European sequence had prepared him to expect.

Mariátegui’s founding moves were three. The first was methodological, and he stated it in the sentence by which the tradition remembers him: socialism in America, he wrote in 1928, must not be a copy or an imitation; in the translation the English reader will meet, “It must be a heroic creation.” The sentence is usually quoted as a nationalist flourish. It is better read as a research programme. A heroic creation is a theory built from the materials of the society it addresses, tested against those materials, and answerable to them rather than to a centre abroad. The second move was substantive: the essays argued that the problem of the Indian, the phrase under which Peruvian debate filed the condition of the indigenous majority, was in its economic root the problem of the land, and that every attempt to solve it by administrative, educational or moral means while leaving the latifundio intact was evasion. The third move was the boldest, and it is the one the indigenous question section below examines: the surviving communal institutions of the indigenous population were not, for Mariátegui, relics to be dissolved by progress, but living forms of cooperative production on which a Peruvian socialism could be built.

The fate of the founding is part of the record. Within two years of his death his party had been renamed, aligned and disciplined into the International’s scheme he had handled so independently, and his books spent decades in a peculiar half-life: honoured in the movement’s rhetoric, marginal in its training, and recovered for serious study largely by scholars outside the parties, in Peru and abroad, from the 1960s onward. The recovery made him the region’s most studied Marxist, the subject of a literature in several languages, and the standard against which the derivative charge, examined at length below, is most often tested. A tradition whose founder had to be rescued from its own organisations is a tradition whose theory and whose institutions must be studied separately, and this guide does so throughout.

The indigenous question: land, race and the communal form

No question distinguishes the region’s Marxism more sharply from the European original than the question of the indigenous population, and none did more to change the theory itself. In the Andes and in Mesoamerica, the populations subjected to the most intense exploitation were indigenous communities whose members were classified by race, taxed and recruited by community, and attached to the land through institutions that predated the conquest. A class analysis that began from the individual wage worker could not see this population whole. Its exploitation ran through the community: through the hacienda’s absorption of communal lands, through labour drafts and debt, through a racial hierarchy that assigned the Indian to servitude as a birthright. The Peruvian founder’s essays made the point programmatically. The problem of the Indian is not an ethnic problem, not a pedagogical problem, not a problem of the Indian’s character as the era’s racist literature supposed. It is the problem of a population dispossessed of its land and held in servitude by the landholding system, and it would be solved by the land’s restitution and the system’s destruction, or it would not be solved at all.

What was the ayllu, and why did it matter to theory?

The ayllu was the Andean indigenous community: kin-based, holding land in common, allocating plots to families, and organising labour collectively for terraces, irrigation and herds. It mattered because it survived the conquest and the republic as a functioning cooperative institution inside a society the stage theory classified as pre-capitalist residue.

The theoretical weight of the ayllu lay in what Mariátegui claimed for it. Under the Inca the communal system had organised an entire civilisation’s agriculture; under colony and republic it persisted in the sierra, battered, shrunken, but alive, its members still working common lands by reciprocal labour and still governing part of their collective life. For the stage theory, such an institution was a survival, scheduled for dissolution as capitalism penetrated the countryside. For Mariátegui it was evidence of something else: that the indigenous population carried, in its own practice, the habits of cooperation and common property from which a socialist order could grow without waiting for a capitalist stage to create its gravediggers in European form. The Indian, he argued, had never been an individualist proprietor in embryo; the community was his native economic form, and a socialism built in Peru would build on it. The argument inverted the sequence. Where the orthodox scheme saw the commune as the past, the Peruvian reading saw it as a resource for the future, and the inversion is the region’s first unmistakably original contribution to Marxist theory.

What did Mariátegui claim communal landholding made possible?

A road to socialism that did not pass through the full dissolution of communal property into individual holdings and a landless proletariat. If the community already practised common ownership and cooperative labour, socialist organisation could develop those forms directly, joining modern technique to an indigenous institution rather than destroying the institution first.

The claim drew criticism from two directions, and the criticism belongs in the record. Orthodox critics inside the International held that it romanticised a decaying form and underestimated the community’s own internal stratification, its authorities, its obligations and its penetration by the market and the hacienda. Later scholarship added a historical caution: the ayllu of the twentieth century was not the ayllu of the Inca state, and the community had been reshaped by three centuries of colonial extraction into something that served survival under oppression as much as it preserved an alternative to it. Both criticisms have force, and the tradition’s mature position absorbed them: the communal argument survives not as a claim that the ayllu was socialism already, but as the demonstration that a regional Marxism could find, in its own society’s institutions, materials for socialist construction that the inherited sequence said could not exist. That demonstration, once performed in Peru, was available to every regional tradition confronting a communal form, from the Indian panchayat debates to the Chinese rediscovery of the peasant commune’s descendants, and it is the clearest case in this guide of a regional repair becoming a general resource.

The agrarian question: the land as the region’s first text

Beneath the indigenous question lay the agrarian question in its general form, the question of the land, and it structured the region’s politics whether or not Marxists were present to name it. Across most of the region, independence in the nineteenth century had transferred sovereignty without disturbing landholding; the liberal reforms that followed, intended to create individual proprietors on the European model, in practice dissolved communal and church lands into the hands of the hacendados, so that the liberal century left the countryside more concentrated than the colonial one. The hacienda and its Brazilian and Caribbean counterparts, the plantation and the engenho, organised production for export with labour forces bound by debt, by residence, by custom and by force, in combinations that varied by crop and country. The peasantry was the region’s majority, its grievances the raw material of every revolution from Mexico onward, and its organisation the test that separated the region’s Marxist parties from mere study circles.

The agrarian question generated a characteristic literature. The region’s Marxists wrote land programmes, histories of the hacienda, and studies of particular rural worlds: the Chilean inquilino, the Peruvian colono, the Brazilian posseiro squatting at the plantation’s edge, the Argentine tenant farmer of the pampas whose grievances produced a rural radicalism of a different, settler character. They argued about whether the rural labourer was a proletarian, a serf, a peasant or a hybrid the categories had not named, and the argument was not scholastic, because the classification decided the strategy: a countryside of serfs called for a democratic revolution against feudalism in alliance with the progressive bourgeoisie, while a countryside of rural wage workers called for socialist organisation directly. The classification question therefore became the region’s most consequential scholarly dispute, and it deserves its own section.

Feudal or capitalist: the colonial economy dispute

Was the economy Spain and Portugal built in the Americas feudal, or was it capitalist from the beginning? The question sounds antiquarian. It decided, for two generations of the region’s Marxists, what kind of revolution they were making, and the debate it generated, running from the 1940s through the 1970s, is among the tradition’s most rigorous achievements. The orthodox position, inherited from the Comintern’s classification, held that the colonial economy was feudal: the encomienda and the hacienda were seigneurial institutions, their labour relations were servile, and the region’s history since independence was the unfinished struggle of a bourgeois order against feudal remnants. The revision began in Argentina with Sergio Bagú, whose His Economy of Colonial Society appeared in 1949 and argued the opposite case in detail.

Was the colonial economy feudal or capitalist?

The tradition’s mature answer, won through its longest scholarly debate, is that the colonial economy was built for the world market and organised by merchant capital from the conquest, so that its coercive labour regimes were instruments of accumulation within a capitalist world economy, not survivals of a European-style feudalism.

What did Sergio Bagú argue about colonial production?

That it was oriented from the start to production for the world market and to the accumulation of capital by the merchants and miners who organised it. The colonial regime’s labour forms, slavery, encomienda, repartimiento, were chosen for their yield within that orientation, so colonial society was capitalist in its driving logic despite its unfree labour.

Bagú’s argument changed the debate’s terms because it relocated the question. Instead of asking whether colonial institutions resembled European feudal institutions, a comparison of forms, it asked what the colonial economy was for, a question of function within a larger system. Silver from Potosí and Zacatecas flowed into European accumulation; Brazilian sugar and later coffee, Cuban sugar, Peruvian guano and Chilean nitrates succeeded one another as the region’s contributions to a world division of labour. On that evidence the Brazilian historian Caio Prado Júnior had already reached a parallel conclusion in his Formação do Brasil contemporâneo of 1942: the meaning of Brazilian colonisation, its sentido, was the production of tropical staples for European commerce, and the whole colonial formation, its land grants, its slavery, its scattered population, was organised by that external purpose. Prado Júnior’s reading made the colony a commercial enterprise before it was a society, and it implied that Brazil’s subsequent history could not be told as a feudalism slowly ripening toward capitalism, since the capitalist purpose was present at the founding.

The debate’s stakes became fully visible when André Gunder Frank, working in the region in the 1960s, radicalised the revision into the thesis that Latin America had been capitalist since the conquest and that its underdevelopment was capitalism’s product rather than its absence, a thesis the dependency section below takes up. The feudal classification did not die quietly. It had organised party programmes, and its defenders could point to real features of the hacienda, its self-sufficiency, its paternalism, its labour dues, that sat awkwardly in a capitalist description. The mature settlement, associated with the Mexican and Argentine historiography of the 1970s and with the concept of the colonial mode of production debated by scholars such as Carlos Sempat Assadourian, held the two truths apart: the region was integrated into a capitalist world economy from the conquest, and the labour relations through which it was integrated were heterogeneous, coercive and locally specific, neither feudal in the European sense nor free in the liberal one. The settlement mattered beyond historiography. If there had never been a feudalism to overthrow, the two-stage strategy lost its premise, and the region’s revolutions had to be theorised on other grounds. Much of the strategic argument of the 1960s, including the foco theory, drew confidence from exactly that conclusion.

The humanist strand: Aníbal Ponce and the education question

The tradition’s early decades also produced a strand that the later emphasis on economics tends to hide. Aníbal Ponce, the Argentine psychologist and essayist who died in 1938, wrote the region’s most widely read early Marxist book after the Peruvian essays: Education and Class Struggle, his study of schooling and the class order, published in 1934 and reprinted across the region for decades. Ponce read the history of education as a history of class formation, from the primitive community’s common instruction through the slave and feudal schools to the bourgeois university, and he wrote as a humanist for whom Marxism was a doctrine of human formation before it was a doctrine of production. His presence in this guide marks a breadth the tradition later narrowed. The region’s Marxism of the 1930s included literary critics, educators, physicians and philosophers of culture; its journals reviewed novels and argued about psychoanalysis; and its defeat, when it came, was prepared partly by its own narrowing into an economics of stages, a narrowing the exile generation of the 1970s would diagnose and attempt to reverse. Ponce also stands for the tradition’s Argentine root, a country whose Marxism, formed in a settler society of European immigration with a large working class and no great indigenous peasantry, differed from the Andean variant at every point and argued with it accordingly. Regional unity, in this tradition, was always unity of problems, never of conditions.

Dependency: the region’s principal theoretical export

If one body of Latin American theory conquered the world’s universities, it is the analysis of dependency, and its full treatment in this series is the companion study of dependency theory in the region. This guide states its place in the tradition. The analysis grew from a regional institution, the United Nations Economic Commission for Latin America, founded in 1948 and directed in its formative period by the Argentine economist Raúl Prebisch, whose 1949 study of the region’s development argued that the world economy was divided into centres and peripheries, that the terms of trade moved secularly against the exporters of primary products, and that the periphery’s industrialisation therefore required deliberate state action rather than faith in comparative advantage. Prebisch was no Marxist, and his structuralism was a reformer’s doctrine, aimed at development within a reformed capitalism. But his centre and periphery gave the region’s Marxists a measured, empirical object that their own categories had gestured at without grasping: a structure of the world economy that reproduced underdevelopment as a condition, not a stage.

The Marxist radicalisation came in the 1960s, and its most famous statement was André Gunder Frank’s. Frank, a German-born economist trained in the United States and working in Brazil and Chile, argued in Capitalism and Underdevelopment in Latin America, published in 1967, that the region’s satellites had been underdeveloped by their very incorporation into the capitalist world system, through a chain of metropolises and satellites along which surplus was drained from the most remote peasant to the world centre. Underdevelopment, on this account, was not the region’s original condition awaiting modernisation. It was a product, manufactured by the same process that manufactured development elsewhere, and it could not be cured by more of the contact that caused it. The thesis inverted the liberal account at its root, and its polemical force carried it around the world, into the African and Asian debates and the North American academy, faster than any other Latin American idea of the century.

What separates Frank’s dependency from Cardoso’s?

Frank’s version made underdevelopment the necessary product of incorporation into the world system, so that development within dependency was a contradiction. Fernando Henrique Cardoso and Enzo Faletto, writing from exile and from the region’s own industrialisation, answered that dependency and development could coexist, and that the outcome depended on historically specific alliances among classes and the state.

Cardoso and Faletto’s Dependencia y desarrollo en América Latina, written in Chilean exile in the later 1960s and published in 1969, is the tradition’s own correction of its most famous export, and its superiority as analysis is the point this guide insists on. Where Frank offered a mechanism that worked everywhere and therefore explained the differences between countries nowhere, Cardoso and Faletto offered a method: dependency named a situation, not a fate, and situations had to be analysed through the concrete alliances, state forms and class compromises by which foreign capital, local capital and popular classes were joined in each country and period. Brazilian industrialisation under military rule, which Frank’s scheme could only describe as deepening underdevelopment, appeared in their frame as dependent development, real growth structured by subordination, with its own political logic. The Brazilian sociologist Theotonio dos Santos supplied the analysis with its most careful definition, dependency as a situation in which the accumulation and expansion of the centre’s capital proceeds at the expense of the periphery’s, and developed the typology of its historical forms, from colonial dependence through financial-industrial dependence to the technological dependence of the multinational era. Between Prebisch’s structuralism, Frank’s inversion, Cardoso’s historicisation and dos Santos’s typology, the region built the twentieth century’s most influential alternative account of why poor countries stay poor, and built it inside institutions, ECLA, the Latin American Faculty of Social Sciences in Santiago, the Brazilian and Mexican universities, that the dictatorships would shortly destroy or scatter. The destruction section of this guide is therefore also dependency’s biography.

The analysis had its critics from the beginning, and two criticisms from inside the Marxist tradition itself shaped its mature form. The first, pressed by the Argentine Ernesto Laclau among others in the celebrated exchange with Frank, charged that Frank had defined capitalism by exchange and circulation rather than by relations of production, so that his capitalism since the conquest dissolved the very distinctions, between the hacienda’s labour regimes and the factory’s, that analysis needed. The second charged the dependency literature with an externalism that explained everything by the world system and nothing by the class structures inside each society, a charge Cardoso’s own work had anticipated. Both criticisms were absorbed. What survived them was not a doctrine but a permanent acquisition: no account of the region’s societies could thereafter treat them as self-contained units moving through universal stages, because the region’s Marxists had shown that the units were constituted by their place in a structure larger than themselves. That acquisition, more than any slogan of the period, is dependency’s legacy, and it passed into world-systems analysis, into development studies and into the region’s own historiography, where it remains the default grammar even among scholars who reject the label.

Super-exploitation: Marini’s mechanism

The most technically original contribution of the dependency decades is also, for the English reader, the least accessible, and the conjunction is itself one of this guide’s themes. Ruy Mauro Marini, a Brazilian sociologist formed in the Brazilian debates, exiled after the 1964 coup to Mexico and then to Chile, where he taught and wrote through the Allende years before a second exile, set out in his Dialéctica de la dependencia, published in 1973, a mechanism that no European Marxist text had specified. The mechanism answered a precise question. If dependent economies lose surplus to the centre through unequal exchange, through the transfer of value embedded in the prices at which their products sell, how does capital in the dependent economy respond, given that it cannot easily raise its productivity to the centre’s level?

What is super-exploitation?

Marini’s name for the dependent economy’s characteristic compensation: capital, unable to match the centre’s productivity and losing value in unequal exchange, recovers its margin by exploiting labour beyond the normal limits, lengthening the working day, intensifying work, and paying labour power below the cost of its reproduction.

How does super-exploitation differ from exploitation as Marx described it?

In Marx’s account of the developed economy, exploitation is compatible with the worker receiving the full value of labour power, the cost of reproducing the worker’s capacity to work. Super-exploitation violates that condition itself: wages fall below the reproduction cost, and the worker’s own substance, health, household and lifespan, subsidises the rate of profit.

The mechanism’s consequences unfolded with a rigour that explains its hold on the region’s debates. A working class paid below the cost of its reproduction cannot constitute a market for the economy’s own manufactures, so dependent industrialisation fractures: it produces luxury goods for the minority whose incomes derive from the surplus, and cheap wage goods of deteriorating quality for the majority, while the dynamic sectors orient themselves to export. The dependent economy’s internal market is thus not merely small but deformed by the mechanism that sustains its accumulation, and the deformity reproduces the dependence that called the mechanism into being. Marini drew the political conclusion without flinching. A formation of this kind could not be reformed into national development by alliance with its own bourgeoisie, since that bourgeoisie’s accumulation rested on the super-exploitation itself; the dependent bourgeoisie was not a national class manqué but a functioning partner in the mechanism. The argument struck at the two-stage strategy from a new direction, not from the countryside’s communal forms as in the Peruvian founding, but from the factory’s wage relation, and it remains the strongest purely economic statement the region produced against the strategy of stages.

Marini’s work also illustrates the tradition’s linguistic fate, to which the untranslated source note below gives full treatment. The Dialéctica circulated in English for decades mainly in summary, in the accounts of scholars who had read it in Spanish or Portuguese, so that the Anglophone debate about dependency proceeded for a generation with its most rigorous mechanism known at second hand. The region’s Marxism in English is a selection made by translators and exile publishers, not a mirror of the tradition, and Marini is the standing proof.

The foco theory: insurrection as method

The strategic question, the table’s fifth row, received the region’s most famous and most costly answer in the decade after the Cuban victory. The experience of the Cuban insurrection, in which a small armed nucleus landed from the yacht Granma in 1956, survived in the Sierra Maestra and entered Havana at the start of 1959 as the old regime collapsed, was generalised by Ernesto Guevara in his manual La guerra de guerrillas of 1960 and systematised by the French philosopher Régis Debray in Révolution dans la révolution?, published in 1967, into the theory of the foco: the small guerrilla nucleus as the embryo of the revolutionary army and party, whose armed action would itself create the conditions for insurrection rather than waiting for them to mature. The full strategic argument, and its electoral counter-argument, is treated in this series in the companion study of guerrilla and electoral strategy; this guide records the theory’s place in the tradition.

What is the foco theory?

The doctrine generalised from the Cuban insurrection: a small armed nucleus, the foco, inserted in favourable rural terrain, can by its own action create the subjective conditions for revolution, generating the army, the party and the mass support in the course of the fighting rather than assembling them beforehand.

What did Debray add to the guerrilla argument?

Systematisation and a fateful subordination. Debray codified the Cuban experience into a portable doctrine, and in doing so subordinated the political party to the guerrilla army, treating the foco as the party in embryo and political leadership as something the armed nucleus would generate, a reversal of the Leninist sequence with consequences the decade recorded.

The theory’s appeal is unintelligible without the frustrations that preceded it. The region’s communist parties, bound to the two-stage scheme and to electoral and trade-union routines, had watched a revolution succeed in Cuba by methods their doctrine classified as premature, led by a movement that was not a communist party at all. The foco offered the young militants of the 1960s an explanation and a permission: the conditions did not need to be awaited, the party did not need to be built first, the mountain would make the revolutionaries. Guevara’s own writings were more conditional than the doctrine made from them; he had written that where a government had come to power through the popular vote and maintained constitutional legality, the guerrilla outbreak could not be promoted, and his account of the Cuban war stressed the agrarian reform and the peasantry’s adhesion as the insurrection’s substance. Debray’s systematisation thinned the conditions into a method, and the method was exported across the continent, to Venezuela, Guatemala, Peru, Colombia, Argentina and Bolivia, where Guevara himself attempted to repeat the Sierra in the Ñancahuazú and was killed in October 1967. The Bolivian failure, and the defeats that accumulated elsewhere, returned the tradition to its argument with itself, between the armed road’s claim that conditions are made and the electoral road’s claim that they are found, an argument the Chilean experience of 1970 to 1973 then tested from the other side.

Liberation theology: the religious question answered from inside

European Marxism inherited an anticlerical reflex and a theory of religion as consolation destined to dissolve with the misery that required it. Latin America confronted the tradition with a fact the reflex could not process: the region’s popular classes were Catholic in their bones, their communities organised around parishes, festivals and brotherhoods, and any movement that treated their faith as an obstacle would remain a sect addressing them from outside. The religious question, the table’s fourth row, was answered not by the parties but by the church’s own dissidents, and the answer became one of the region’s two great exports. Its full treatment is the companion study of liberation theology and Marxism in this series; this guide states what the tradition contributed and what it received.

The institutional opening came at the Latin American bishops’ conference at Medellín in 1968, whose documents named the region’s condition as institutionalised violence and called the church to a preferential option for the poor. The theoretical founding followed in 1971 with Gustavo Gutiérrez’s Teología de la liberación, A Theology of Liberation, in which the Peruvian priest argued that theology must begin from the practice of liberation, that sin was embodied in unjust structures and not only in individual hearts, and that the social sciences, Marxist analysis among them, were necessary instruments for naming those structures truthfully. Around the founding text grew a movement: base ecclesial communities in Brazil and Central America where peasants and slum dwellers read scripture against their own conditions, a generation of theologians including Leonardo Boff and Jon Sobrino, and a practice of accompaniment that placed priests and religious inside the region’s conflicts, at a cost the dictatorship sections below record.

How did a theology become one of the region’s Marxist contributions?

By reversing the direction of borrowing. Liberation theologians took from Marxism its analysis of structural exploitation while subordinating that analysis to a theological end, and in doing so they carried Marxist categories into communities, parishes and eventually seminaries that no party publication could have reached, transforming both the categories and the church.

For the Marxist tradition the encounter cut both ways. It gained an ally with a mass presence the parties lacked and a vocabulary, liberation, Exodus, the Kingdom, in which the region’s poor already thought. It also faced an internal correction. The theologians insisted that the human reality of the poor exceeded their class position, that faith was not a mask over interest but a constituent of the people’s identity, and that a Marxism which treated it as mere ideology would misread the very population it proposed to emancipate. The region’s Marxist philosophy registered the correction; the most systematic of its philosophers, treated next, had already argued that Marxism was a philosophy of praxis in which human beings make themselves through transformative activity, a formulation under which the theologians’ insistence could be heard as something other than heresy. The Vatican’s instructions of 1984 and 1986, which criticised the movement’s use of Marxist analysis while affirming its option for the poor, mark the encounter’s outer boundary: the borrowing was real, contested and consequential on both sides, and it remains the region’s most original contribution to the theory of how Marxism meets a religious people.

The philosophy of praxis in exile: Adolfo Sánchez Vázquez

The tradition’s most systematic philosopher arrived in the region as a refugee. Adolfo Sánchez Vázquez, a Spanish Republican intellectual exiled to Mexico in 1939, built at the National Autonomous University of Mexico a body of work that re-founded the region’s Marxist philosophy on the concept of praxis. His Filosofía de la praxis, published in 1967, argued against the deterministic materialism of the Soviet textbooks that Marx’s philosophy centred on human creative activity, on the unity of theory and practice in the transformation of the world, and it supported the argument from the young Marx’s manuscripts with a scholarship that matched the European rediscovery of those texts then underway. His later work on aesthetics, on ethics and on the philosophy of the Spanish exile extended the same humanist and anti-dogmatic reading.

What did Sánchez Vázquez bring to the philosophy of praxis?

A systematic restatement, from Mexican exile, of Marxism as a philosophy of human creative activity rather than a doctrine of historical necessity, argued from the early manuscripts against the Soviet textbook orthodoxy, and institutionalised in the region’s largest university, where it formed generations of the region’s philosophers.

Sánchez Vázquez matters to this guide for three reasons beyond his arguments. He embodies the region’s role as a refuge for European Marxism itself, a direction of travel the derivative charge never contemplates: the Spanish exile of 1939 deposited in Mexico a philosophical culture that Mexico then naturalised and taught. He demonstrates the tradition’s institutional depth, since his seminar at the university was a school in the strict sense, producing philosophers who carried the praxis reading across the Spanish-speaking world. And his work, like Marini’s, is largely absent from English, a fact the untranslated source note below weighs. The region’s philosophy of praxis is one of the bodies of work an English reader is most likely never to have heard of, and its absence from the Anglophone picture is a measure of that picture’s distortion.

Dussel and the manuscripts: the region reads Marx’s workshop

The philosopher whose three-volume study of Marx’s manuscripts is a significant contribution to Marx scholarship worked, like Sánchez Vázquez, in Mexican exile. Enrique Dussel, an Argentine philosopher driven from his country by the dictatorship of the 1970s, settled in Mexico and undertook in the 1980s the most sustained reading of Marx’s economic manuscripts produced anywhere in that decade: La producción teórica de Marx, a commentary on the Grundrisse published in 1985; Hacia un Marx desconocido, Towards an Unknown Marx, on the manuscripts of 1861 to 1863, published in 1988; and El último Marx, on the Marx of the final decades, published in 1990. Working through the drafts in sequence, Dussel argued that the category of living labour, the labourer’s creative capacity standing outside capital and yet appropriated by it, was the generative centre of Marx’s economics, and that the mature Marx of the final manuscripts had moved toward positions his orthodox interpreters had not registered, including a serious reckoning with the communal forms of the non-European world.

What did Dussel find in Marx’s manuscripts?

A Marx whose central category was living labour, the worker’s creative power exterior to capital, and whose late work, including the drafts and letters on the Russian commune, questioned the unilinear sequence his followers had canonised. The finding grounded Dussel’s later philosophy of liberation in Marx’s own workshop rather than in commentary upon it.

The significance for this guide is the direction of the scholarship. In the 1980s, when European Marx scholarship was preoccupied with the defence or dissolution of the doctrine, its most laborious textual work was being done in Mexico City by an exile from Buenos Aires, and was being done partly in order to equip a Latin American philosophy of liberation with a Marx read at first hand. Only the middle volume of the three has been fully translated into English. The episode therefore belongs equally to the tradition’s achievements and to its translation deficit, and the untranslated source note below returns to it.

Coloniality of power: Quijano and the longest structure

The tradition’s most influential late concept came from Peru, from a sociologist whose formation ran through the dependency debates and the study of the indigenous movement. Aníbal Quijano, who had worked on the region’s agrarian structures and on the cholificación of Peruvian society, formulated in the early 1990s the concept of the coloniality of power. Its canonical early statement is the essay Colonialidad y modernidad/racionalidad, Coloniality and Modernity/Rationality, written in 1991 and published in 1992; its systematic English statement, Coloniality of Power, Eurocentrism, and Latin America, appeared in 2000. The concept holds that the conquest of the Americas constituted a new structure of power whose organising principle was the racial classification of the world’s population, that this classification assigned labour forms, authority and knowledge by race, and that it survived formal independence and the end of colonial administration, persisting as coloniality within formally sovereign republics whose states, economies and hierarchies of knowledge it continues to organise. Colonialism ended. Coloniality, on this account, is the longer structure, and it is constitutive of modernity itself rather than a residue modernity failed to clear.

When did Quijano formulate the coloniality of power?

In the years around the quincentenary of the conquest. The concept’s first statement, the essay on coloniality and modernity, was written in 1991 and published in 1992, and Quijano elaborated it through the decade, giving it systematic form in the English-language statement of 2000 that carried it into the world academy.

The concept’s relation to the Marxist tradition is double, and the guide reports both faces. Quijano formed the concept from inside the tradition’s own materials: the dependency analysis of a world structure, Mariátegui’s insistence that race in the Andes was a matter of land and labour, not a prejudice, and the feudalism debate’s finding that the region’s labour regimes were constituted by its insertion into a world economy. At the same time the concept displaces class from the centre of the analysis, treating racial classification as a structure as deep as the relations of production and irreducible to them, and its later career in the decolonial school, associated with scholars such as Walter Mignolo, has often proceeded at a distance from Marxism or in polemic against its Eurocentrism. Both faces are the tradition’s legacy. The coloniality of power is at once the Latin American Marxist tradition’s culminating production and a standing internal challenge to it: the claim that its founding category, class, does not reach the deepest structure its own region exhibits. A guide that concealed the challenge would misdescribe the tradition’s present state, in which the argument between the class analysis and the coloniality analysis is one of the live disputes the dictatorship sections’ survivors handed to their successors.

Marx’s own Latin America: the Aricó problem

One further contribution completes the theoretical survey, and it concerns the founder himself. Marx wrote about Latin America rarely and, in the region’s judgement, badly: his 1858 encyclopaedia article on Simón Bolívar, compiled from hostile sources, portrayed the liberator as a cowardly and authoritarian figure, and his journalism on Mexico and on British policy in the hemisphere applied his categories with a confidence the evidence did not always earn. The Argentine scholar José Aricó made this embarrassment into a research programme. His Marx y América Latina, Marx and Latin America, published in 1980, asked why Marx, whose analysis of Ireland and India had grasped the colonial question’s centrality, failed to construct an analysis of the region that had won its independence before he wrote, and Aricó’s answer, that Marx lacked a category for a postcolonial society dominated by classes formed under colonialism yet formally sovereign, turned the failure into a diagnosis of the theory’s gap. The region’s problem, the applicability of a European sequence to a society outside its premises, was thus located in the founder’s own texts, and the regional traditions’ repairs were reframed as completions of an unfinished analysis rather than deviations from a finished one. Aricó, who also directed the influential Cuadernos de Pasado y Presente notebooks that carried European Marxist theory, Gramsci above all, into Spanish American circulation, represents the tradition’s scholarly conscience: the insistence that the inheritance be read whole, including the pages where it fails the region that inherited it.

The primer that formed a generation: Harnecker and the diffusion machine

A tradition is measured not only by its peaks but by its instruments of diffusion, and on that measure the region possesses a case without parallel elsewhere in the Marxist world. In 1969 the Chilean sociologist Marta Harnecker, who had studied in Paris in the circle of Louis Althusser and had worked on the French philosopher’s own project of rereading Marx, published in Mexico with the Siglo XXI publishing house a manual titled Los conceptos elementales del materialismo histórico, The Elementary Concepts of Historical Materialism. The book taught the doctrine’s basic categories, mode of production, class, surplus value, ideology, the state, in a sequence of short chapters with summaries and questions, designed for study circles of workers, peasants, students and militants who had no teacher. It succeeded beyond any comparable text. An estimate repeated by Michael Löwy in his survey of the region’s Marxism puts the book’s circulation at over a million copies, carried through edition after edition in Spanish and in Portuguese and in the pirated and movement printings that no bibliography fully records. For a generation of Latin Americans, across countries and across the spectrum from party schools to guerrilla camps to parish study groups, this was the book from which Marxism was first learned.

How did Harnecker’s primer form a generation?

By standardising the tradition’s elementary vocabulary at continental scale. A militant formed in a Chilean población, a Brazilian seminary or a Mexican normal school in the 1970s had very likely met the categories of historical materialism first in Harnecker’s chapters, with Althusser’s preface attached to later editions and the same worked examples passing from hand to hand.

The primer’s significance for this guide is analytical, not merely bibliographical, and it cuts in two directions that the objection section below weighs. On one side, the primer is the region’s diffusion machine at its most effective, proof that Latin America did not merely receive the doctrine but organised its mass transmission with a pedagogical instrument Europe never produced for itself. On the other side, the primer’s content was a synthesis of the Soviet textbook tradition as filtered through Althusser’s Paris, so that the region’s greatest act of diffusion transmitted a doctrine whose theoretical content was substantially imported. The tension between those two truths, a regional instrument carrying a partly imported content, is the diffusion problem in its sharpest form, and the answer this guide gives to the derivative charge depends on holding both sides of it. Harnecker’s own later work, including her interviews with the commanders of the region’s guerrilla movements and her studies of the left’s strategy after the dictatorships, belongs to the tradition’s second formation and is treated in the reassembly section below.

The Cuban revolution and the continental shock

Every regional tradition has a date after which its questions change, and for Latin America the date is the first of January 1959, when the Cuban insurrection’s victory sent the Batista regime into flight and installed a revolutionary government ninety miles from the United States. The Cuban case itself, its radicalisation and its Marxist reading, is treated in its own article in this cluster; this guide records what the victory did to the tradition around it. It demonstrated, first, that a revolution could succeed in the region without the permission of the two-stage scheme, without a mature proletariat, and under the leadership of a movement that the orthodox parties had initially dismissed as petit-bourgeois adventurism, and the demonstration devalued every party’s accumulated theoretical capital at a stroke. It posed, second, the question of the revolution’s character: the Cuban leadership’s declaration of the revolution’s socialist character in 1961, and its alignment with the Soviet Union, forced every regional current to define itself by its attitude to Havana, and the resulting arguments, between the parties that counselled solidarity with gradualism and the movements that took Cuba as a warrant for immediate insurrection, reorganised the left for a generation. It created, third, an institutional patron: Cuba’s publishing houses, its Casa de las Américas, its scholarships and its solidarity apparatus made Havana a second centre of the regional tradition, translating, printing and training at a scale no party could match.

Why did the Cuban victory alter theory as well as politics?

Because it falsified, in practice, the scheme under which the region’s parties had operated for three decades. A revolution had succeeded without the prescribed stages, the prescribed class alliances or the prescribed party, and every element of the inherited strategy, the road, the subject, the timetable, had to be reargued from the evidence of the Sierra.

The debates of the 1960s inside the Cuban process itself contributed theory as well as example. The great debate on the socialist economy of 1963 to 1965, conducted in the journals between Guevara’s advocacy of the budgetary finance system, moral incentives and the new man, and the defenders of economic calculus, enterprise autonomy and material incentives associated with Carlos Rafael Rodríguez and with the French economist Charles Bettelheim’s counsel, was the most serious discussion of socialist economic organisation held anywhere in that decade, and it was held in Havana, in Spanish, by a government in the act of building the economy under discussion. The English reader can reach it in translation; the region lived it as its own seminar. When this guide claims that Latin America was a laboratory rather than a province, the Cuban economic debate is among its primary exhibits: a theoretical production arising from a regional problem, the construction of socialism in a small dependent economy, that the theory’s European custodians of the same years were not attempting at comparable depth.

The electoral road and its Chilean test

Against the foco stood the older road, and in Chile the older road received the most consequential test any Marxist strategy underwent in the region. Chile possessed what most of the region lacked: a large and organised working class in mining and industry, mass Marxist parties with decades of parliamentary experience, and a constitutional order within which those parties had contested power for a generation. The Socialist and Communist parties’ coalition brought Salvador Allende to the presidency in 1970 on a programme of transition to socialism by constitutional means: the nationalisation of copper and banking, the acceleration of agrarian reform, the socialisation of monopolies, all to be accomplished within legality and ratified at successive elections. The Chilean road, the vía chilena, was the democratic strategy’s supreme experiment, argued in the region’s journals as the foco’s antithesis: where the foco held that conditions are created by armed action, the Chilean leadership held that a majority could be assembled, held and deepened through the institutions themselves.

The experiment’s destruction in the military coup of September 1973, in which Allende died in the presidential palace and the armed forces under Augusto Pinochet inaugurated a dictatorship of exceptional duration and violence, closed the test without settling the argument, and the guide must be precise about what the evidence does and does not show. The Chilean process faced an economic war conducted by its domestic opponents and documented hostility from the United States, whose covert intervention in Chilean politics before and after the election is a matter of declassified record. It faced the structural problem its own theorists had named: a government that controlled the executive but not the judiciary, the legislature after the midterm elections, the officer corps or the commanding heights of distribution, attempting a transition whose legality armed its opponents with the state’s own forms. And it divided, in its final year, between a governing coalition that counselled consolidation and a revolutionary left that pressed for acceleration and for the arming of the workers’ organisations that had sprung up in the industrial belts. The coup answered none of the argument’s questions. It demonstrated that the armed forces would not permit the experiment to continue, which the foco’s theorists had predicted, and it demonstrated nothing about whether the experiment, unpermitted, could have consolidated, which is the question its defenders continue to argue. The full case is treated in the cluster’s own article on the democratic road; this guide registers the Chilean test as the strategic argument’s centre of gravity, the event to which every subsequent position in the region, armed or electoral, has had to address itself.

The guerrilla decades: the argument conducted in arms

Between the Cuban victory and the Chilean coup, the strategic argument was conducted not only in journals but in the field, and the guide records the sequence as the tradition’s lived debate. In Venezuela the Armed Forces of National Liberation fought the elected government of Rómulo Betancourt through the 1960s, in a campaign the Venezuelan Communist Party eventually abandoned for legality, splitting its own youth toward the guerrilla organisations. In Guatemala the Rebel Armed Forces and their successors opened an insurgency that, renewed in the 1970s under largely indigenous leadership in the highlands, drew the state into a counterinsurgency whose conduct the repression section below addresses. In Peru a generation inspired by the Cuban example launched focos in 1965 under Luis de la Puente Uceda and Héctor Béjar, defeated within the year, and the defeat entered the tradition’s memory as evidence on the theory’s conditions. In Colombia the insurgency took a different and longer form, rooted in the peasant self-defence zones of the Violencia period and consolidated from 1964 into the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia, whose longevity, financed in its later decades by the coca economy, posed the tradition a different question: not whether a foco could ignite a revolution, but what a guerrilla army becomes when it survives its own strategy. In Argentina and Uruguay the argument moved into the cities, where the Montoneros and the Tupamaros developed the urban guerrilla as a distinct form, kidnapping, expropriating and assassinating in the capitals, and drawing the region’s most industrialised societies into the same cycle of insurgency and state terror that consumed the rural movements.

The balance the tradition itself drew from the guerrilla decades was severe, and it was drawn by participants before it was drawn by scholars. The foco’s central claim, that the armed nucleus creates its conditions, had been tested in country after country and had succeeded nowhere after Cuba, at a cost in lives that the repression sections of this guide decline to number and refuse to minimise. The survivors’ literature, of which Béjar’s account of the Peruvian 1965 campaign is the classic, records the theory’s defects from inside: the peasantry’s caution misread as readiness, the state’s intelligence and mobility underestimated, the party and mass work the theory had demoted proving indispensable precisely where the foco lacked them. Yet the electoral road’s balance sheet, closed at the Moneda in 1973, was no more reassuring, and the tradition’s strategic argument therefore survived its own evidence, unresolved, into the dictatorship years. That unresolved state is the honest description, and the guide preserves it: Latin America’s Marxists argued the road question for half a century with the strongest possible incentives to settle it, and the region’s history refused to settle it for them.

The dictatorships: the long night of the tradition

The tradition’s catastrophe arrived as a sequence of military regimes whose dates map the region’s political geography: Brazil in 1964, where a coup against the Goulart government opened two decades of military rule; Bolivia in successive coups from 1964 and most brutally from 1971; Uruguay and Chile in 1973, the region’s two most institutionalised democracies falling within months of each other; Argentina in 1976, where the armed forces conducted the most systematic of the region’s campaigns of disappearance; and the Central American counterinsurgencies of the late 1970s and 1980s, in El Salvador and Guatemala, where states armed and advised by the United States fought insurgencies with methods their own truth commissions would later document. The regimes differed in ideology and duration. They shared a doctrine, the national security doctrine, which defined an internal enemy whose defeat required the reorganisation of the state and the elimination of the Marxist presence from the institutions of civil society, and they shared, as the coordination among their intelligence services known as Operation Condor attests, a regional conception of their task. What they did to the Marxist tradition is this guide’s subject; what they did to their societies is recorded in the reports named below, to which the guide directs the reader for the accounting it does not reproduce.

The destruction was institutional before it was personal, and its institutional character is what distinguishes it in the tradition’s history. The regimes closed or purged the universities in which the tradition taught, beginning with episodes such as the night of the long batons in Buenos Aires in 1966, when police cleared the faculties of the University of Buenos Aires and drove hundreds of academics into exile, and extending to the intervention of the University of Chile, the dissolution of research centres, and the burning and banning of books. They shut the publishing houses and journals through which the tradition reproduced itself, raided the institutes where dependency theory had been built, and proscribed the parties and unions that had carried Marxist ideas to mass audiences. FLACSO, the region’s social science faculty, the Brazilian Centre for Analysis and Planning, the Chilean institutes where Cardoso and dos Santos had worked: the infrastructure of a regional social science was dismantled in a decade, by regimes that understood precisely what they were dismantling. The tradition had been, among other things, an academic formation, housed in the region’s public universities to a degree unusual in the Marxist world, and the dictatorships struck the housing.

Repression and the record: what the sources establish

The personal destruction matched the institutional. The regimes killed, imprisoned, tortured and exiled the tradition’s producers along with the far larger number of its readers, students, union members and neighbours who formed their target population, and they did so in several countries by disappearance, a method designed to deny the record itself. This guide follows the series protocol for such material. It reports the repression factually, and it does not quote totals for the dead, the disappeared or the exiled, because the totals are contested, because they belong to the official reports and scholarly estimates that hold them, and because the guide’s subject, the fate of a body of thought, is not measured by them. The reader who needs the accounting will find it in the sources the successor states themselves commissioned: for Argentina, the report of the National Commission on the Disappearance of Persons, Nunca Más, published in 1984; for Chile, the report of the National Commission for Truth and Reconciliation of 1991, known by the name of its chairman Raúl Rettig, and the later Valech commission’s work on political imprisonment and torture; for Brazil, the report of the National Truth Commission delivered in 2014; for Guatemala, the report of the Commission for Historical Clarification of 1999; for El Salvador, the report of the United Nations Truth Commission of 1993. These documents, and the scholarly literature built on them, are where the figures live, with their methods stated and their disputes visible.

What do the truth commission reports establish, and what do they leave open?

They establish, from testimony and the states’ own records, the fact, the methods and the institutional responsibility for the repression: the disappearances, the clandestine centres, the torture, the coordination across borders. They leave open, and their own texts mark as open, the full accounting of the dead and the disappeared, which the method of disappearance was designed to prevent.

One consequence of the destruction concerns this guide directly, and it is stated here because it disciplines everything the guide says about the tradition’s later decades. A substantial part of the reason so much of the tradition was never translated, and so much of its archive is fragmentary, is that its institutions were destroyed at the height of their productivity and their people scattered. Manuscripts were abandoned in flight, libraries were confiscated, journals ceased mid-volume, and scholars rebuilt their working lives in languages and institutions abroad. The translation deficit examined below is not a judgement the Anglophone world passed on the tradition’s quality. It is, in significant part, a scar left by the regimes that burned the books.

Exile and relocation: Mexico, Europe and the second formation

The tradition survived its destruction by moving, and the geography of its survival is a map of the region’s remaining refuges. The first refuge was Mexico, whose governments maintained an asylum tradition that had already received the Spanish Republicans of 1939 and now received the South Americans of the 1970s: Chileans after 1973, Argentines after 1976, Uruguayans, Brazilians in the earlier wave, Central Americans in the 1980s. The Casa de Chile in Mexico City, the journals founded or refounded in exile, and above all the National Autonomous University and the publishing houses gave the scattered scholars posts, presses and students. Marini’s Mexican years, Dussel’s settlement, the presence of the region’s historians, sociologists and philosophers in Mexican institutions: the second formation of Latin American Marxism, the one that wrote the tradition’s retrospective and critical literature, was disproportionately a Mexican production, written by exiles about countries they could not enter.

Where did the exiled scholars go?

First to the region’s own refuges, Mexico above all, and to Venezuela and Costa Rica in smaller streams; then to Europe, to France, Spain, Britain, Sweden and the two Germanies, where universities and solidarity networks offered posts; and to the United States, whose Latin American studies programmes absorbed a generation of the region’s social scientists.

The second refuge was Europe, and the European exile changed the tradition’s intellectual chemistry. In Paris, London, Barcelona and Stockholm the exiles encountered the Western Marxism of the post-1968 decades, the Althusserian and post-Althusserian theory, the Gramsci scholarship, the Eurocommunist debates, and they encountered them as colleagues rather than as readers. The encounter produced the tradition’s most self-critical literature: the re-examinations of populism and the state by scholars such as Ernesto Laclau, who carried the Argentine debates to an English university and rebuilt them into a theory of populism and hegemony; the histories of the region’s left written with archival calm by a generation that had lost the argument in practice and intended to understand why; and a widespread turn, among the exiles, from the strategy of revolution to the theory of democracy, as the survivors concluded that the defence of democratic institutions, which both the foco’s contempt for legality and the parties’ instrumentalism had undervalued, was the precondition of everything else they wanted. That turn, from revolution to democracy as the tradition’s central problem, is the exile generation’s deepest bequest to the currents that followed, and it was purchased by defeat and thought through in foreign seminar rooms.

Exile also redrew the tradition’s linguistic map, with consequences the untranslated note below develops. Scholars who had written in Spanish and Portuguese now wrote in French, English and German for their host institutions; some, like the Brazilian Theotonio dos Santos in his later Mexican years or the Argentine historians in Spain, moved between languages; and a body of work about Latin America came to exist primarily in the languages of the exile countries, addressed to audiences for whom the region was an object of study rather than a home. When the dictatorships ended and the exiles returned, many to found institutes and journals in the restored democracies, they brought the exile literatures with them, and the tradition’s third formation, the one the later sections describe, was built by returnees who had been formed twice: once in the region’s own institutions, and once in its diaspora.

What was lost: the archive of an interrupted tradition

An honest guide must attempt the inventory of the loss, not in figures, which the protocol reserves to the reports, but in kinds. The tradition lost a generation’s continuity: the seminar successions by which a school reproduces itself were broken at the region’s major universities, and the students of the 1970s who would have been the masters of the 1990s were in many cases dead, exiled or driven from academic life. It lost archives: party records seized or destroyed, journal runs pulped, personal libraries confiscated, and with them the primary material of its own history, which is why the tradition’s historiography leans so heavily on the exile press and on the records of its enemies. It lost the regional integration its institutions had built: the Santiago of the 1960s, where FLACSO and the university institutes drew scholars from every country into a single conversation, had no successor capital, and the tradition’s later life has been more national, more fragmented among countries whose exiles returned to different defeats. And it lost time in a specific intellectual sense. The debates the destruction interrupted, on the state, on populism, on the colonial mode of production, on the economics of transition, were resumed decades later in a world that had moved on, by scholars working from partial records. The coloniality concept and the decolonial turn, the tradition’s most successful late production, can be read as the resumption, under a new name and with new materials, of the interrupted argument about race and the region’s place in the modern world that the Peruvian founder had opened and the dictatorships had scattered.

The Bolivian laboratory: miners and the motley society

Bolivia gave the tradition its most instructive national case, because Bolivia compressed into three decades the sequence the whole region debated: a revolution made from below, a workers’ movement of exceptional power, and a theorist who rebuilt the categories to fit what he had watched. The revolution of April 1952, in which the miners’ militias defeated the army and the Movimiento Nacionalista Revolucionario took power, enacted universal suffrage, nationalised the great tin mines and decreed an agrarian reform that broke the hacienda in the highlands, all under a government that was nationalist rather than Marxist but that governed, for its first years, in unstable partnership with the Central Obrera Boliviana, the labour federation whose miners’ contingents were the revolution’s armed force. The Bolivian Trotskyist party, the Partido Obrero Revolucionario, exercised an influence out of all proportion to its size through the miners’ federation, whose Pulacayo theses of 1946 had adopted a programme of transitional demands modelled on the Fourth International’s founding document. Bolivia was thus the one country where a Trotskyist formation stood near the centre of a real revolution, and the tradition’s internal argument between its communist and Trotskyist branches had a Bolivian archive to argue over.

The theorist the case produced was René Zavaleta Mercado, a Bolivian sociologist whose work, written across exile and return and cut short by his death in 1984, is among the most original in this guide and among the least translated. Zavaleta’s central concept named the condition the other regional theories had circled: Bolivia was a sociedad abigarrada, a motley society, in which modes of production, temporalities and forms of authority from different epochs coexisted within a single social formation without fusing into a homogeneous order. The mine, the ayllu, the hacienda’s remnants, the urban informal economy and the modern state were not stages awaiting their turn but simultaneous realities whose articulation was the country’s actual structure. The concept travelled, in the Spanish-speaking literature, as the region’s most precise tool for the condition the stage theory could not describe, and its author’s companion notion, lo nacional-popular, the national-popular as the form in which the region’s masses enter politics, reorganised the study of populism treated below. Zavaleta matters to this guide as the Bolivian proof of its central pattern: a regional theorist, confronting a society the inherited sequence could not file, produced a category that the whole region then used.

Peru’s other road: the party that took the founder’s name in vain

Peru, the founder’s country, also produced the tradition’s most disturbing late chapter, and a guide that omitted it would fail its readers. In 1980, as Peru returned to elected government, a communist party faction led by Abimael Guzmán, a philosophy professor at the university of Ayacucho, launched an armed struggle under the banner of a Marxism it proclaimed to be the doctrine’s third and higher stage. The organisation, known by the name its admirers gave it, Sendero Luminoso, the Shining Path, built its base among the Quechua-speaking peasantry and the provincial students of the southern highlands, the very populations in whose name the Peruvian founder had written, and conducted a war against the Peruvian state and against rival left organisations whose violence the state’s truth and reconciliation commission would later document in its report of 2003. The commission’s findings, and the scholarly literature on the conflict, are the sources for its accounting, which this guide does not reproduce. Guzmán was captured in 1992 and the organisation collapsed as a national force.

The episode belongs in this guide for a theoretical reason. The Shining Path presented itself as the heir of Mariátegui, quoted the founder’s authority for its own doctrine of a protracted people’s war, and drew from Maoism a universalised sequence, countryside encircling cities, that it applied to Peru with a literalism the founder’s own method, the heroic creation against the copy, explicitly forbade. The Peruvian left’s other currents, and the scholars of the founder’s work, contested the claim of inheritance from the beginning, and the contest is instructive: it shows a regional tradition arguing over its own founder’s meaning under the worst possible conditions, and it shows the difference, which this guide has maintained throughout, between a tradition’s texts and the uses armed organisations make of them. The founder’s essays survive the episode. The claim that they authorised it does not survive the reading of them.

Nicaragua: the last insurrection and the tradition’s balance sheet

The final act of the region’s revolutionary period was played in Nicaragua, where the Frente Sandinista de Liberación Nacional, founded in 1961 in the Cuban victory’s aftermath and named for Augusto César Sandino, the guerrilla leader who had fought the United States occupation of the 1920s and 1930s, overthrew the Somoza dynasty in July 1979 after an insurrection that joined the guerrilla fronts to a general civic uprising. The Sandinista decade that followed, a revolutionary government attempting a mixed economy and political pluralism under the pressure of a counterrevolutionary war financed by the United States and a domestic opposition that divided the country, and its electoral defeat in 1990, closed the period this guide covers with a symmetry the tradition itself noted. The movement that took power had synthesised the era’s lessons as its founders understood them: the broad alliance the foco had scorned, the mass insurrection the electoral road had not dared, the Marxist formation tempered by nationalism, liberation theology and the memory of Sandino. Its decade in power, and the terms on which it lost power at the ballot box and accepted the loss, became the exile generation’s final exhibit in the argument about democracy: the tradition’s last revolutionary government was also the first to hand over power after an election, and the survivors drew the conclusion their own history had been preparing, that the institutions they had treated as obstacles were the only ground on which their project could durably stand.

Argentina’s problem: a working class that chose Peronism

Every regional tradition has a national case that torments it, and for the region’s Marxism the case is Argentina, where the largest and most organised working class in South America gave its durable loyalty not to any Marxist party but to Peronism, the movement founded by Juan Domingo Perón in the 1940s. The Argentine left’s failure to win the class it claimed to represent generated a literature of self-examination unmatched in the region, and two of its products belong in this guide. The historian Milcíades Peña, writing in the 1950s and 1960s, rebuilt Argentine history from its agrarian base and argued that the country’s development had been blocked by the alliance of the landowning oligarchy with British capital, a reading that made the national question, the question of the country’s sovereignty over its own economy, prior to the class question in its simple form. Jorge Abelardo Ramos drew the more scandalous conclusion. In works such as Revolución y contrarrevolución en la Argentina, he argued that the region’s left had been colonised in its thinking, that it had imported European schemas and applied them to societies they did not fit, and that a Latin American left worthy of its continent would have to be national in its categories before it could be socialist in its programme. Ramos’s charge, the charge of derivation, is the strongest objection this guide must answer, and it is stated at full strength in the objection section below, in its author’s own terms. Its presence here marks the fact that the charge was first and most forcefully made not by the tradition’s enemies but by one of its own heretics, which is why it cannot be dismissed as an outsider’s misunderstanding.

The Argentine case also produced the tradition’s most consequential export to European theory. Ernesto Laclau, formed in the Argentine debates and in the milieu of the national left before his exile-era settlement in England, took the Peronist problem, the construction of a popular identity that cut across class positions, and rebuilt it into a general theory of populism and hegemony whose influence on European political theory exceeded that of any other Latin American Marxist work of its generation. The direction of travel deserves emphasis. A problem posed by Buenos Aires politics, the loyalty of workers to a movement their Marxist parties classified as reactionary, generated, through an Argentine theorist’s exile, one of the late twentieth century’s most debated theories of how popular identities are made. The region as province does not explain the case. The region as laboratory does.

The translation enterprise: Gramsci in Spanish and the notebooks

A tradition’s imports deserve the same scrutiny as its exports, and the region’s greatest import enterprise was conducted from Argentina and Mexico by the publishing project known as the Cuadernos de Pasado y Presente, the Notebooks of Past and Present, directed by José Aricó and his collaborators from the late 1960s. The Cuadernos translated and introduced, in cheap and widely distributed volumes, the European Marxist theory that the region’s universities and parties could not otherwise obtain: Gramsci above all, whose prison writings the project edited with a care that made the Spanish Gramsci for a generation more complete than the English one, and with him the Frankfurt School, the Austro-Marxists, the debates on the state and on the transition. The enterprise matters to the guide’s argument in two ways. It demonstrates that the region’s relation to European theory was not passive reception but active editorial construction: the Cuadernos selected, sequenced, introduced and argued with their texts, and the Latin American Gramsci, read through the national-popular question and the problem of the region’s incomplete bourgeois revolutions, was a distinct theoretical object from the Italian or the English one. And it complicates the diffusion ledger in the opposite direction from the primer. Where Harnecker’s manual diffused a simplified doctrine outward to the region’s militants, the Cuadernos diffused a sophisticated doctrine inward to its intellectuals, and the region’s theory of the 1970s, its debates on hegemony, the state and populism, ran on rails the Cuadernos had laid. A tradition that builds its own translation infrastructure is exercising a form of theoretical sovereignty, even when the texts translated are foreign, and the objection section’s verdict takes the enterprise into account.

The Soviet connection: formation, texts and the price of affiliation

No honest account can omit the tradition’s third external relation, after Europe’s theory and the region’s own problems: the Soviet Union as an institution. For the communist parties, affiliation brought training in Moscow’s schools, where generations of Latin American cadres studied; it brought the canonical texts in cheap Spanish editions distributed across the continent; it brought subsidies, discipline and a line that changed with Moscow’s requirements, most painfully in the era of the Nazi-Soviet pact and in the Browder episode’s regional echoes, when parties dissolved their militancy into national unity at the centre’s instruction. The costs are part of the record the objection section weighs: a derivative party culture, in which the resolution of Latin American questions awaited signals from abroad, and a repeated sacrifice of regional judgement to international discipline, of which the cold reception of the Peruvian theses in 1929 was the founding instance. Against the costs stand the connection’s real services, which the survivors’ memoirs record without embarrassment: the schools taught organisation to militants from countries without universities open to them, the editions put Marx’s texts into villages that had never held a book, and the affiliation gave small and persecuted parties a sense of belonging to a world movement that sustained them through dictatorships older than the ones this guide records. The tradition’s mature historians hold both sides of the ledger, and so does this guide. What the four-instance pattern adds is the observation that the region’s theoretical originality flowered precisely where the connection’s grip was weakest or most successfully resisted: in the Peruvian founder’s independence, in the dependency school’s university base, in the exile generation’s distance. The correlation is the region’s own verdict on its Soviet decades, delivered by its practice rather than its polemics.

Brazil’s long road: the party, the leagues and the universities

Brazil, the region’s largest country and the only one whose Marxism worked in Portuguese, developed the tradition’s most institutionally complete variant, and its trajectory summarises the regional pattern in a single national arc. The party founded in 1922 spent its early decades under the shadow of Luís Carlos Prestes, the army officer whose long march of the 1920s, the Prestes Column’s trek through the interior, made him the country’s revolutionary legend before his conversion to communism made him the party’s leader for a generation. The Brazilian party’s history runs through the failed rising of 1935, long illegalities, and a postwar legality in which it became a significant force in the unions and the universities. Its agrarian work met its test in the Peasant Leagues of the northeast, organised from the 1950s by the lawyer Francisco Julião among the sugar zone’s tenants and labourers, whose demand for agrarian reform by law or by force frightened the republic’s proprietors more than any urban movement of the period. The leagues, the student movement, the party’s cultural apparatus and the reform government of João Goulart together formed the constellation whose destruction the 1964 coup accomplished, and Brazil’s dictatorship, the region’s longest of the era, gave the tradition its first great exile and its first long lesson in what military rule does to a Marxist culture.

Brazil’s distinctive contribution to the tradition’s institutional history is the university. The University of São Paulo, founded in 1934 with a French academic mission, formed a generation of social scientists who made the Brazilian reading of Marx an academic discipline of the first rank: the seminar on Capital that met from the late 1950s, gathering scholars who would include the sociologist Fernando Henrique Cardoso’s teachers and colleagues, read Marx’s text with a rigour the parties never attempted, and the São Paulo school of Marx studies, extending to the philosophers and historians of the following decades, gave the region its most sustained example of Marxism as scholarship. When the dictatorship purged the universities after 1964 and again after 1968, compulsorily retiring the seminar’s members among many others, the school scattered to the private research centres the exiles and the dismissed founded, the Brazilian Centre for Analysis and Planning chief among them, and the dependency analysis that conquered the world was written substantially in those centres, by scholars the dictatorship had expelled from the university into the institute. The pattern, destruction producing diaspora and diaspora producing theory, is the region’s signature, and Brazil exhibits it in its purest form.

The state debate: the authoritarian state and the theory of democracy

The dictatorships forced on the tradition a question its classical texts had treated thinly: the theory of the state, and specifically of the authoritarian state that the region’s militaries had built. The debate ran through the exile journals and the surviving institutes of the 1970s, and it drew on the European discussion, on Poulantzas and the German state derivation debates the Cuadernos had translated, while answering to regional evidence the Europeans did not possess. The political scientist Guillermo O’Donnell, an Argentine working at the boundary of the tradition, supplied its most durable concept with his analysis of bureaucratic authoritarianism, the regime type installed in the most industrialised countries of the region precisely where modernisation theory had predicted democracy, a finding that turned the region’s evidence against the liberal account examined below. Within the Marxist debates proper, the questions were harder. Was the authoritarian state an instrument of a dependent bourgeoisie, a relatively autonomous arbiter among classes, or the political form of the super-exploitation mechanism itself? The answers mattered practically, because they decided what the opposition should demand: the state’s democratisation, its capture, or its destruction, and the exile generation’s gradual convergence on democratisation as the immediate and non-negotiable aim was the theoretical form of the democracy turn recorded above. The tradition emerged from the dictatorships having learned, at ruinous cost, a lesson its founder texts had not taught it: that the forms of the state, elections, courts, a free press, are not a shell to be discarded on the road to power but part of the substance of any socialism the region could durably build. The currents of the following decades, including those that won elections, operated inside that lesson’s terms.

The reassembly: the tradition after the dictatorships

The military regimes ended in sequence: Ecuador and Peru at the decade’s turn, Bolivia, Argentina after the Malvinas defeat of 1982, Uruguay and Brazil by 1985, Chile by the plebiscite of 1988 and the transition of 1990, and the Central American wars by the peace accords of the early 1990s. The tradition that reassembled in the restored democracies was recognisably the same tradition and irreversibly changed. Its personnel were the returnees, formed in the exile seminar rooms, staffing the refounded institutes and the new democratic parties. Its central problem had migrated from the road to power to the terms of democracy: the quality of the region’s democracies, the persistence of the economic model the dictatorships had installed, the human rights accounting the truth commissions conducted. Its relation to its own past was newly critical, conducted in a literature of balance sheets, of which Harnecker’s interviews and stocktakings of the revolutionary left are representative, in which the survivors asked what the armed road had cost, what the parties’ orthodoxies had prevented them from seeing, and what of the inheritance remained usable. And its international frame had collapsed: the Soviet Union’s disappearance between 1989 and 1991 removed the affiliation that had structured the parties for seventy years, orphaned the Cuban economy whose patronage had sustained a second centre, and forced every current to restate its socialism without a world movement behind it. The currents described in the following sections are the tradition’s answers to that triple condition: democracy restored, the revolutionary road discredited by its own record, and the international centre gone.

Indigenous movements and the Marxist inheritance

The tradition’s oldest problem returned, in the decades after the dictatorships, wearing new organisational forms, and the encounter between the Marxist inheritance and the indigenous movements of the late twentieth century is the regional problems table’s first row reopened. In Ecuador the Confederation of Indigenous Nationalities, founded in 1986, built a movement that could paralyse the country with its levantamientos, its uprisings, and that carried its own programme of a plurinational state into national politics. In Bolivia the cocalero and indigenous movements of the Chapare and the highlands converged with the urban insurrections of 2003 to bring the Movement for Socialism to government in 2006, where it remained until 2019, a period in which the vice presidency was held by Álvaro García Linera, a sociologist formed in the Marxist tradition whose writings on the state, on communal forms and on the motley society’s successor concepts made the Bolivian government the region’s most self-consciously theorised experiment of its period. In Mexico the Zapatista uprising of January 1994, launched from the Lacandón jungle by an organisation whose cadres had been formed in the Maoist and Guevarist currents of the Mexican left, announced itself in a language that fused the indigenous communities’ demands with a critique of neoliberalism addressed to a world audience, and then refused, deliberately and theoretically, the classical objective of taking state power.

The tradition’s relation to these movements was neither simple inheritance nor simple succession. The movements took from Marxism its analysis of land, of imperialism and of the state, and they took its organisational memory through the cadres who had passed from the left’s organisations into the indigenous movement’s service. They refused, at the same time, the tradition’s historic subordination of the indigenous question to the class question, insisting that the plurinational demand, the recognition of indigenous nations within the state, was not a stage on the road to a class politics but a transformation of what politics in the region could mean. The Peruvian founder’s proposition, that the Indian problem is the land problem, was thus simultaneously vindicated and surpassed: vindicated, because land and territory remained the movements’ material core; surpassed, because the movements claimed a national and cultural standing the founder’s generation had filed under class. The coloniality analysis supplied the theoretical bridge, which is why Quijano’s concept, formed where the class analysis met the race structure, became the period’s common currency. A guide written in the tradition’s own terms must record the outcome plainly: the region’s Marxism changed the indigenous movements, and the indigenous movements changed what remained of the region’s Marxism, and the exchange is the tradition’s most consequential late transaction.

The feminist correction and the tradition’s second self-criticism

The reassembly included a correction the classical tradition had postponed for a century. The region’s Marxist organisations had recruited women in large numbers, in the parties, the unions, the guerrilla movements and the exile communities, while reserving theory and command overwhelmingly to men, and the feminist movement that grew inside and against the left from the 1970s named the arrangement and theorised it. The encuentros, the continental feminist gatherings that began in Bogotá in 1981, became the movement’s parliament; the theorists of the current, among them the Bolivian Julieta Kirkwood, whose work asked what a feminist politics would do with the region’s authoritarian inheritance in the family and the state, and the Mexican Marta Lamas, who carried the argument into the region’s public sphere, built a body of work in explicit dialogue with the Marxist inheritance: accepting its analysis of production, extending it to reproduction and to the sexual division of labour, and refusing its assurance that the woman question would be settled by the revolution’s victory. The correction parallels, in the region’s own sequence, the communal and coloniality corrections before it: a population the theory had treated as a constituency presented itself as a subject with its own account of the structure, and the tradition that survived the encounter was the one that revised itself accordingly. The correction is recorded as part of the tradition’s history rather than as an external judgement upon it, because that is how the region’s own feminists, most of them formed inside the left, conducted it.

The pink tide: a closed period and its place in the tradition

Between the late 1990s and the middle of the following decade, governments of the left or centre-left won elections across most of the region: in Venezuela from 1998, Brazil from 2002, Argentina from 2003, Uruguay from 2004, Bolivia from 2006, Ecuador from 2007, with allied or sympathetic governments elsewhere, in a sequence the commentary named the pink tide. This guide treats that sequence strictly as a closed historical period, describing its relation to the tradition without evaluating any government that succeeded it and without reference to any later event. The period’s governments were not, in the main, Marxist governments, and the tradition’s relation to them was that of an ancestor variously honoured: their cadres had been formed in the parties, unions and movements this guide describes; their programmes drew on the dependency era’s critique of the open economy and on the democracy turn’s institutionalism; and their practice, redistributive within a commodity boom, constitutional reform in the Andean cases, regional integration projects in several, belonged to a post-revolutionary left whose defining decision, taken before it took office, was to seek power by election and to keep it by election. The theorists of the tradition debated the period in its own terms at the time: whether the tide represented the inheritance’s maturity, its dilution, or its final transformation into a regional social democracy. This debate stands as the tradition’s last internal argument of the period covered here, and with it stands the fact that gives the period its place in the longer story: the questions the tide’s governments argued about, land, sovereignty over resources, the colonial structure of the region’s hierarchies, the terms of insertion into the world economy, were the questions of the regional problems table, posed now from government offices rather than from exile. The table had outlasted the strategies.

The institutional account: colonial extraction and its long shadow

The tradition’s account of the region’s development is not the only one on offer, and this guide now states the principal rivals at full strength, in their own terms, as the brief for the article requires. The first is the institutional account associated with the economists Daron Acemoglu and James Robinson and their collaborators. On this account, the region’s poverty and inequality were founded in the colonial period by the institutions the colonisers built where they could extract: where dense indigenous populations and mineral wealth permitted, the Spanish built extractive institutions, the encomienda, the mita labour draft, the monopoly port system, designed to transfer resources to a narrow elite and to the crown; where such extraction was impossible, Europeans settled and built inclusive institutions instead. Independence changed the flags without changing the institutions, because the creole elites who inherited the extractive structures had every interest in preserving them, and the resulting institutional persistence, not geography, not culture and not the world market’s prices, explains the region’s long divergence from the North Atlantic economies. The account’s strength is its mechanism: it explains variation within the region, between the mining highlands and the settler south, by a single variable with documentary depth, and it explains persistence by the rational interest of those the institutions enrich. Its authors state it as a general theory of why nations fail, and the region is their principal historical exhibit.

What do Acemoglu and Robinson claim colonial institutions explain?

The region’s long-run divergence: why some American societies grew rich and others stayed poor. Their answer assigns the cause to the institutions founded under colonisation, extractive where the colonisers could plunder labour and minerals, inclusive where they had to settle, with the founding choice persisting through independence because its beneficiaries inherited the state.

The Marxist tradition’s response to the institutional account is instructive about both. The two accounts agree on the founding period and on the centrality of colonial labour coercion; they divide on the mechanism of persistence and the remedy. Where the institutionalists see rules that elites preserve because the rules enrich them, the tradition sees relations of production that reproduce a class with the interest and the means of preservation, and it asks the institutional account a question it finds hard to answer in its own terms: if extractive institutions persist because they serve their beneficiaries, what distinguishes an institution from the class power that maintains it, and what, short of a change in that power, has ever reformed one? The exchange is live in the literature and this guide does not pretend to close it. What the guide records is that the institutional account, the strongest non-Marxist explanation of the region’s development produced in the North Atlantic academy, converges with the tradition on the colonial founding while diverging on everything the tradition considers causal, which makes it the rival the region’s Marxists are obliged to answer rather than dismiss.

The liberal modernisation account: underdevelopment as an original condition

The second rival is the account against which the dependency school defined itself, and it deserves statement in its strongest form rather than in the caricature the polemics of the 1960s left behind. The modernisation account, whose canonical statement is Walt Whitman Rostow’s The Stages of Economic Growth of 1960 and whose regional sociology was built by the Argentine Gino Germani among others, holds that underdevelopment is the original condition of societies, not a product of their contact with the developed world. All societies begin traditional; development is the general process by which they acquire the preconditions, the capital formation, the urbanisation, the literacy, the secular and achievement-oriented values, for sustained growth; and the developed countries are simply those that traversed the process earlier. On this account the region’s difficulties are transitional and internal: the persistence of traditional elites and values, the demographic surge that outruns capital formation, the weakness of the entrepreneurial strata, the political instability that frightens investment. Contact with the centre is, in itself, an opportunity: trade, capital and technology flow toward the periphery’s development, and the obstacles lie in the periphery’s own structures and mentalities, which time, education and integration will dissolve. Germani’s regional version gave the account sociological depth, analysing the transition’s dislocations, the availability of masses detached from traditional orders for mobilisation by populist movements, with a subtlety that influenced even the scholars who rejected his framework.

What did the modernisation school expect development to require?

The traversal, by each society in its own time, of a general sequence: the building of preconditions, the take-off into sustained growth, the drive to maturity. It expected the obstacles to be internal and transitional, traditional values, scarce capital, demographic pressure, and it expected contact with the developed economies to assist the traversal rather than obstruct it.

The tradition’s counter-argument has been stated in the dependency sections and is not repeated here. What fairness requires is the acknowledgement of what the modernisation account explained well. It explained the region’s mid-century urbanisation and its dislocations better than the parties’ own sociology did; its account of the available masses remains embedded, usually unacknowledged, in the region’s later theories of populism; and its central empirical embarrassment for the Marxist tradition is real: several societies outside the region did traverse something like the sequence, industrialising within the world economy the dependency analysis described as a trap, and the tradition’s explanations of those cases, by exception, by geopolitics, by the peculiarities of the East Asian states, have the character of amendments to a theory whose first form predicted they could not occur. The dependency school’s mature representatives conceded the point in substance by rebuilding their analysis around dependent development, in which growth within dependency was possible and its forms were the object of study. The modernisation account in its original form has few defenders left, but the argument it forced, about whether incorporation into the world economy develops or underdevelops, remains the region’s permanent contribution to the world’s social science, and both sides of it were sharpened in Latin America.

The state failure account: the state that war never built

The third rival directs attention neither to the world economy nor to colonial institutions in general but to the region’s states themselves, and its most distinguished statement is the work of the political scientist Miguel Angel Centeno, whose Blood and Debt, published in 2002, inverted the European maxim that war made the state. In Europe, Centeno argues, the existential wars of the seventeenth to nineteenth centuries forced rulers to tax, to conscript, to borrow and to build the administrations that became the modern state. Latin America’s wars after independence were limited: fought by small professional forces, financed by foreign loans and customs revenues rather than by domestic taxation, and rarely threatening the survival of the states that waged them. The region’s states therefore never built the fiscal and administrative capacity their European counterparts were forced to build; they remained, in Centeno’s phrase, states that could not extract, could not register, could not reach their own territories, and their weakness, not their strength, is the region’s recurring political fact. The account extends to the region’s violence: the states’ incapacity left order to private and local powers, the caudillo, the landowner’s gunmen, the company town, and left the state’s own coercive apparatus, when the dictatorships later built it up, as an island of terrible competence in a sea of administrative weakness. On this account the region’s problem is not that its states were captured by the wrong classes or subordinated to the wrong centre. It is that its states were never fully built at all.

The state failure account presses the Marxist tradition at a genuinely weak point. The tradition’s theory of the state was a theory of the state’s class character, of whose interests it served, and it had little to say about the state’s capacity, its ability to perform the elementary operations of rule across its territory, as a variable in its own right. A state can be, in the tradition’s terms, the executive committee of a dependent bourgeoisie and still be unable to collect its taxes or police its countryside, and the second fact explains outcomes, the failure of land reforms decreed and never executed, the guerrilla zones the state could not enter, the informal economies that swallowed the formal ones, that the first fact cannot reach. The tradition’s best late work absorbed the point: the Bolivian theorists of the motley society, and the analysts of the region’s informal and fragmented orders, built state incapacity into their accounts of the social formation. But the absorption was an amendment, and the amendment’s origin in a rival school is recorded here in fairness. The three rivals together, extraction, modernisation and the unbuilt state, mark the field on which any defence of the tradition’s own account must now be conducted, and the objection that follows is best read against them: the question is never whether the tradition explained everything, but what it explained that its rivals did not, and at what cost in what it missed.

The derivative charge: the strongest objection, stated fairly

The strongest objection to everything this guide has claimed can now be stated, and the guide states it at full strength, attributed to the named critics who made it, because a tradition that cannot survive its own best critics in fair statement does not deserve the guide’s defence. The objection is that Latin American Marxism was, in its substance, derivative: that it imported European and Soviet debates and applied them, with local colour, to a region they were not made for, and that its apparently distinctive contributions dissolve on inspection. The charge was made first from inside the tradition. Jorge Abelardo Ramos argued that the region’s left had been mentally colonised, that its parties thought in categories imported from Europe and judged the region’s own movements, Peronism above all, by their distance from a European script, and that this derivation, not repression, was the left’s deepest failure. The scholarly version followed. Robert Packenham’s study of the dependency movement argued that dependency was less a research programme than an ideology, a restatement, in the vocabulary of centres and peripheries, of older underconsumptionist and stagnationist themes descending from Paul Baran, whose surplus, blocked from productive investment, explained underdevelopment by a mechanism the dependency writers never succeeded in making precise or testable. Sanjaya Lall’s earlier criticism had pressed the same point from economics: dependence, as its theorists used it, lacked a definition that could be false, and a concept that explains every outcome explains none. For liberation theology the corresponding charge, stated by the theologian’s critic Michael Novak among others, is that the movement borrowed its entire social analysis from Marxism while contributing no economics of its own, so that its theology stands or falls with an analysis it did not make and cannot defend. Gathered into one sentence, the objection runs: the region’s Marxism applied, translated and diffused; where it appeared to originate, it restated; and its history is the history of European theory’s American career, not of an American theory.

Who states the derivative charge against the region’s Marxism?

Its own heretics and its scholarly critics together. Jorge Abelardo Ramos charged the left with mental colonisation by European schemas; Robert Packenham argued dependency restated underconsumptionist economics as ideology; Sanjaya Lall found dependence undefined and untestable; Michael Novak held liberation theology’s social analysis to be borrowed entire from Marxism.

The objection must also be given its strongest evidence, which is considerable. The region’s communist parties did reproduce Moscow’s debates with a fidelity that their own historians record with shame, down to the vocabulary of their internal purges. The region’s academic Marxism of the 1970s did conduct large parts of its business in categories manufactured in Paris, and the Althusserian and Poulantzian seasons in the Latin American universities are not obviously distinguishable, at a distance, from their Parisian originals. The primer that formed the region’s militants did transmit a textbook doctrine assembled abroad. And the foco, the region’s most famous strategic production, was a generalisation from a single insurrection whose conditions its theorists failed to specify, so that its diffusion across the continent looks, in retrospect, like the career of a slogan rather than of an analysis. A defence that began by denying any of this would deserve the objection’s contempt. The defence begins by conceding it, and then asks what the concession leaves standing.

What the region claimed that Europe had not: the answer

What it leaves standing is the set of claims, identifiable and dated, that no European source had made before the region’s thinkers made them, and the guide’s answer to the derivative charge is an inventory rather than a rhetoric. The communal argument stands first. No European Marxist text had claimed, before the Peruvian essays of 1928, that a surviving indigenous communal institution could serve as the living basis of a socialist construction, bypassing the dissolution of communal property that the European sequence treated as progress’s price; the claim ran against the founder’s own published judgements on communal forms and against the Comintern’s classification simultaneously, and it was argued from the region’s evidence by a thinker who paid for the argument with his standing in his own movement. The super-exploitation mechanism stands second. No European text had specified, before Marini’s work of 1973, the mechanism by which dependent capital compensates for unequal exchange by paying labour power below its value and thereby fractures its own internal market; Baran’s surplus, which the objection cites as the source, is a category of stagnation, not a mechanism of the wage relation, and the distance between the two is the distance between a mood and a theory. The coloniality of power stands third: no European text had claimed, before Quijano’s essays of the early 1990s, that racial classification was a constitutive structure of the modern world, coeval with capitalism and irreducible to it, and the claim’s subsequent career in the world academy, where it reorganised fields far from Peru, is not the career of a restatement. To these the guide adds the feudalism debate’s settlement, the demonstration, built from Bagú and Prado Júnior onward, that the region’s coercive labour regimes were created by a capitalist world market rather than inherited from a feudal past, a demonstration that corrected the founder tradition’s own classification and that European historiography subsequently absorbed.

The answer also has a methodological edge, and it is the edge the four-instance pattern supplies. Derivation is a relation between a text and its source; originality in a regional tradition is a relation between a theory and a problem. The region’s thinkers were derivative exactly where they addressed Europe’s problems in Europe’s terms, the party orthodoxies and the Parisian seasons, and original exactly where they addressed the problems their own societies posed and Europe’s had not: the commune, the dependent wage, the racial structure of the modern world, the religious people. The objection, fairly weighed, therefore convicts half the tradition and acquits the other half, and the halves are not randomly assorted. They are sorted by the very criterion this guide has used throughout, fidelity to the region’s evidence against fidelity to the centre’s text. Ramos’s charge, the insider’s version, said the same thing from the other side: the left failed when it copied. The founder’s sentence of 1928 had said it first and shortest. A tradition whose own founding maxim is the objection’s criterion cannot be refuted by the objection; it can only be graded by it, and the grade this guide returns is mixed, earned and specific.

Diffusion and originality: the distinction the verdict requires

The concession the brief for this guide requires can now be made precisely, because the distinction it rests on has been built. A tradition’s diffusion is the movement of its texts, its vocabularies and its organisational forms across populations; its originality is the production of claims that were not made before. The two vary independently, and Latin America’s Marxism is the case that proves their independence, because the region scores at the extremes of both scales at once. Its diffusion was the most effective in the Marxist world: a primer that reached over a million readers, a bishops’ conference vocabulary that entered the region’s parishes, a guerrilla doctrine that reorganised the strategies of a continent’s youth within five years of its statement, a dependency vocabulary that became the default grammar of the world’s development debates. Its originality was real but narrower, concentrated in the claims inventoried above and in the corrections, Cardoso’s historicisation of dependency, Zavaleta’s motley society, Aricó’s diagnosis of the founder’s gap, that the region’s best minds applied to their own tradition’s excesses. And the two were often inversely related within the same career: the foco diffused continentally and originated little that survived its testing; Marini originated much and diffused, in his own language, mainly among specialists; the primer diffused a doctrine it did not originate; the Cuadernos originated a reading of Gramsci while diffusing a European text.

The student of the tradition should therefore keep the two scales separate as a matter of method, and the examination of the region’s claims should proceed claim by claim rather than by verdict on the whole. That is the grading the fourth regional instance performs. Set beside India, Japan and China, Latin America’s claim to originality does not rest on the volume of its Marxist production, which was large, nor on the heroism of its militants, which is not a theoretical category, but on the same ground as theirs: each region, confronting the stage theory’s misfit with its own society, produced repairs the theory’s home had not produced, and the repairs are the tradition. Latin America’s repairs, the communal argument, the dependency analysis in its corrected form, the super-exploitation mechanism and the coloniality of power, stand comparison with any region’s. Its diffusion, by contrast, exceeded every other region’s, and the excess is a fact about the region’s institutions, its universities, its church, its exile presses, rather than about its theory. The tradition’s epitaph and its prospectus are the same sentence: it taught a continent to read a doctrine, and at its best, in a handful of dated and nameable arguments, it taught the doctrine something the doctrine had not known.

The untranslated tradition: a note on sources

A substantial part of this tradition exists principally or only in Spanish and Portuguese, and the English reader’s picture of it is therefore a picture of a selection. This note states plainly what can be obtained and what cannot, because the guide’s claims rest on the whole tradition and the reader is entitled to know which parts of the evidence are open to inspection in English and which must be taken, for now, on the word of the scholarship that reads the originals. Nothing in what follows should be taken to imply that the untranslated material is minor. The opposite is true, and it is the note’s central point: some of the tradition’s most consequential arguments have never been Englished, and an account of Latin American Marxism built only from translated sources is systematically skewed toward what exile publishers, North American universities and the solidarity market chose to carry across.

What the English reader can obtain is considerable and should be named first. Mariátegui’s Seven Essays has been available in English since 1971, and the anthology of his writings edited by Harry Vanden and Marc Becker, published in 2011, carries a wide selection of the essays and journalism beyond it. Gutiérrez’s A Theology of Liberation appeared in English in 1973 and its successors have followed it. Cardoso and Faletto’s Dependency and Development in Latin America appeared in English in 1979; Frank wrote his major work in English directly. Guevara’s writings are translated entire, many times over. Dussel’s middle manuscript volume, Towards an Unknown Marx, is available in English, as is Aricó’s Marx and Latin America. Quijano’s key essays exist in English, including the 2000 statement of the coloniality of power and the collected foundational essays. The primer itself exists in English in a partial rendering of an early edition, made by a small collective in the United States in the late 1970s, though the standard Spanish text, with its later revisions, remains the reference. Löwy’s anthology and survey of the region’s Marxism, assembled by a Brazilian scholar writing between Portuguese, Spanish, French and English, gives the English reader the tradition’s own map of itself.

What cannot be obtained is the longer list, and it is given here with the original titles and their translations, as the brief requires. Marini’s Dialéctica de la dependencia, The Dialectics of Dependency, the founding statement of super-exploitation, circulated in English for decades only in excerpt and summary, and the body of his work, including his studies of the Brazilian subimperialism thesis and his later writings on globalisation, remains in Spanish and Portuguese. Bagú’s Economía de la sociedad colonial, Economy of Colonial Society, the 1949 founding text of the feudalism debate, has never been translated. Caio Prado Júnior’s Evolução política do Brasil, The Political Evolution of Brazil, is untranslated, as is Ponce’s Educación y lucha de clases, Education and Class Struggle, for decades the region’s most read Marxist book after the founder’s own. Sánchez Vázquez’s Filosofía de la praxis, Philosophy of Praxis, the systematic statement of the region’s humanist Marxism, is untranslated, as is most of Zavaleta’s work, including the essays in which the motley society is developed. Dussel’s first and third manuscript volumes, La producción teórica de Marx, Marx’s Theoretical Production, and El último Marx (1863-1882), The Last Marx, remain untranslated, so that the English reader meets the trilogy’s middle without its foundations or its conclusion. Dos Santos’s Imperialismo y dependencia, Imperialism and Dependence, the dependency analysis’s most systematic single-authored statement, is untranslated in full. Mariátegui’s journalism, the hundreds of newspaper pieces in which much of his political thought was worked out, is mostly untranslated, as is his Ideología y política, Ideology and Politics.

Why does so much of the tradition remain untranslated?

Because translation follows institutions, and the tradition’s institutions were destroyed at their peak and rebuilt in exile. What crossed into English was what exile publishers, solidarity campaigns and North American syllabuses selected, which favoured the revolutionary and the theological over the scholarly and the systematic, and left the tradition’s hardest arguments in their original languages.

The consequences for the English reader’s judgement are direct, and the guide states them as a warning attached to its own claims. The Anglophone picture overweights the tradition’s dramatic surface, the guerrilla, the theology, the revolution, because those were translated; it underweights the tradition’s scholarly core, the feudalism debate, the philosophy of praxis, the São Paulo seminar, the Bolivian sociology, because those were not. The derivative charge itself is partly an artefact of this selection: a reader who meets the region’s Marxism only in its translated, and therefore most exportable and often most sloganised, forms will find it more derivative than a reader of the Spanish and Portuguese corpus does, because the corpus’s most original arguments are disproportionately among the untranslated. This guide has been written from the whole record as the scholarship reports it, and its judgements about Marini, Bagú, Zavaleta and Sánchez Vázquez rest on that scholarship’s testimony about texts the English reader cannot yet inspect. The reader is told so plainly, because a guide that concealed the state of its own evidence would repeat, in miniature, the offence the dictatorships committed against the archive.

Internal colonialism: the Mexican school’s concept

Mexico’s own Marxist sociology produced a concept that travelled the region and beyond, and it belongs in the inventory of original claims. In the 1960s the Mexican sociologist Pablo González Casanova, working on the structure of Mexican society and its indigenous population, formulated the concept of internal colonialism: the proposition that the colonial relation, between a dominant metropolis and a subordinated population, was reproduced inside the formally independent republic, between the Ladino cities and the indigenous regions, whose labour, lands and products were administered by the national society on terms structurally identical to those of the old colonial order. His colleague Rodolfo Stavenhagen developed the analysis in parallel, in essays on the region’s ethnic classes and on the errors of a developmentalism that treated the indigenous areas as merely backward. The concept did theoretical work that neither the class analysis nor the dependency analysis could do alone. Dependency located the region’s subordination between nations; internal colonialism located a second subordination within them, and explained why a century and a half of independence had left the indigenous population’s structural position nearly intact, governed from the national capital as the colonies had been governed from Madrid. The concept passed into the region’s general vocabulary, into the indigenous movements’ own programmes, where it named their experience with a precision the class vocabulary lacked, and eventually into the coloniality analysis, whose genealogy runs through it. It is a further instance of the guide’s pattern: a regional problem, the Indian inside the republic, generating a category the theory’s home had not required.

APRA and the road not taken: the rival inheritance

The Peruvian founder’s tradition had a twin, and the twin’s existence explains much about the region’s political shape. Víctor Raúl Haya de la Torre, a Peruvian of Mariátegui’s generation, founded in Mexican exile in 1924 the Alianza Popular Revolucionaria Americana, APRA, conceived as a continental movement against imperialism, with its own doctrine of Indoamérica, its own analysis of the region’s dependent development, and its own claim to the indigenous inheritance. Haya and Mariátegui read each other, argued through intermediaries, and divided over the question that structured their generation: whether the anti-imperialist revolution in the region required a socialist transformation or a national and democratic one led by the middle classes in alliance with workers and peasants. APRA became Peru’s largest party and its most persecuted, spent decades in illegality and exile, and eventually governed Peru in the 1980s under a later leadership, its doctrine by then long moderated. The Marxist tradition’s historians treat Aprismo as the road not taken and as the standing alternative hypothesis: that the region’s anti-imperialism would be carried by multiclass national movements rather than by socialist ones. The Peruvian case, where the two inheritances were founded by two men of the same small Lima world in the same decade, is the tradition’s cleanest natural experiment, and its outcome, the national movement’s organisational victory and the Marxist founder’s theoretical victory, each in a different register, is the pattern this guide found in the diffusion and originality distinction, written in two biographies.

Camilo Torres and the Christian road to the guerrilla

The religious question had a biographical emblem before it had its theology. Camilo Torres, a Colombian priest and sociologist formed at Louvain, who taught at the National University in Bogotá and worked among the city’s poor, concluded in the middle 1960s that the Christian duty of love, to be effective in a society of structural injustice, required the revolution that would change the structures, and he joined the Ejército de Liberación Nacional, the National Liberation Army, taking up arms in 1965 and dying in his first combat in February 1966. His platform for a united front, his sociology of the Colombian violence, and his death made him the region’s martyr of the Christian left, argued over by the church that suspended him and the movements that claimed him. The episode’s place in this guide is diagnostic. Five years before Gutiérrez’s book gave the encounter of Christianity and Marxism its systematic form, Torres had enacted it, and the scandal his choice caused, in a church whose hierarchy condemned it and a left whose parties distrusted it, measured the distance the religious question still had to travel. The liberation theology of the following decade can be read as the tradition’s effort to give Torres’s intuition a theology and a discipline that would not require the priest to die in the mountains to prove it, and the base communities’ practice, organisation without arms, was its institutional answer. The region’s Marxism, which had begun by expecting religion to fade, found itself by the 1970s in sustained negotiation with a church in motion, and the negotiation changed its theory of the people, of culture and of the sources of revolutionary commitment more deeply than any of its internal debates of the same years.

The tradition’s historians: the region rewrites its past

The tradition’s most widely practised discipline was history, and its historiography deserves a section of its own, because the region’s Marxist historians performed for their societies the service the founders had promised: they rewrote the national pasts from the evidence of land, labour and surplus. The feudalism debate, already treated, was the historiography’s theoretical summit, but its daily work was archival and national. In Brazil Emília Viotti da Costa rebuilt the history of slavery and abolition from the plantations’ records, showing how the slave order’s structures survived into the republic that abolished it, and her work, available in English, formed generations of Brazilian historians. In Argentina the Marxist historians argued with the liberal pantheon and with the revisionist school over the meaning of the nineteenth century, the caudillos, the British connection and the land settlement of the pampas, in a polemic that made Argentine historiography a branch of the country’s political argument. In Mexico the tradition’s historians quarrelled with the official history of the revolution their state administered, recovering the revolution’s defeated currents, the Magonistas, the agrarian radicals of Morelos, from the state’s monumental version. In Chile the historians of the labour movement reconstructed the nitrate north and the workers’ press from the archives the dictatorship later seized. The historiography’s common method was the founders’ own: to ask of every national myth whose land, whose labour and whose surplus it concealed. Its common fate was the dictatorships’, whose regimes understood historians as enemies of the first rank, purged their departments, and in several countries made the writing of the recent past an offence. The truth commissions of the transitions were staffed substantially by the tradition’s surviving historians and social scientists, and the reports named in the repression section are, among other things, the historiography’s revenge: the region’s past, written at last from the evidence, by the scholars the regimes had exiled, under the authority of the states that succeeded them.

The literary wing: muralists, novels and the committed imagination

No account of the tradition’s culture is complete without its artists, because Latin American Marxism was, to a degree unusual among the regional traditions in this series, a movement of writers and painters as well as of parties. The Mexican muralists of the 1920s and 1930s, Diego Rivera, José Clemente Orozco and David Alfaro Siqueiros, painted the revolution’s history on the walls of its ministries, in a public art whose Marxism was its medium as much as its message, and Siqueiros carried the commitment to the point of leading, in 1940, an armed assault on the exiled Trotsky’s house in Coyoacán, an episode the tradition records as its culture’s pathology as well as its passion. The Peruvian founder’s journal Amauta was a literary review as much as a political one, publishing the indigenista writers whose novels, among them Ciro Alegría’s El mundo es ancho y ajeno, Broad and Alien Is the World, of 1941, made the hacienda’s destruction of the indigenous community into the region’s canonical fiction. The Cuban revolution institutionalised the wing: Casa de las Américas, founded in 1959, became the Spanish American literary world’s prize-giver, publisher and meeting place, and the debates it hosted, on the writer’s commitment, on the novel’s politics, on the revolution’s cultural demands, were the tradition arguing with its own imagination in public. The literary Boom of the 1960s, whose great novelists were formed in this milieu and variously broke with its Cuban centre over the following decades, carried the region’s narrative art to world literature, and the quarrels of that passage, over the Padilla affair of 1971 above all, when the Cuban poet Heberto Padilla’s arrest and self-criticism divided the revolution’s literary friends across three continents, belong to the tradition’s history as its severest internal test on the question of culture’s freedom. The wing earns its record here because the tradition’s diffusion ran through it: for every reader the primer formed, a novel formed another, and the region’s Marxism entered the world’s imagination as much through its fictions as through its theories.

Central America’s long war: the tradition’s last armies

The revolutionary period’s final wars were fought in the region’s smallest countries, and they tested the tradition’s accumulated lessons under the harshest conditions. In El Salvador the Farabundo Martí National Liberation Front, named for the communist leader executed after the rising and massacre of 1932, united the country’s guerrilla organisations in 1980 and fought the armed forces to the stalemate that produced the peace accords of 1992. In Guatemala the Guatemalan National Revolutionary Unity joined the insurgent organisations whose highland war had drawn the counterinsurgency documented by the clarification commission, and signed the final peace in 1996. The Central American wars differed from the foco era in the respects the survivors’ balance sheets had prescribed: the insurgencies built mass organisations before and beside their armies, sought negotiated outcomes when victory proved unattainable, and accepted, in the accords, the democratic framework their predecessors had scorned. The tradition’s historians read the Central American settlements as the revolutionary period’s true end, more instructive than any victory: the armed road, pursued with greater discipline, broader alliances and deeper roots than the 1960s had managed, still could not take power against a state sustained from abroad, and the movements that survived did so by becoming parties. The lesson completed the arc this guide has traced from the Sierra to the ballot box, and it was learned, characteristically, in the region’s poorest countries, at the highest price, by the generation that had inherited all the previous generations’ arguments and found them, one by one, insufficient without the democratic ground the exile theorists had identified from their seminar rooms a decade before the accords were signed.

The extractive frontier: the tradition argues with its own governments

The tradition’s most productive late argument was conducted against its own side, and it returned the regional problems table’s second row, the agrarian question, in a new form: the question of extraction. During the pink tide period the region’s exports boomed on the world’s demand for soy, oil, gas, copper, lithium and iron, and the left governments of the period financed their redistribution from the rents of that boom, expanding mining and hydrocarbon frontiers and agribusiness into territories whose indigenous and peasant populations resisted them. The region’s intellectuals, many of them formed in the tradition this guide describes, split over the result. The Uruguayan Eduardo Gudynas named the model neoextractivism and argued that it reproduced, under progressive administration, the dependency structure the tradition had spent a century analysing: the export of unprocessed nature, the sacrifice of territories, the subordination of every other value to the rent. The Argentine sociologist Maristella Svampa described a commodities consensus succeeding the neoliberal one, in which governments of left and right alike treated extraction as development’s engine and its opponents as obstacles. Defenders within the governments answered from the tradition’s own arsenal: that the rent, captured by the state rather than by foreign companies, was the material basis of the first serious redistribution in the region’s history, and that the founder generation’s question, who appropriates the surplus, had been answered in the people’s favour even if the surplus’s source remained the mine and the well. The argument is recorded here because it exhibits the tradition’s late condition exactly: its categories, dependency, surplus, the colonial structure, deployed by its own intellectuals against governments that claimed its inheritance, in journals and universities rather than in parties, with the indigenous movements of the earlier section supplying the argument’s social force. A tradition whose concepts can be turned on its own governments by its own scholars is not dead. It has become what the exile generation intended: a critical culture rather than a catechism.

The Caribbean margin: the tradition beyond the Spanish and Portuguese world

This guide’s region has been the Spanish and Portuguese speaking mainland and Cuba, but the tradition’s Caribbean margin produced two figures whose absence would distort the map. The Guyanese historian Walter Rodney, formed in Jamaica and Tanzania as much as in Georgetown, wrote in How Europe Underdeveloped Africa, published in 1972, the dependency analysis’s most famous application beyond the region, carrying the framework the Latin Americans had built to the African case with a rigour that made the book a classic of both literatures; his assassination in Georgetown in 1980 belongs to the record of the tradition’s costs. The Trinidadian C. L. R. James, whose Black Jacobins of 1938 rebuilt the Haitian revolution as a modern epic of slave insurrection, worked in a Marxism formed between the Caribbean, the United States and Britain, and his presence at the margin marks the point where the region’s tradition meets the Black Marxist tradition that this series treats elsewhere. The margin matters to the guide’s argument because it shows the regional framework travelling along the routes of a shared colonial history rather than a shared language: the plantation, the mine and the racial order were the Caribbean’s problems too, and the theory built for them on the mainland proved exportable to the islands and, in Rodney’s hands, to another continent. The fourth regional instance is a claim about four regions across three continents; the Caribbean margin is evidence that the pattern’s reach exceeded its four cases.

The universities: the tradition’s unusual home

A structural peculiarity of the region’s Marxism deserves a section of its own, because it explains both the tradition’s theoretical productivity and the scale of its catastrophe. In most of the Marxist world, theory was produced in parties and their schools. In Latin America it was produced, to an extent unmatched elsewhere, in public universities: in the seminar rooms of São Paulo and Santiago, in the institutes of Mexico City and Buenos Aires, in the social science faculties that the postwar decades built across the region and staffed with the tradition’s scholars. The arrangement had causes. The region’s parties were small, poor and often illegal, while its universities, expanding and comparatively autonomous, offered salaries, libraries and students to intellectuals the parties could not employ. The arrangement had consequences. The region’s Marxism became an academic Marxism without ceasing to be a political one: its debates were conducted in journals with footnotes, its heresies were examined in seminars, its generations succeeded one another through chairs and institutes, and its characteristic products, the dependency analysis, the feudalism debate, the philosophy of praxis, bear the university’s marks of documentation, of controversy conducted by citation, of theories built to survive examination by enemies qualified to examine them. And the arrangement had its price, exacted in the dictatorship years: a tradition housed in universities can be evicted by decree, and the purges of the 1960s and 1970s, the interventions, the compulsory retirements, the closed institutes, struck the tradition’s home directly, as a party tradition’s home, in cells and safe houses, could not have been struck. The exile and the private institute were the tradition’s answers, and the reassembly after the dictatorships was substantially a rehousing: the return of the scholars to the universities, the refounding of the institutes, the resumption of the seminar successions the purges had broken. The guide’s emphasis on the tradition’s institutions, its tables of problems rather than its pantheon of heroes, reflects the tradition’s own nature. Latin American Marxism was a university civilisation with a revolutionary vocation, and it is unintelligible unless both halves of that description are kept in view.

Santiago in the 1960s: the tradition’s capital at work

For one decade the tradition had a capital, and the guide pauses on it because the Santiago of the 1960s shows the whole system, university, institute, exile, journal and party, operating at full capacity before the catastrophe. The city held the headquarters of the Economic Commission for Latin America, where Prebisch’s structuralism had been built and where the dependency debates had their first audience; the regional faculty known as FLACSO, founded in 1957 to train the region’s social scientists in a common curriculum; the university institutes where exiled Brazilians after 1964, Cardoso and dos Santos among them, found the posts their own dictatorship had taken; the journals, from the Chilean left’s theoretical reviews to the publishing houses that printed the continent’s debates; and after 1970 a government attempting the democratic road to socialism, which drew the region’s intellectuals to Santiago as advisers, observers and participants in the tradition’s greatest practical test. Marini taught there; the dependency school’s seminars met there; the Cuban debate’s participants passed through; the young militants of three countries learned their Marxism in its institutes and its parties’ schools. The coup of September 1973 destroyed the capital in a day, and its diaspora, to Mexico, to Caracas, to Paris and to Stockholm, seeded the exile formation described above. The episode concentrates the guide’s argument about institutions. The tradition’s productivity in the Santiago decade was not the sum of its talents, which were constant, but the product of their concentration in working institutions, and its subsequent history, brilliant in exile and fragmented at home, is the history of that concentration’s loss and partial recovery. Readers who ask why this guide insists on institutes and journals where other accounts offer heroes will find the answer in the comparison between the Santiago decade and everything that followed it.

Misreadings to correct

Five misreadings dominate the coverage this guide competes with, and they are corrected here in one place. The first holds that Latin American Marxism begins with Cuba, in 1959 or with Guevara’s face. The tradition was forty years old when the Sierra was won, and the Cuban revolution’s own protagonists were formed in arguments the 1920s had opened. The second holds that the region’s Marxism was derivative, a copy of European or Soviet theory with local colour. The objection section has graded that charge in detail: it convicts the party orthodoxies and acquits the tradition’s dated and nameable arguments, and a reader who repeats it whole has not done the grading. The third holds that Marxism was the region’s first radical labour tradition. The anarchist precedence, documented in the labour historiography, refutes it, and the refutation matters because the tradition’s character was formed in rivalry with the anarchists. The fourth holds that the tradition was politically uniform, a single left with a single line. The record shows Peruvian against Argentine, Cardoso against Frank, the democratic road against the foco, the coloniality analysis against the class analysis, in continuous argument. The fifth holds that the tradition’s output is available in English, so that what an English reader has not heard of does not exist. The untranslated source note refutes it, and the refutation is the guide’s most practical gift to its reader: the map of what cannot yet be read is also a map of where the tradition’s weight actually sits.

Where to begin: a reading order for the region’s Marxism

The reader who wants the tradition at first hand should begin where the tradition began, with the Seven Interpretive Essays, in the English translation, read for the land argument and for the method: a society’s evidence rebuilt into a theory. The anthology of Mariátegui’s writings edited by Vanden and Becker extends the beginning into the journalism and the polemics. From the founding, the road runs to the dependency debates: Frank’s Capitalism and Underdevelopment for the thesis at its most forceful, then Cardoso and Faletto for the correction that made the thesis into an analysis, the two read together as the tradition’s central seminar. Gutiérrez’s Theology of Liberation opens the religious row of the table, and the cluster’s own article carries the argument further. For the strategic argument, Guevara’s Guerrilla Warfare should be read beside the record of its testing, in the cluster’s treatment of the two roads. Quijano’s essay on the coloniality of power, in its English statement, closes the survey with the tradition’s culminating claim. Around these, the reader with Spanish or Portuguese should place the untranslated core named in the source note, Marini first, as the tradition’s own scholars would advise. The order is the table’s order, problems before parties, and a reader who follows it will possess the tradition in the shape this guide has defended: a set of arguments, made by nameable people in dated texts, about problems that have not finished with the region that posed them.

The urban question: the tradition meets the informal city

The regional problems table was drawn from the tradition’s classic agenda, but the region’s own transformation forced a sixth problem on it, and the guide records the addition. Between 1950 and 1980 Latin America became the most urbanised region of the developing world, as millions left the countryside for cities whose industries could not employ them, and built the informal settlements, the poblaciones, favelas, villas miseria and pueblos jóvenes, that ringed every capital. A Marxism formed on the factory and the hacienda confronted a population that was neither proletarian in the classical sense nor peasant: street vendors, domestic servants, casual builders, the self-employed of the informal economy, organised, where they were organised at all, by neighbourhood, by parish and by the struggle for land, water and title rather than by trade. The tradition’s response ran through its universities. The young Manuel Castells, working in Chile at the start of the 1970s, built his early theory of urban social movements on the Santiago poblaciones and their land seizures; the Chilean pobladores’ movement, with its campamentos named for heroes of the left, became the period’s exhibit of a popular subject the classical categories had not predicted. The debate the informal city forced, whether marginality was a reserve army of labour, a distinct mode of insertion into the economy, or a political constituency in formation, occupied the region’s sociology for a decade and fed directly into the populism theories the exile generation built. The guide registers the urban question as the table’s unofficial sixth row: the problem the region posed to the tradition after the tradition thought its problems were settled, and a standing reminder that the table is a historical document, open at the bottom.

The Mexican crisis: the tradition reckons with Tlatelolco

The Mexican refuge had its own catastrophe, and it belongs in the record because it set the terms on which the exiles of the following decade were received. The Mexican state that sheltered the Spanish Republicans and would shelter the South Americans governed at home through a party that claimed the revolution’s inheritance while monopolising its exercise, and the Mexican left, communist, Trotskyist and independent, lived in the interstices of that claim. In 1968 the student movement that filled the capital’s streets, demanding democratic freedoms in the name of the constitution the regime itself professed, was answered on the second of October at Tlatelolco, in the Plaza de las Tres Culturas, where the army and police fired on the crowd in an episode whose accounting belongs, like the others in this guide, to the official and scholarly sources that hold it. The massacre broke the Mexican regime’s revolutionary legitimation for the generation that witnessed it, drove a cohort of the country’s intellectuals into a permanent critical distance from the state, and radicalised a minority toward the guerrilla organisations of the following decade. For this guide the episode’s significance is structural. The tradition’s Mexican home was itself an authoritarian order of a peculiar, civilian and electoral kind, and the Mexican Marxists who received the South American exiles did so as fellow survivors of a regional pattern that spared no country: the pattern by which the region’s states, of every ideological colour, answered the tradition’s challenge with force when the challenge reached the streets. The exiles’ Mexico was generous and compromised at once, and the literature the exiles wrote there carries both facts in its texture.

The critique of structuralism from the left: Cueva and the synthesis

The dependency school’s relation to its own parent, ECLA structuralism, was argued out inside the tradition, and the argument produced the period’s most complete single-authored synthesis. Prebisch’s school had explained the region’s condition by the centre-periphery structure and prescribed industrialisation under state direction; the Marxist critics answered that structuralism described the circulation of the region’s product without analysing the production relations that generated it, and that its remedy, a national industrial bourgeoisie allied with the state, foundered on that bourgeoisie’s integration into the very structure it was asked to dismantle. The Ecuadorian sociologist Agustín Cueva gave the critique its canonical form in El desarrollo del capitalismo en América Latina, The Development of Capitalism in Latin America, published in 1977, a work that rebuilt the region’s history from the conquest as the history of a capitalism constituted in dependence, class by class and country by country, with a documentation that made it the standard university text of the tradition’s second formation. Cueva’s book matters to this guide as the proof that the tradition’s arguments were cumulative: the feudalism debate’s settlement, the dependency analysis’s structure and the super-exploitation mechanism are all present in it, corrected by one another, in a synthesis written in Quito and Mexico City by a scholar of the exile generation. It is also, characteristically, untranslated into English in full, and the source note’s warning applies to it: the Anglophone debate about the region’s Marxism proceeds without its most complete statement, and judgements formed in that debate should be discounted accordingly.

The socialist renewal: the tradition learns democracy in exile

The democracy turn recorded earlier had an organised intellectual form, and its most consequential site was the Chilean Socialist Party’s exile. The Chilean socialists, whose party had been the democratic road’s senior partner and whose secretary general had died in the Moneda, spent the dictatorship years divided between a wing that held to the insurrectionary conclusions drawn from the coup and a wing that undertook, in the European exile, a renovation of the party’s doctrine. The renovation’s theorists, working through the Gramsci the Cuadernos had translated and through the Eurocommunist debates of the Italian and Spanish parties, argued that the Chilean left’s catastrophe had intellectual causes as well as military ones: a conception of power as a thing to be seized whole, an instrumental view of democracy as a bourgeois form to be used and discarded, and a consequent failure to build the broad social and political majority that alone could have defended the process. The renovated doctrine put democracy at the centre, not as a tactic but as the form in which a socialist project in the region could exist at all, and it carried the Chilean transition: the renovated socialists entered the coalition that governed Chile after 1990, and their theorists became the transition’s ministers and senators. The episode is the exile generation’s most complete practical vindication and its most debated one. The tradition’s unreconciled wings charged the renovation with having traded the inheritance for office; the renovators answered that the inheritance’s unreconciled form had been tested, in Chile above all countries, and had left the field to the dictatorship for seventeen years. The argument is left open, as the strategic argument is left open throughout: it is the tradition’s own, conducted by its own survivors, on evidence the whole region supplied.

Peru’s military experiment: revolution from above and the left’s dilemma

Peru posed the tradition a problem no other country matched: a revolution decreed by generals. The military government that took power in 1968 under General Juan Velasco Alvarado expropriated the United States owned International Petroleum Company, enacted in 1969 an agrarian reform that finally broke the coastal plantations and the highland haciendas the founder’s essays had indicted, created industrial communities in the factories, and conducted the whole programme in a rhetoric of anti-imperialist national transformation that quoted the region’s own critique of the oligarchy. The Peruvian left divided over the experiment exactly as its categories predicted it would. One wing read the regime as a bourgeois reformism in uniform, modernising the capitalism it claimed to supersede and demobilising the popular movement it claimed to serve. Another read it as the national revolution the two-stage scheme had promised, arriving in the only form the country’s balance of forces allowed, and joined or served its agencies. A third, the founder’s most careful readers, noted the irony the guide is bound to record: the land reform the essays had demanded as the precondition of everything else was enacted, four decades on, by the institution the essays’ tradition least expected to enact it, and its enactment dissolved the hacienda order whose persistence had been the premise of Peruvian Marxist analysis since 1928. The experiment faltered on its economics and on the succession to Velasco, and the military withdrew in 1980 to the elections from which the Shining Path’s war emerged. Its place in this guide is as the tradition’s hardest test of classification: an anti-oligarchic transformation conducted by the state against the left’s expectation and partly against the left’s will, which the categories of the day, reform or revolution, bourgeois or socialist, fitted so badly that the argument over its nature outlasted the regime itself.

Hugo Blanco and the peasant road in the Andes

Between the founder’s essays and the foco’s arrival, the Andean countryside produced its own organiser, and his career binds the tradition’s agrarian theory to its practice. Hugo Blanco, a Peruvian formed in Argentina’s Trotskyist movement, settled at the start of the 1960s in the valley of La Convención in the department of Cusco, where the peasants of the coffee haciendas laboured under the condición system, owing days of unpaid work for the use of their plots. Blanco organised the valley’s union federation, led the strikes and land occupations that dismantled the system in fact before the law ratified the dismantling, and became, for the international left that adopted his cause, the emblem of the peasant road conducted by organisation rather than by foco: the union first, the land taken by the organised, the arms, when they came, in the movement’s defence. Captured in 1963 after a clash in which a policeman died, sentenced to death and then, after an international campaign, to imprisonment, exiled and eventually returned to sit in the constituent assembly of 1978, Blanco’s biography traverses the tradition’s whole strategic argument in one life: the anarchist inheritance of direct action, the Trotskyist formation, the peasant union as the instrument, the state answering with its courts and its prisons. The guide sets his career beside the foco theory’s because the comparison is the tradition’s own internal control case. In the same years, in the same mountains, two roads were tried: the organised peasantry of La Convención won its land and survived its leader’s imprisonment, while the focos of 1965, launched in the founder’s name by men who had read Debray’s predecessors, were destroyed in a season. The evidence was available to the generation that chose the foco elsewhere. That they chose as they did is part of the record the balance sheets of the exile years were written to explain.

The northern audience: how the region’s theory entered the United States

The tradition’s diffusion had a northern circuit, and it shaped what the English reader can know. The Cuban revolution and the Alliance for Progress together created, in the United States of the 1960s, an institutional demand for knowledge of the region, and the Latin American studies programmes that the foundations and the federal government funded became the northern home of the region’s scholarship, employing its exiles in the following decade and translating its debates for its seminars. Around the universities grew the solidarity circuit: the North American Congress on Latin America, founded in 1966, whose reports carried the region’s own analyses to North American readers; the journal Latin American Perspectives, founded in 1974, which made itself the English language venue of the region’s Marxist social science and published its dependency theorists, its historians and its exiles in translation for decades; and the publishing houses, Monthly Review Press above all, whose list was the region’s northern shelf. The circuit’s selectivity is the source note’s subject, but its existence is a fact of the tradition’s history: Latin American Marxism is the only regional tradition in this series that acquired, in the metropolis it analysed, a standing institutional audience of its own, and the audience fed back into the tradition, since the exiles who taught in the northern universities wrote for two publics at once and the region’s debates of the exile years were conducted partly in English, in California and New York as much as in Mexico City. The feedback had a cost the tradition’s critics noted: a theory accountable to the northern seminar room drifts toward the questions the seminar room rewards, and the decolonial turn’s later career, global and academic, exhibits the drift in its purest form. The circuit belongs in the same ledger as the Soviet connection, as a real service and a real deformation, and as evidence, in both aspects, that the region’s theory had become a world commodity whose producers no longer controlled its itinerary.

The journals: the tradition’s nervous system

The tradition’s life ran through its journals, and a reader who wants its texture should know their names as a naturalist knows a coastline. Amauta, the founder’s Lima review of 1926 to 1930, set the type: the journal as the party of the mind, gathering the vanguard of a country’s arts and letters around a theoretical project. Pasado y Presente, founded in Córdoba in 1963 by Aricó’s circle, carried the enterprise into the Gramscian decades before becoming the Cuadernos’ publishing house. Havana’s Pensamiento Crítico, in its brief life from 1967 to 1971, was the revolutionary government’s own heterodox seminar, translating the world’s new left for a Cuban readership until its closure marked the limits of the revolution’s internal pluralism. Santiago’s Punto Final served the Chilean revolutionary left as its weekly argument. Montevideo’s Marcha, though not a Marxist journal, was the Spanish American left’s common room for three decades, its literary and political pages the region’s conversation with itself, until the Uruguayan dictatorship closed it. Caracas’s Nueva Sociedad, founded in 1972, carried the social democratic and renovated currents through the dictatorship decades and into the transitions. Around these stood the university journals, the exile bulletins, the party reviews and the institute proceedings, a print ecology of a density the region’s poverty makes astonishing and its university civilisation makes intelligible. The journals matter to the guide’s method because they are where the tradition actually happened: the feudalism debate, the dependency corrections, the renewal arguments, the balance sheets, all were journal events before they were books, and the scholar who works the tradition works its periodicals. Their fate in the dictatorships, closed, raided, their editors exiled or worse, is the institutional destruction told at the level of the single title, and their refounding, in the transitions, by returnees who had kept the subscription lists in their heads through twenty years of exile, is the reassembly’s most concrete image.

The Cuban economic debate: the tradition’s seminar on socialism itself

The guide returns briefly to the Cuban debate of 1963 to 1965, because it is the tradition’s one sustained argument about the construction of socialism conducted by the constructors, and because its terms illuminate every other section. The question was practical: how should a small, poor, blockaded economy organise its enterprises, its incentives and its plan? Guevara, as Minister of Industries, defended the budgetary finance system, under which enterprises operated as branches of a single national firm, financed from the budget, without monetary relations among themselves, and he joined to the system a moral economy: the withering of material incentives, the elevation of voluntary labour and consciousness, the formation of the new man as the transition’s true product. His opponents, among them Carlos Rafael Rodríguez and the economists who favoured the system of economic calculus on the Soviet model, defended enterprise autonomy, monetary accounting and material incentives as the indispensable instruments of an economy that could not yet afford virtue as a planning method. The French Marxist Charles Bettelheim intervened for the calculus side; the Belgian Ernest Mandel intervened for a middle position; the journals printed them all. The debate’s resolution was administrative rather than theoretical, and the Cuban economy’s subsequent history, the turn to the Soviet system in the 1970s and the rectification campaign of the 1980s that revived Guevara’s themes against it, kept the argument alive inside the one state where it was a matter of policy. For this guide the debate’s significance is its proof of capacity. A regional tradition that could conduct, in its own journals and ministries, the most searching discussion of socialist economic organisation of its decade was not applying a finished doctrine. It was doing the doctrine’s unfinished work, on the hardest question the doctrine contains, with the evidence of a real economy arriving daily at the debaters’ desks.

What the tradition did to the social sciences

The tradition’s widest influence ran through disciplines rather than movements, and a closing survey should register it, because it is the channel through which the region’s Marxism most durably entered the world’s common sense. In sociology, the dependency analysis and the internal colonialism concept reset the questions of a generation: the unit of analysis ceased to be the nation state developing in isolation and became the structure in which nations were inserted. In history, the feudalism debate and the national historiographies it disciplined established that the region’s past would be written from land and labour records or not credibly written at all. In political science, the bureaucratic authoritarianism literature and the populism theories rebuilt the study of the region’s regimes on foundations the tradition had laid, whatever labels the builders used. In theology, the liberation school’s option for the poor passed into the universal church’s vocabulary and its social teaching, an outcome no one in 1928 could have predicted for a doctrine born in polemic against the church’s hierarchy. In literary studies, the indigenista novel and the Boom’s formation inside the tradition’s institutions remain the region’s gift to world literature’s self-understanding. The pattern across the disciplines is the pattern of the guide: the tradition’s concepts travelled furthest when they answered questions the receiving disciplines could not answer with their own tools, and they travelled under other flags, as development studies, as postcolonial theory, as the new historiography, often without the Marxist label their makers would have insisted on. A balance sheet of the tradition that counted only its parties and its revolutions would record a defeat. A balance sheet that counts its concepts records something else: the most successful export of theory from the twentieth century’s periphery to its centre, achieved by the region this guide has surveyed, and achieved, characteristically, in the decades when the tradition’s own organisations were at their weakest. The four-instance pattern explains the paradox. Theory made from a society’s evidence, under the pressure of problems the centre had not faced, travels; doctrine administered from a centre does not. Latin America’s Marxists, at their best, made theory. The world, in its disciplines if not in its headlines, has been using it since.

For students and exam candidates

Your route into this tradition runs through the regional problems table, and the examination version of the tradition, with model answers built on the table’s rows, is set out in the cluster’s exam guide. Keep the five problems and their theories as your architecture: the indigenous question and the communal argument, the agrarian question and the feudalism debate’s settlement, dependency and super-exploitation, the religious question and liberation theology, the strategic question and the two roads. For each, hold one dated text and one named critic: the Seven Essays of 1928 against the Comintern’s classification, Cardoso against Frank, Marini against the two-stage strategy, Gutiérrez against the anticlerical inheritance, the Chilean test against the foco. Organise your revision of the tradition’s positions in the VaultBook study system at the Marxism study notes, where the regional problems table makes a serviceable set of cards, one problem per card with its theory and its critic on the reverse. Where your paper sets questions from previous years, drill the actual stems in the ReportMedic explorer at the UPSC previous year question explorer, and note how often the region appears through its exports, dependency above all, rather than through its parties. Two disciplines will raise your marks on this material. Never present the tradition as uniform: the divisions are the examinable content. And never quote a figure for the dictatorships’ toll: the protocol this guide follows, routing the accounting to the truth commissions and the scholarly estimates, is the protocol of the scholarship itself, and an answer that respects it reads as an answer written from the literature.

For teachers and seminar leaders

Teach this tradition as a set of arguments with addresses, and your students will retain what a narrative survey loses. The regional problems table is a syllabus in itself: five seminars, one per row, each opening with the problem’s evidence and closing with the theory it forced. Set the founding seminar on the confrontation between the Seven Essays and the Comintern’s 1928 classification, and let students argue the classification from the hacienda’s records before they are told how the tradition settled it. Set the dependency seminar as a trial, Frank prosecuted by Cardoso with Laclau as expert witness on the definition of capitalism, and require the verdict to specify what survived. Use the objection section as the assessment instrument it was built to be: the derivative charge, fairly stated and then graded claim by claim, is the best single exercise in the cluster, because it teaches the distinction between diffusion and originality that students will use on every tradition they meet afterward. Two cautions from the guide’s own discipline are worth importing into the classroom. The untranslated source note should be taught, not skipped: a class that knows its picture of the tradition is a selection, and knows who selected it, has learned something about all intellectual history. And the figures protocol should be imposed as a scholarly rule with its reason attached, that the numbers in this field are held by named reports with stated methods, because students who meet the rule as a principle of evidence will apply it when the material is not this guide’s but their own.

For researchers, historians, and journalists

Your interest in this tradition is the state of its archive and its arguments, and both are more open than the textbook picture suggests. The archive’s condition is the dictatorship sections’ subject: party records seized or scattered, journal runs incomplete, the exile press dispersed across the libraries of three continents, and a generation of participants whose testimony the truth commissions and the oral history projects have only partly gathered. The live research frontiers follow from that condition. The feudalism debate’s country literatures remain incompletely synthesised across the Spanish and Portuguese scholarship. The exile formation’s full history, its journals, its publishing houses, its seminar successions in Mexico City, Paris and Stockholm, awaits its historian. The untranslated core named in the source note awaits its translators, and a scholarly edition of Marini, of Bagú, of Zavaleta in English would change the Anglophone field more than another monograph would. For journalists, the guide’s discipline transfers directly: the tradition’s concepts, dependency, coloniality, the motley society, are the region’s own instruments for describing itself, and they will explain more of what you report than the vocabularies flown in for the purpose, provided they are used as the tradition’s best practitioners used them, as questions about land, labour and surplus, and not as labels. The cluster’s articles carry the individual cases; this guide’s contribution to your work is the map, and the warning that the map’s blank spaces are where the regimes burned the records.

The Pulacayo theses: the miners write the programme

The Bolivian section above named the Pulacayo theses in passing; they deserve a fuller record, because they are the one programme in the tradition’s history that a workers’ federation wrote for itself at the height of its power. In November 1946 the congress of the Bolivian miners’ federation, meeting at Pulacayo in the mining district, adopted a programme drafted under Trotskyist influence that rejected collaboration with the national bourgeoisie, demanded the nationalisation of the mines under workers’ control, the arming of the workers’ militias and a workers’ and peasants’ government, and framed the demands in the transitional method the Fourth International had codified: demands that begin from the workers’ immediate necessities and lead, by their own logic, to the question of power. The theses’ significance is the identity of their authors and their audience. They were not an exile’s pamphlet or a party’s instruction from abroad; they were the adopted programme of the strongest labour federation in the region, debated in the mining camps and carried into the revolution of 1952, where the federation’s militias were the revolution’s army and its leaders sat, briefly, in the government the revolution made. The experiment that followed, the co-government of 1952 to 1956 and its dissolution as the nationalist government consolidated itself against its labour partner, became the world Trotskyist movement’s central case study and the Bolivian tradition’s permanent argument: whether the miners’ federation, at the summit of its strength, should have taken the power its programme described. The guide registers the Pulacayo theses as the strategic argument’s documentary jewel, the point where the region’s theory and its workers’ movement coincide exactly, and as a standing correction to any account of the tradition that treats its theory as the work of intellectuals alone. The miners who adopted the theses could not have named the Fourth International’s founding congress. They knew what they wanted, and they found, in the tradition’s store, the words for it.

The Tricontinental and the export of the foco

The foco era had an institutional machinery, and it was Cuban. In January 1966 Havana hosted the Tricontinental Conference, gathering the liberation movements of Asia, Africa and Latin America in the Organisation of Solidarity of the Peoples of the three continents, and in 1967 the Latin American Solidarity Organisation, OLAS, convened the region’s movements to endorse, over the objections of most of its communist parties, the armed road as the continent’s strategy. The conferences matter to this guide as the moment the tradition’s centre of gravity shifted, institutionally, from Moscow to Havana: the region’s revolutionaries now took their line, their training and their publishing from a capital inside the region, and the Soviet-aligned parties found themselves outvoted in their own continent by a doctrine their theory classified as adventurism. Guevara’s message to the Tricontinental, published in April 1967 as he fought in Bolivia, with its call to create two, three, many Vietnams, was the era’s most famous text and its most fateful: a strategy of multiplying the fronts of a world confrontation, stated by the foco’s own theorist at the moment the foco was failing in the field. The machinery is set down because the diffusion ledger requires it. The foco’s continental career was not the spontaneous combustion of a generation; it was organised, financed, printed and broadcast by a state and its solidarity apparatus, and the tradition’s later balance sheets, in assigning responsibility for the defeats, assigned a share to the apparatus that had made a Cuban exception into a continental rule. The episode completes the diffusion analysis begun with the primer. The region built two diffusion machines in one decade, a book and a conference system, and the book’s doctrine outlasted the conferences’ by half a century.

The Cordobazo: the urban working class answers

In May 1969 the Argentine city of Córdoba rose in the insurrection the country remembers as the Cordobazo, when a general strike against the military dictatorship’s economic measures became, over two days, a popular uprising that held the city against the police until the army restored order. The Cordobazo’s place in this guide is as evidence in the strategic argument from an unexpected quarter. Its protagonists were not guerrillas and not peasants but the industrial workers of the region’s most modern factory belt, the auto and metal workers of Córdoba’s plants, led by a current of class-struggle unionism, clasismo, whose leaders, Agustín Tosco of the light and power workers among them, had built their authority in opposition to both the Peronist union bureaucracy and the communist party’s caution. The uprising demonstrated what the foco’s theorists had denied and the electoral road’s theorists had not dared to claim: that the region’s urban working class, organised in its unions and acting with the city’s students and neighbourhoods, retained an insurrectionary capacity of its own, independent of any armed nucleus. The Argentine dictatorship never recovered its authority from the Cordobazo, and the years that followed, of guerrilla war and counterinsurgency, unfolded in the opening it made. The tradition’s theorists drew the lesson unevenly. The clasista current itself was destroyed in the repression after 1976, its leaders dead, imprisoned or exiled, and its history written largely by its survivors in the exile literature. The Cordobazo stands as the urban row of the strategic table, the third road the period actually exhibited: neither the mountain foco nor the ballot box, but the organised working class in the streets of its own city, a road the tradition’s theory, rural in its Peruvian founding and electoral in its Chilean test, never succeeded in theorising as completely as it deserved.

Oil and the magical state: the Venezuelan question

Venezuela posed the tradition a problem none of its categories had anticipated: a country whose commanding resource was a subsoil rent of fabulous size, accruing to the state that owned the oil, in a society whose classes were formed around the rent’s distribution rather than around production. The Venezuelan left, communist and later guerrilla and later still renovated, argued for half a century about a formation in which the state was not the executive of a dominant class so much as the proprietor of the national income, and the population’s relation to it was that of claimants on a patrimony. The analysis received its classic statement from the anthropologist Fernando Coronil, whose The Magical State, published in 1997, read the Venezuelan state as a magician whose wonders, the modernising projects, the subsidies, the sudden fortunes, were performed with oil money, and whose authority rested on the population’s belief in the performance. Coronil wrote from within the tradition’s questions, of how a social formation is constituted by its insertion into the world economy, and his book, available in English, carried the dependency generation’s problematic into the analysis of the rentier state with a literary power the earlier literature rarely matched. The Venezuelan case matters to the guide because it generalises. Every state in the region that lived from a commodity rent, the copper of Chile, the tin of Bolivia, the oil of Mexico and Ecuador, faced a version of the magical state’s problem, and the tradition’s late work on extractivism, recorded above, is the Venezuelan question posed at continental scale in the age of the commodity boom. The founder generation had asked who owns the land. Their successors were obliged to ask who owns the rent, and the second question proved as fertile, and as divisive, as the first.

The anthropologists’ region: indigenismo and the community studied

The indigenous question had a scholarly profession of its own, and the tradition’s relation to it was one of alliance and rivalry that the guide should register. The indigenista movement, the network of anthropologists, officials and institutes that from the 1940 congress of Pátzcuaro onward made the indigenous population an object of state policy and academic study across the region, shared the Marxists’ object while rejecting their explanation: for the indigenistas the Indian’s condition was a problem of integration, of cultures in contact and of a national society incomplete, to be solved by schools, roads, bilingual education and the anthropologist’s mediation. The Mexican school of anthropology, whose leading figure Gonzalo Aguirre Beltrán theorised the regions of refuge where the colonial order survived, worked inside the state’s own institutes and produced the ethnography on which everyone else depended. The Marxist critics, Stavenhagen among them, answered that integration on the dominant society’s terms was the colonial relation administering itself, and that the community’s defence required not mediation but the transformation of the structure that made it a refuge of exploitation. The argument was conducted in the journals and the institutes for three decades, and its outcome was the internal colonialism concept and, in the longer run, the indigenous movements’ own appropriation of both traditions: the movements of the 1980s and 1990s took their ethnography from the anthropologists, their structural analysis from the Marxists, and their authority from neither, speaking in their own names in a way both professions had claimed to prepare and neither had expected. The rivalry earns its place because it disciplines the tradition’s self-image. The region’s Marxism never held a monopoly of the indigenous question; it held the strongest explanation of it, in competition, and the competition improved the explanation.

The francophone margin: Roumain and the Haitian founding

The Caribbean margin section above named the anglophone figures; the francophone margin has its founder too, and his omission from most surveys repeats the linguistic selection this guide has criticised. Jacques Roumain, the Haitian poet and novelist, founded the Haitian Communist Party in 1934, was imprisoned and exiled by the regime his party opposed, and wrote in his brief life the works that made him the francophone Caribbean’s Marxist classic: the ethnographic studies of his country’s peasantry, the poetry of the Bois d’ébène collection, and the novel Gouverneurs de la rosée, Masters of the Dew, published after his death in 1944, in which a returned emigrant brings water and collective organisation to a drought-stricken village and is murdered for the hope he organises. The novel, translated into many languages, is the indigenista novel’s francophone counterpart, and Roumain’s formation, in Port-au-Prince, in European exile and in the ethnographic institute he founded on his return, parallels the mainland founders’ at every point: the same decade, the same confrontation of a European doctrine with a peasant society organised by race and land, the same recourse to the community as the revolution’s material. Haiti, the region’s first independent state and its most punished, produced its Marxist founder in the same generation as Peru and Brazil, and the fact that the standard surveys, written from the Spanish and Portuguese mainland, so often omit him is the translation problem in its geographic form. The guide restores him to the map as the fourth linguistic founding, and as evidence that the pattern it defends, the regional problem generating the regional theory, operated wherever the problem was posed, in whatever language the posing occurred.

The Christian left in Chile: the convergence organised

The religious question’s political form appeared in Chile before it appeared anywhere else, and the Chilean case shows the convergence of Christianity and Marxism as an organisational fact rather than a theological proposal. Chilean Christian Democracy, the region’s most successful reformist party, generated from its own youth and its own left a series of defections toward the Marxist camp as the 1960s radicalised: the Movimiento de Acción Popular Unitaria, MAPU, founded in 1969 by Christian Democratic dissidents who concluded that their party’s reformism had reached its limit, joined the Popular Unity coalition and supplied the Allende government with ministers, theoreticians and a cadre formed in the social Christianity of the encyclicals and the base communities. The Izquierda Cristiana followed a parallel path. The convergence’s significance for the tradition is that it occurred inside politics before the theologians had finished legitimating it in doctrine: thousands of Chilean Christians arrived at Marxist analysis through the practice of the pobladores’ movements, the agrarian reform and the parish base communities, and their arrival changed the receiving tradition, which found itself obliged to treat faith not as the residue its textbooks described but as the living motivation of a fraction of its own cadres. The theologians of the following years, several of them Chileans or formed in Chile, theorised a convergence the Chilean organisations had already enacted. The case stands as the religious row of the table in its organisational form, and as a further instance of the region’s pattern: the practice, generated by the region’s conditions, preceded and compelled the theory, in the church as in the countryside and the seminar room.

The tradition as a curriculum: what the next generation inherits

A guide of this kind ends by inventorying the inheritance, and the inventory can be made in the tradition’s own terms. What the next generation of the region’s scholars and movements inherits is, first, a set of problems that have not closed: the land, in its new forms of agribusiness and extraction; the racial structure, in its coloniality formulation; the terms of the region’s insertion into a world economy whose centre of gravity has shifted toward Asia, posing the dependency question in a form its founders would recognise and its categories must be rebuilt to answer. It inherits, second, a set of dated and nameable arguments, the communal argument, the corrected dependency analysis, the super-exploitation mechanism, the internal colonialism concept, the motley society, the coloniality of power, which constitute the region’s permanent contribution to the world’s stock of theory and which this guide has inventoried against the derivative charge. It inherits, third, an institutional lesson written in the tradition’s own losses: that theory lives in institutions, universities, journals, publishing houses and archives, and that a tradition which neglects its housing will bequeath fragments. And it inherits, fourth, a discipline, the discipline the founder stated in 1928 and the exile generation relearned at the highest price: that the theory must be a creation from the society’s own evidence or it will be a copy, and that copies, in the region’s history, have always ended by serving someone else’s purposes. The regional problems table with which this guide organised the tradition is therefore left open at the bottom, as the urban question already amended it once. The problems that will extend it are being posed now in the region’s territories and seminar rooms, in Spanish, in Portuguese, in Quechua and Aymara and the region’s other languages, mostly untranslated, as the tradition’s decisive work has always first appeared. The guide’s final word is the founder’s criterion, which the whole record has vindicated as the tradition’s law of life: what is created from the evidence endures, and what is copied does not.

The nitrate north: Recabarren and the labour movement’s geography

The tradition’s Chilean founder deserves a fuller record than the passing mentions above, because the movement he built was the region’s strongest early case of a Marxism grown from a workplace. Luis Emilio Recabarren, a typographer from Valparaíso, spent two decades organising the workers of the nitrate pampas of the northern desert, where British and Chilean capital extracted the fertiliser the world’s farms demanded from company towns in one of the harshest industrial landscapes on earth. The pampas gave his organising its form: the mancomunales, the mutual aid and resistance societies that combined the union, the cooperative, the school and the theatre company in one organisation, because the company town left no other institution standing. Recabarren founded newspapers as he founded unions, travelled to Buenos Aires and into the Argentine movement’s debates, attended the Comintern’s congresses as the Chilean party’s founder delegate, and built, by his death in 1924, the political formation that became the Communist Party of Chile. The guide dwells on the case because it corrects two simplifications at once. Against the derivative charge’s simpler form, Recabarren’s Marxism was an organising practice elaborated in the pampas before it was a doctrine received from abroad: the mancomunal was an invention, not an import. And against the tradition’s later rural romance, the region’s most durable early movement was industrial, built by wage workers in an export enclave whose product fed the world’s agriculture, so that the Chilean working class was international in its insertion before it was national in its consciousness. The nitrate economy collapsed with the synthetic substitutes of the interwar years, and the pampas emptied into the region’s saddest landscape of abandoned company towns; but the party and the habits of organisation the nitrate workers built survived the industry that made them, and the Chilean labour movement’s century long discipline, its federations, its press, its martyrology of Santa María de Iquique and the later massacres, descends from the desert schools of Recabarren’s mancomunales.

The Trotskyist current: Posadas, Moreno and the Argentine laboratory

The region’s heterodox Marxisms include a Trotskyist current of unusual weight, and its Argentine centre made Buenos Aires a capital of the world movement’s arguments. The Fourth International’s Latin American bureau sat in the region from the 1940s, and its secretary, the Argentine Juan Posadas, led the bureau’s parties into positions, on the revolutionary role of the nationalist military regimes and later on questions stranger still, that split the world Trotskyist movement repeatedly. Against Posadas’s current stood the tradition of Nahuel Moreno, the Argentine theorist whose party building and whose writings on the region’s revolutions, on the method of the transitional programme and on the character of the nationalist governments, formed generations of cadres across the Spanish speaking world and sustained one of the largest Trotskyist organisations anywhere. The Bolivian miners’ Pulacayo theses, treated above, were this current’s documentary foundation in the region, and its parties and sympathisers ran through the labour movements of Argentina, Bolivia, Peru and Brazil for half a century. The guide registers the current for three reasons. It demonstrates, again, the region’s role as a producer in the world movement’s internal life rather than a consumer: the arguments of the Fourth International’s crises were substantially Argentine arguments. It supplied the tradition with its sharpest internal critics of both the communist parties and the foco, since the Trotskyist current held, against the first, that the national bourgeoisie would not complete the democratic revolution and, against the second, that only the organised working class could make one. And its fate illustrates the tradition’s general law of institutions: strong in the unions and the universities, prolific in print, the current’s organisations repeatedly fractured over the very questions of doctrine they existed to answer, and their legacy survives more in the cadres they formed for every other current of the region’s left than in any single surviving party.

Marxist economists in office: the tradition administers an economy

Three times in the tradition’s history its economists held office and had to run what they had analysed, and the three experiments belong in the guide because they tested the theory against the treasury. In Cuba after 1959 the economists of the revolution inherited a sugar economy and a treasury emptied by the fallen regime, and the great debate treated above was, among other things, the argument of men who signed the decrees. In Bolivia after 1952 the miners’ leaders entered the government as ministers, and the co-government’s economists faced the tin economy’s collapse and the inflation that dissolved the revolution’s gains, an experience the Bolivian tradition’s literature records as its education in the difference between expropriating an economy and commanding one. In Chile after 1970 the Popular Unity’s economic team, in which the economist Pedro Vuskovic, a former ECLA official formed in the structuralist school, held the ministry, attempted the transition’s economic management under the three pressures table’s conditions: the redistribution that raised demand, the nationalisations that transferred the commanding heights, and the blockade, the shortages and the black market that answered them. The Chilean experiment’s economics remain the tradition’s most argued balance sheet, since its defenders cite the first year’s growth and redistribution and its critics the third year’s inflation and collapse, and since the argument’s terms were set, as this guide’s figures protocol requires, by the commissions and the scholarly literature that hold the record. The general lesson the tradition drew from its three administrations was absorbed into the exile generation’s theory: that the conquest of office is the beginning of the economic problem and not its solution, that an economy answers to its own constraints whatever flag flies over the ministry, and that a Marxism which cannot say what it will do on the Monday after the victory has not finished its theoretical work. The region’s later left governments, of the period this guide treats as closed, governed with that lesson’s literature on their shelves, which is one reason their economics differed so markedly from the three experiments recorded here.

The tradition’s first experience of government came a generation earlier than the famous cases, and it set a pattern the later ones repeated. In the later 1930s, following the Comintern’s turn to popular fronts against fascism, the region’s communist parties entered electoral alliances with the liberal and radical parties of their countries, and in Chile the alliance won: the Popular Front of Radicals, Socialists and Communists elected Pedro Aguirre Cerda president in 1938, and the region had its first government with Marxist ministers, its first state development corporation, CORFO, founded in 1939 to build the industry the structuralists would later theorise, and its first experience of the front’s internal arithmetic, in which the Marxist partners supplied the votes and the discipline while the senior partners held the presidency and set the limits. The Chilean front governed until the radical presidents who succeeded Aguirre Cerda turned, under the pressure of the cold war, against their communist allies, outlawing the party in 1948 under the law its victims named the Ley Maldita and confining its cadres, among them the poet Pablo Neruda, senator and fugitive, whose flight across the Andes became the tradition’s most famous escape narrative. The front decade is set down because it prefigures the century. Every subsequent argument about alliances, about the price of junior partnership, about the state’s capacity to turn on the left it had used, was conducted with the Chilean front in the footnotes; and the development corporation the front founded became the institutional ancestor of the region’s whole developmentalist state, the machinery the dependency theorists would analyse and the dictatorships would dismantle. The tradition’s governmental education thus began not with a revolution but with a coalition, a development bank and a betrayal, and the order of those lessons explains much about the suspicion of alliances that the founding generation’s successors carried into the very different circumstances of the 1960s.

The Cuban agrarian reform: the revolution remakes the countryside

The Cuban revolution’s first great measure was an agrarian reform, and its course illustrates the agrarian row of the table in power. The reform law of May 1959, drafted in the Sierra’s liberated territory and promulgated from La Plata, expropriated the great estates, the sugar latifundia and the cattle ranches of the foreign companies among them, and created the National Institute of Agrarian Reform as the revolution’s economic government in the countryside. A second law in 1963 extended the expropriation to the medium holdings, leaving the small peasantry in possession and organising the expropriated land in state farms and cooperatives whose relative weight became one of the economic debate’s practical questions. The reform’s significance for this guide is twofold. It enacted, in the region’s most Americanised economy, the programme the founder generation had written for the Andes: the destruction of the latifundio as the precondition of everything else, carried out by a movement whose social base, the Oriente peasantry and the sugar workers, the orthodox parties had not organised. And it posed, in the sharpest form, the question the tradition’s agrarian theory had never had to answer from office: what replaces the estate? The Cuban answer, the state farm on the expropriated land with the peasantry’s small sector beside it, differed from the founder’s communal road and from the Mexican ejido alike, and the argument among the three models, conducted across the region’s journals in the 1960s, is the agrarian debate’s last great chapter. The reform marks the point where the table’s second row ceased to be a programme and became a record, with all the gains in concreteness and all the losses in innocence that the transition from programme to record implies.

Valcárcel and the Cusco school: the founder’s contemporaries

The Peruvian founding had a second centre, and its presence complicates the founder’s singularity in a way the guide should register. In Cusco, the old Inca capital, a school of indigenista intellectuals formed around the university and its journals in the same 1920s, and its leading figure, Luis E. Valcárcel, published in 1927, a year before the Seven Essays, his Tempestad en los Andes, Tempest in the Andes, a prophetic account of the indigenous world’s coming rising against the gamonal order. Valcárcel was not a Marxist; his indigenismo was cultural and redemptive where the founder’s was economic and structural, and the two men’s Lima and Cusco circles regarded one another across a genuine theoretical divide: whether the Indian’s emancipation ran through the recovery of a civilisation or through the destruction of the land system that exploited it. The divide matters because the founder’s achievement is clearer against it. The Seven Essays’ insistence that the Indian problem was the land problem was a polemic against the indigenista alternative as much as against the oligarchy, and the tradition’s subsequent history, in which the cultural and structural readings of the indigenous question have alternated and combined down to the indigenous movements of the present literature, replays the Lima and Cusco argument in every generation. The guide names Valcárcel as the founding’s necessary foil: the road not taken, whose partisans built the museums, the institutes and the ethnography the Marxists used, and whose question, what the indigenous civilisation itself contributes, returned inside the tradition in the coloniality analysis’s insistence that the classification of peoples, and not only the ownership of land, was the conquest’s durable work.

The exile press in Europe: Paris, Madrid, Stockholm

The exile formation had a European geography, and its publishing nodes deserve a record, because the tradition’s arguments of the 1970s were substantially made in three European cities. Paris received the largest intellectual colony, as it had received the Spanish Republicans a generation before: the exiles found the publishing house of François Maspero, whose list had carried the Algerian and Vietnamese revolutions to the French public and which now issued the Latin Americans; the journals and seminars of the French left, where the region’s theorists encountered the Althusserian and post-Althusserian debates at their source; and the Latin American student and exile community whose bookshops and bulletins made the Latin Quarter a Spanish speaking intellectual capital. Madrid, after the Spanish transition, became the Chilean exile’s publishing centre, home of the journal Araucaria, the cultural review of the Chilean resistance edited by exiles and circulated clandestinely in Chile itself, an enterprise that kept a national literature in being while its country was closed to it. Stockholm received a Chilean colony of a size that made Sweden, improbably, a centre of the tradition’s preservation, its solidarity committees and its publishing ventures sustained by the Swedish labour movement’s hospitality. The European nodes matter to the guide’s argument about institutions because they show the tradition’s portability and its price together. The arguments travelled; the audiences changed; and the exile literature’s characteristic abstraction, its turn to theory at the highest level of generality, bears the mark of seminar rooms in Paris and Stockholm as surely as its democratic conclusions bear the mark of the catastrophe that sent the authors there. A tradition’s thought is never placeless, and the map of its exile is part of its intellectual history.

The analysis of the northern power: anti-imperialism as a theory

The tradition’s account of the United States was its oldest continuous argument, and it developed, across the century, from a rhetoric into an analysis. The first form was organisational: the anti-imperialist leagues of the 1920s, in which the young Haya de la Torre’s continental vision and the Comintern’s anti-imperialist apparatus briefly cooperated, treated the northern power as the region’s common enemy and the continental unity of its peoples as the answer, an inheritance APRA carried into its doctrine of Indo-America. The second form was economic: the dependency analysis relocated the northern power inside the region’s own structures, in the multinational corporation, the transferred technology and the denationalised commanding heights, so that imperialism ceased to be an external pressure and became a mode of the region’s own organisation, with domestic beneficiaries and domestic administrators. The third form was strategic and doctrinal: the analysts of the dictatorships reconstructed the national security doctrine, the counterinsurgency teaching by which the region’s officer corps had learned to define an internal enemy and to treat the whole of society as its theatre, and traced the doctrine’s transmission through the military schools and missions of the cold war decades. Each form corrected its predecessor’s simplification. The leagues’ external enemy became the dependency school’s internal structure, and the structure acquired, in the dictatorship literature, its military and ideological machinery. The sequence is worth setting down because it is the tradition’s most complete example of an argument maturing under evidence, and because it explains the tradition’s durability in the region’s common sense: long after the parties that coined them vanished, the categories in which the region discusses the northern power, the enclave, the denationalised sector, the internal enemy, remain the ones this literature built, tested against the region’s experience of the power it described.

The Guatemalan spring: reform, land and the lesson of the overthrow

Central America’s tradition begins with a decade of reform and its destruction, and the episode’s lessons governed the region’s strategic argument for half a century. In 1944 the Guatemalan dictatorship fell to a civic military rising, and the decade of democratic government that followed, under Juan José Arévalo and then Jacobo Arbenz, attempted the programme the founder generation had written: labour rights, social security, and, in the agrarian reform law of 1952 known as Decree 900, the expropriation of the uncultivated portions of the great estates, the United Fruit Company’s fallow reserves conspicuously among them, for distribution to the landless. The Guatemalan Labour Party, the country’s communist formation, supported the government and grew inside its legality, and its theorists read the decade as the national democratic revolution proceeding by law. In 1954 the government was overthrown by an invasion organised from abroad with the northern power’s sponsorship, the reform was reversed, the distributed land was restored, and the country entered the long counterinsurgency whose accounting the clarification commission of 1999 would hold. The tradition’s reading of the episode was settled early and held long: that a reform which touched the foreign estate and armed the peasantry with land would be answered from abroad whatever its legality, and that the democratic road therefore required either a neutrality the cold war did not permit or a capacity for defence the Guatemalan government had declined to build. The young Guevara was in Guatemala City for the overthrow, an observer whose letters record the lesson forming, and the line from the Guatemalan spring to the Cuban road’s insistence on the militia and the Sierra runs directly through his biography. The decade stands as the strategic argument’s first modern exhibit, prior to Chile and in some ways cleaner: a legal reform, a foreign answer, and a generation instructed.

The military as a problem: the tradition theorises the armed forces

No institution forced itself on the tradition’s attention more repeatedly than the armed forces, and the tradition’s account of them developed through four successive theories, each corrected by a coup. The first theory, inherited from the founding period, treated the military as the oligarchy’s instrument, a praetorian guard whose politics were the politics of its paymasters; the caudillo was its personal form. The second theory arose from the nationalist military experiments, Peru after 1968 above all, and from the Panamanian case of Omar Torrijos: the armed forces as a relatively autonomous institution, recruited from the middle and lower strata, capable of an anti-oligarchic programme of its own when its corporate doctrine and its reading of the national interest aligned, a theory the Peruvian left’s divisions over Velasco tested in practice. The third theory was the dictatorship literature’s: the armed forces as a state within the state, with an institutional project, the national security doctrine, that made them the arbiters and finally the rulers of the political order, no longer an instrument of any class but a corporation governing in its own conception of the national good. The fourth, the transition literature’s, treated the military as a veto power to be retired by negotiation, its prerogatives dismantled by instalments under civilian governments that could not command it outright. The sequence is the tradition’s political science in miniature, and it exhibits the method this guide has attributed to the tradition throughout: a category held until an event broke it, then rebuilt from the event’s evidence. The founder generation’s praetorian guard and the transition generation’s veto power are descriptions of the same institution at different moments of its career, and the tradition’s capacity to replace the first description with the fourth, rather than repeating the first for seventy years, is among the strongest evidences against the derivative charge’s picture of a doctrine administered without reference to the world it described.

The publishers: the houses that built the shelf

The tradition’s infrastructure included its publishing houses, and their history belongs in the guide because the shelf on which the region’s Marxism stands was built by identifiable firms under identifiable pressures. The Fondo de Cultura Económica, founded in Mexico in 1934 as a state supported publisher of economics and social science, became under its Argentine director Arnaldo Orfila Reynal the Spanish language’s great social science house, issuing the translations and the original works through which the postwar generation read the world’s scholarship. Orfila’s removal in 1965, in the controversy over a work of anthropology the Mexican government disliked, produced the tradition’s own house: Siglo XXI Editores, founded by Orfila with the region’s intellectuals as its shareholders and its authors, which published the primer in 1969 and went on to issue the dependency school, the feudalism debate’s texts, the Spanish editions of the Cuadernos and the exile generation’s balance sheets, from offices in Mexico City, Madrid and Buenos Aires. Around these stood the Mexican house of Era, the Cuban state publishers and Casa de las Américas’ editions, the university presses of the great public universities, the party and institute imprints, and the commercial houses, Joaquín Mortiz and Grijalbo among them, that carried the tradition’s authors to the general reader when the market allowed. The publishers’ fate tracked the tradition’s own. The dictatorships raided the warehouses, burned the stock in the Argentine case’s notorious episodes, exiled the editors and bankrupted the firms whose authors were in prison or in flight; the transitions refounded several of them, Siglo XXI among them, with the returning exiles again on their lists. The houses are set down for the same reason as the journals and the institutes: the tradition’s survival was an achievement of logistics as much as of thought, and the men and women who printed, warehoused, smuggled and reprinted its books, at risks the authors sometimes did not share, are part of its history in the strictest sense. A reader who holds the primer’s Siglo XXI edition holds the whole system in one object: a Chilean author’s text, formed in a Paris seminar, published in Mexico City by an Argentine editor’s house, financed by the region’s intellectuals, and read, within a decade, in every country the house’s trucks and the exiles’ suitcases could reach.

Freire and the pedagogy of the oppressed: the tradition teaches reading

The tradition’s most widely practised method was not a strategy of power but a method of teaching adults to read, and its author carried the region’s Marxism into classrooms on every continent. Paulo Freire, a Brazilian educator formed in the Catholic and Marxist currents of Recife, developed in the early 1960s, in the literacy work of Brazil’s populist years, the method he would state in Pedagogia do oprimido, Pedagogy of the Oppressed, written in Chilean exile and published at the end of the decade: literacy taught not as the depositing of words in passive minds, the banking model his book named and indicted, but as a dialogue in which the learners’ own world, its words, its work and its oppressions, supplied the curriculum, so that learning to read the word and learning to read the world were one act. The Brazilian coup of 1964 imprisoned and exiled him, as it exiled the dependency theorists in the same years, and his Chilean exile placed the method inside the agrarian reform’s literacy campaigns and the Christian Democratic and then Popular Unity governments’ educational projects, before a further exile carried it to the World Council of Churches in Geneva and to the literacy campaigns of the newly independent African states. The book, available in English since 1970, became one of the most cited works of educational theory in the world, and its career exhibits the guide’s recurring pattern in its gentlest form: a method built from the region’s evidence, the illiterate peasantry of the Brazilian northeast, corrected the inherited doctrine, in this case the doctrine that consciousness is delivered to the oppressed from outside, and travelled under its own name into fields, education above all, that the tradition’s parties never reached. Freire’s place in this guide is also a correction of scale. The tradition’s balance sheets are usually drawn in parties and revolutions; drawn in classrooms, in the literacy circles of three continents where the method is still practised by teachers who may never have read a page of the founder, the tradition’s diffusion exceeds anything the primer achieved, and its mechanism is the one the founder prescribed: not a copy delivered to the learners, but a creation elicited from their own world.

The smaller stages: Paraguay, Ecuador and the long dictatorships of the interior

A survey organised by problems risks implying that the tradition lived only in its great centres, and a closing correction should register the smaller stages where its arguments were tested under the region’s longest and least reported dictatorships. Paraguay lived from 1954 to 1989 under the regime of Alfredo Stroessner, the longest rule of the South American century, and its Marxist tradition survived in the conditions that rule imposed: a communist party driven into a clandestinity measured in decades, its cadres formed in the prisons, in the exile of Buenos Aires and Montevideo, and in the peasant leagues of the interior, where the agrarian question of the table’s second row was posed in a country of land abundance and land monopoly combined. The Paraguayan case contributes to the guide a limiting instance of the institutional argument: a tradition reduced almost to memory and family transmission, without universities, journals or legal parties, which nevertheless re-emerged at the transition with its categories intact, carried by the survivors and their children. Ecuador’s tradition worked between the coast and the sierra, between the cacao and banana enclaves of Guayaquil, where its labour movement was born and where the massacre of striking workers in 1922 stands in its martyrology beside Santa María de Iquique, and the indigenous highlands whose communities posed the founder’s question in its second American homeland. The Ecuadorian synthesis found its theorist in Cueva, treated above, whose work was written from a small country’s evidence to a continental standard, a further instance of the pattern by which the region’s theory was made as often in its peripheries as in its capitals. The smaller stages matter to the balance sheet because they discipline its generalisations. The tradition’s productivity tracked its institutions, as this guide has argued throughout; the Paraguayan and Ecuadorian records show the converse, what the tradition became where institutions were denied it longest, and the answer, endurance without production, a memory kept for a future it could not date, completes the institutional argument by exhibiting its negative case.

The Dominican Republic supplies the smaller stages with their own theorist of the northern power. Juan Bosch, the Dominican writer and founder of his country’s revolutionary party, governed for seven months in 1963 as the republic’s first democratically elected president in decades, was overthrown by the military, and saw his constitutional restoration attempted in the civil war of 1965, which the northern power’s intervention decided. From that experience Bosch wrote Pentagonismo, sustituto del imperialismo, Pentagonism, Substitute of Imperialism, published in 1968, whose argument deserves its place in the sequence this guide traced from the anti-imperialist leagues to the national security doctrine. Bosch held that the classical imperialism of territorial and corporate domination was being succeeded, in the northern power itself, by the rule of a military industrial establishment whose interest lay not in colonies or concessions but in the permanent preparation for war, an establishment that required internal enemies abroad and treated the small countries of its sphere as garrisons to be kept in reliable hands. The thesis was a Caribbean Marxist’s reading of the same phenomenon the dependency school analysed economically and the dictatorship literature analysed doctrinally, reached from the experience of an island that had supplied the intervention’s textbook case, and it circulated in the region’s debates as the strategic literature’s Dominican contribution. Bosch himself broke with his own party’s Marxist wing in the following decade and the Dominican left divided around his legacy, but the book remains in the record as the smaller stages’ proof of the guide’s central claim: that wherever the region’s problems were faced with the tradition’s method, in a capital or in an island of the interior sea, the result was an argument the sources had not contained.

Frequently Asked Questions

Q: What is distinctive about Latin American Marxism?

Its founding condition. The doctrine arrived where exploitation fell principally on indigenous and rural populations rather than on an industrial working class, where a racial order inherited from the conquest divided the labouring classes, and where the economies were constituted by their insertion into a world market they did not govern. The tradition that resulted made its original arguments on those problems: the indigenous community as a surviving economic form, the agrarian structure as the key to the whole society, dependency as the region’s mode of insertion, super-exploitation as the mechanism linking that insertion to the labour process, and the coloniality of power as the racial grammar beneath the class structure. The distinctiveness is therefore not a style or a temperament. It is a set of dated and nameable arguments, made by identifiable thinkers in published texts, on problems the European sources had not faced in the same form, and the test of the distinctiveness is whether those arguments say anything the sources did not, which this guide has examined claim by claim.

Q: Which thinkers matter most in Latin American Marxism?

The founder is José Carlos Mariátegui of Peru, whose Seven Interpretive Essays of 1928 set the tradition’s problems and its method. The dependency generation follows: André Gunder Frank for the thesis at its most forceful, Fernando Henrique Cardoso and his co-author Enzo Faletto for the correction that made it an analysis, Theotonio dos Santos for its most rigorous statement, and Ruy Mauro Marini for the super-exploitation mechanism, the tradition’s strongest single claim to theoretical novelty. Sérgio Bagú and Caio Prado Júnior anchor the feudalism debate’s settlement. Ernesto Guevara matters as the foco’s theorist and the Cuban economic debate’s protagonist. Gustavo Gutiérrez founded the liberation theology school, Aníbal Quijano stated the coloniality of power, René Zavaleta Mercado built the motley society concept, and Adolfo Sánchez Vázquez gave the tradition its philosophy of praxis. Marta Harnecker, whose primer formed the region’s militants, belongs on the list by influence if not by theoretical novelty, and José Aricó, the Cuadernos enterprise’s founder, by the infrastructure he built for everyone else’s work.

Q: Was anarchism stronger than Marxism at first?

Yes, and the point is established by the labour historiography rather than asserted by the tradition’s rivals. From the 1870s to the 1920s the region’s organised workers, in Lima, Havana, Santiago, Mexico City, São Paulo and Buenos Aires, were led predominantly by anarchists and revolutionary syndicalists, heirs of the Spanish and Italian emigration, who built the first federations, the first general strikes and the labour press. The Marxist parties founded in and after 1918 entered a house the anarchists had built, and the rivalry between the two inheritances, over organisation, over the state, over the peasantry neither at first understood, formed the early tradition’s character. The anarchists’ eclipse followed from the Russian Revolution’s prestige, from state repression that fell hardest on their organisations, and from their refusal of the political instruments the century rewarded. A reader who begins the tradition’s history with the communist parties misses its formative contest, and misses why the region’s Marxism carried, from the start, a syndicalist memory and an anti-authoritarian undertow that its official doctrines never wholly suppressed.

Q: How did the indigenous question change Marxist theory?

It forced the tradition to revise the doctrine’s inherited sequence of social forms. The orthodox scheme expected communal property to be a dissolving survival on the road to private property and proletarianisation. The Peruvian evidence showed the indigenous community, the ayllu, surviving four centuries of colonial and republican pressure as a functioning economic form, organising land, labour and reciprocity for the majority of the country’s producers. Mariátegui’s founding argument drew the consequence: the community was not the past to be waited out but a material basis on which a socialism in Peru could rest, and the Indian problem was at root the land problem, a matter of the hacienda’s expropriation of communal land rather than of culture or education. The argument changed what the tradition’s successors had to explain. Every later account of the region, the internal colonialism concept, the coloniality of power, the motley society, begins from the same refusal to treat the indigenous population as a residue, and the indigenous movements of the later twentieth century inherited the argument even when they revised its conclusions.

Q: What did Latin America contribute to Marxist theory?

Four contributions stand the test of comparison with the sources. The indigenous communal argument claimed that a pre-capitalist communal form could be a foundation for socialism rather than an obstacle to it, a claim no European text had made for a living institution. The dependency analysis rebuilt the theory of the world economy from the periphery’s evidence, and in Marini’s super-exploitation mechanism it specified how the transfer of value from the region rested on the payment of labour power below its value, a mechanism absent from the classical texts. The coloniality of power argued that the racial classification of the world’s population was constitutive of capitalism from its American beginning, not a survival within it. And the feudalism debate’s settlement, that the region’s countryside was capitalist in its insertion from the conquest, corrected the stage scheme on documentary evidence. Around these stand the philosophy of praxis, the liberation theology borrowing, the motley society and the populism theories. The derivative charge, graded in this guide, convicts the region’s party orthodoxies and acquits these.

Q: Which book was the standard Marxist primer in the region?

Marta Harnecker’s Los conceptos elementales del materialismo histórico, her elementary concepts of historical materialism, published in Mexico City in 1969. Harnecker, a Chilean sociologist formed in Paris in Althusser’s seminar, wrote the book as a systematic exposition of the doctrine’s categories, surplus value, class, the state, ideology, in numbered propositions designed for study groups, and later editions carried a preface by Althusser himself. Its circulation, estimated by Michael Löwy’s survey of the tradition at over a million copies across its many editions and translations, made it the formative text of a generation of the region’s militants, in the parties, the unions, the universities and the guerrilla movements alike. The primer’s place in this guide is evidentiary. It proves the tradition’s diffusion, its unmatched capacity to reproduce itself in readers, while its content, a faithful exposition of the doctrine rather than an addition to it, marks the exact point where diffusion and originality part company. The region that produced the primer also produced the arguments that corrected it, and the tradition’s distinction lies in holding both facts together.

Q: How did the dictatorships affect Marxist thought?

They destroyed its institutional home and, by destroying it, changed its content. The coups of 1964 in Brazil, 1973 in Chile and Uruguay and 1976 in Argentina, with the region’s other authoritarian regimes, purged the universities where the tradition was housed, closed its journals and institutes, and drove its scholars into exile in Mexico, Venezuela, Europe and North America. The exile formation that resulted wrote the tradition’s most self-critical literature: the balance sheets of the defeats, the theory of bureaucratic authoritarianism, the populism analysis, and above all the democracy turn, the conclusion, drawn from the experience of societies that had lost every freedom, that democratic institutions were a value in themselves and the necessary ground of any socialist project. The repression is reported in this guide without totals, by reference to the official truth commissions and the scholarly literature that hold the accounting, and its intellectual effects are inseparable from its human cost. The tradition that returned with the transitions was smaller, chastened and theoretically transformed, and its transformation is unintelligible without the catastrophe that produced it.

Q: What is the coloniality of power?

Aníbal Quijano’s name for the pattern of power constituted in the Americas from 1492 and constitutive of capitalism itself. Its core is the social classification of the world’s population by race, invented in the colonial Americas to assign the conquered peoples to unpaid and servile labour and the conquerors to wages, property and command, and then extended across the globe as capitalism expanded. Coloniality names what survives colonialism’s formal end: the republics abolished the colonial state in the nineteenth century, but the racial classification of labour and authority persisted inside the independent states, organising their labour markets, their hierarchies of credibility and their insertion into the world economy. The concept differs from internal colonialism, which it absorbed and generalised, in its claim about capitalism’s origin: where classical theory treated the Americas as a mere field of accumulation, Quijano argues that the racial organisation of labour was present at the creation, so that there is no capitalism without coloniality. The argument is the tradition’s culminating claim and the decolonial school’s foundation.

Q: Is there a Latin American Marxist tradition today?

The question is best answered by distinguishing the tradition’s three carriers. As a body of theory, the tradition persists in the region’s universities and journals, where its concepts, dependency, internal colonialism, the coloniality of power, the motley society, remain working instruments, and where its classic texts are taught and argued with as living documents. As a political inheritance, it persists inside the region’s left parties and movements, many led by cadres formed in its schools, and in the indigenous movements that inherited its arguments while revising its conclusions. As an organised doctrine it survives diminished and fragmented, its energies dispersed into the broader critical culture the exile generation built. The pattern is the one this guide has traced throughout: the tradition’s theoretical production has repeatedly outlived its organisations, and its concepts circulate, under its name and under others, in fields far from the parties that commissioned them. Whether that persistence amounts to a living tradition or to a distinguished afterlife is the question the cluster’s closing articles take up.

Q: Where should you start with Latin American Marxism?

Start with the founder. Mariátegui’s Seven Essays, in Marjory Urquidi’s English translation, gives you the land argument whole and shows the method at work on a real society. Pair it with the Vanden and Becker anthology for the journalism, where the same mind argues week by week with its opponents. Then take the dependency controversy as a two-text seminar: Frank for the thesis unqualified, Cardoso and Faletto for the historicised correction, reading the second as a reply to the first. Gutiérrez opens the religious dimension; no other text explains so well why a theology needed Marxist analysis. Guevara’s Guerrilla Warfare, read against the record of the foco’s testing, covers the strategic argument. Close with Quijano’s Nepantla essay on coloniality, the tradition’s culminating claim in its author’s own English statement. If you read Spanish or Portuguese, Marini’s Dialéctica de la dependencia is the first untranslated summit to attempt, and the region’s scholars will tell you the same.

Q: How does the fourth regional instance grade the region’s claim to originality?

The pattern grades by comparison. India, treated in the cluster before this one, posed the colonial question to a tradition that answered with arguments about caste, the village community and the mode of production that colonial rule imposed. Japan and China, treated in the cluster’s Asian articles, posed the stage question and the peasant question. Latin America, the fourth instance, posed the indigenous, agrarian, dependency, religious and strategic problems together, and its claim to originality rests on the answers that have no European source: the communal argument, the super-exploitation mechanism, the coloniality of power and the feudalism settlement. The comparison also grades the failures symmetrically. Each instance produced orthodoxies that copied, and each produced its corrections from its own evidence. The fourth instance’s distinction within the pattern is the completeness of its record: no other region supplies, in one connected literature, a founding text, a corrected theory of the world economy, a theological borrowing and a self-critical exile literature. The grade the pattern assigns is therefore the highest the series gives, with the diffusion caveat attached.

Q: What should a student separate between a tradition’s diffusion and its theoretical originality?

Everything in the assessment of a regional tradition depends on the separation. Diffusion is measured by circulation, translation and the formation of readers: by that measure the region’s primer, with its million copies, made the tradition one of the most diffused bodies of doctrine of its century. Originality is measured by dated arguments that say what no source had said: the communal argument of 1928, the super-exploitation mechanism of 1973, the coloniality of power of the 1990s. The two measures are independent, and confusing them corrupts judgement in both directions. A tradition can diffuse an orthodoxy it did not create, as the region’s parties diffused the stage scheme; and it can create arguments that diffuse poorly, as Marini’s work diffused for decades mainly among specialists. The derivative charge against the region trades on the confusion, pointing to the diffused orthodoxy as if it were the whole tradition. The student’s discipline is to keep two ledgers, one for what the tradition spread and one for what it added, grading each claim where it belongs.

Q: Why does the untranslated literature matter to an English reader’s picture?

Because the picture is a selection, and the selection was made by other hands for other purposes. The works an English reader can obtain, the founder’s essays, the dependency classics, the liberation theology texts, the decolonial essays, were translated because northern publishers and universities wanted them, and they present the tradition as its importers wished to receive it. The works that remain untranslated, Marini’s central book, Bagú’s founding settlement, Zavaleta’s major writings, Cueva’s synthesis, the exile generation’s journals, include the tradition’s strongest single theoretical claim and its most complete statement of its own history. A judgement formed from the translated shelf alone therefore errs in both directions: it overrates the currents the north rewarded and underrates the arguments the region regards as central. The practical consequence is humility about verdicts, including this guide’s, and a programme: translating the untranslated core would change the Anglophone field more than any other single intervention. Until it happens, the honest reader holds the map of what cannot be read alongside the map of what can.

Q: How does the regional problems table order the tradition?

The table orders the tradition by the problems that generated its theory rather than by its parties, its countries or its chronology, and the choice is the guide’s method in miniature. The indigenous problem comes first because it came first and because its solution, the communal argument, established the pattern every later row repeats: a problem the inherited doctrine could not process, an answer built from the region’s evidence, a correction administered to the doctrine. The agrarian row follows as the founder’s own reduction of the first problem to the land. The dependency row carries the tradition’s centre of gravity, its most corrected and most exported argument. The religious row records the borrowing that no other regional tradition performed. The strategic row closes the table because it was tested last and at the highest price, in the confrontation of the two roads. A table ordered by problems shows what narrative hides: the tradition’s unity is not a line or a loyalty but a set of inherited questions that the region’s conditions kept posing.

Q: What separates a regional variant of Marxism from an imported copy?

The founder stated the criterion in 1928, in Amauta’s anniversary editorial: the region’s socialism must not be a copy but a heroic creation. The criterion is operational. A copy reproduces the source’s answers to the source’s problems: it classifies the region’s societies by a European scheme, applies its stages, and reports the discrepancies as backwardness. A variant lets the region’s evidence correct the scheme: it finds the community where the scheme predicted dissolution, capitalism where it predicted feudalism, the transfer of value where it saw only trade, and rebuilds the theory to hold what it found. The test of any text is therefore documentary: does it cite the region’s land records, wage data, community structures and racial classifications, and does its argument change where the evidence requires? Mariátegui’s essays pass; the Comintern’s classification of his country fails. The tradition at its best is the record of the test being passed; its orthodoxies are the record of the test evaded. The same region produced both the copy and the creation, often in the same decade.