A.C. Bradley’s Shakespearean Tragedy (1904) is the most influential book ever written about Shakespeare’s tragedies, and Romeo and Juliet is not in it. The exclusion was a decision about the scope of one book: Bradley announced in his Introduction that he would consider “the four principal tragedies” from a single point of view, and he placed the lovers’ play outside that design with one sentence, calling it “a pure tragedy, but it is an early work, and in some respects an immature one.” Because the book became the discipline’s court of appeal, a filing decision hardened into a ranking, and the play spent a century under a suspicion it had done nothing fresh to earn: that it is a lesser tragedy, a beautiful apprentice piece that fails the tests the great four pass.
The verdict argued here is that the suspicion reverses the evidence. Bradley’s criteria were drawn from the four plays he had already chosen, so the exclusion is circular at its root; measured against his own stated tests, the play passes most of them, several on the strength of passages where Bradley himself uses it as his example; and where it genuinely differs, in the inward division of its hero, the difference marks a different kind of tragedy rather than a deficient one. The catastrophe in Verona is organized by an institution, the feud, and by a formal design of pattern and haste, not by the slow self-division of a single colossal consciousness. That is another species of the genus, and Bradley’s limit was to mistake his species for the genus.

What gives the exclusion its interest is that Bradley is no enemy of the play. His book mentions it more often than any other work he left out, quotes its hero’s premonition as a model of tragic exposition, gives its hero the fundamental tragic trait and a named tragic error, and in a later lecture finds, for this very play, the inward necessity that rescues a tragedy of accident. The exclusion case, assembled whole, convicts the definition more than the play. It also explains the definition: Bradley was describing, with unmatched fidelity, the tragedies of Shakespeare’s maturity between about 1601 and 1608, and he honestly reported that the early love tragedy did not exhibit their inward machinery. His error was one of taxonomy, and it took the combined work of Franklin Dickey, Harry Levin, Susan Snyder, and Nicholas Brooke to correct the filing.
Why did a filing decision carry such force? Because of the form the authority took. A canon announced in a table of contents reproduces itself through syllabi: the lectures a professor sets are the lectures the professor was set, and Bradley’s four became, for two generations, the syllabus of Shakespearean tragedy in the English-speaking university. Students met the lovers’ play, if they met it in a tragedy course at all, as the preface to the real subject, and they carried that order of dignity into schoolrooms of their own. The exclusion therefore did its work without ever being argued. It needed no defence, because it was never presented as a claim; it was presented as the shape of a book, and books shape fields more durably than arguments do. A claim can be refuted. A table of contents can only be outgrown, and outgrowing this one took the better part of seventy years.
The Exclusion in Its Setting: A Book of Four Tragedies
Andrew Cecil Bradley (1851 to 1935) came to the subject with a philosopher’s training and a lecturer’s platform. A fellow of Balliol College, Oxford, he taught literature at Liverpool and then held the chair of English language and literature at Glasgow before his election in 1901 as Professor of Poetry at Oxford, a post he kept until 1906. The lectures that became Shakespearean Tragedy were, by his own preface, “based on a selection from materials used in teaching at Liverpool, Glasgow, and Oxford,” with the lecture form largely preserved. The book appeared from Macmillan in 1904; a second edition followed in March 1905, and the title page of the 1919 impression already records a thirteenth reprinting. Katherine Cooke devoted a scholarly monograph, A. C. Bradley and His Influence in Twentieth-Century Shakespeare Criticism (1972), to the book’s dominion, and the description of it as probably the most influential single work of Shakespeare criticism ever published has become a commonplace of the reference literature. Penguin kept it in print with a foreword by John Bayley, the Warton Professor at Oxford, as late as 1991.
The Bradley who wrote it was formed in two disciplines at once, and the exclusion bears both formations’ marks. His elder brother was F. H. Bradley, the philosopher of Appearance and Reality (1893), the most formidable British idealist of the age; Andrew Cecil’s Balliol was the Oxford of the idealist ascendancy, where reality was habitually conceived as a single ordered whole whose parts suffer when they set themselves against it. That habit survives in the lectures’ deepest doctrine, the vision of a tragic world that is an order and not a chaos, in which evil carries contradiction inside itself and destroys itself in convulsing the whole. A literary critic with a metaphysician’s inheritance naturally asks of a tragedy whether its world holds together as one causal and moral system centred on persons of vast interior scale. He less naturally asks whether a tragedy might cohere as music coheres, or as a ritual does, in pattern rather than in psychology. The exclusion is, among other things, the record of a magnificent critical intelligence applying the only unity it had been educated to see.
The book’s architecture is part of its authority. After a short Introduction stating the point of view, two general lectures treat “The Substance of Shakespearean Tragedy” and “Construction in Shakespeare’s Tragedies”; a third, on Shakespeare’s tragic period, surveys the chronology before the play lectures begin: two lectures each on Hamlet, Othello, and King Lear, and a final tenth lecture on Macbeth; some hundred pages of notes, lettered A to EE, pursue questions of fact and text. Bradley’s stated object was narrow and exact: “In these lectures I propose to consider the four principal tragedies of Shakespeare from a single point of view,” the point of view being dramatic appreciation, the close imaginative reconstruction of action and character. Nothing was promised on Shakespeare’s life, his sources, his texts, or his place in literary history. The exclusion of the other tragedies was therefore announced as a boundary of the inquiry, not delivered as a sentence on the excluded.
The boundary, however, was drawn with reasons, and the reasons differ by play in a way that matters. The historical tragedies, Richard II, Richard III, Julius Caesar, Antony and Cleopatra, and Coriolanus, are set aside as works in which Shakespeare accepted “a certain obligation to follow his authority,” so that they show “considerable deviations” from the standard of pure tragedy and are not to be judged by it. Titus Andronicus is left out because, whenever it was written, it precedes Shakespeare’s possession of “a style of his own or any characteristic tragic conception.” Timon of Athens is omitted because much of it is evidently not Shakespeare’s and its conception probably another writer’s. Romeo and Juliet alone receives a reason that touches its quality as tragedy: it is pure tragedy, Bradley grants, “but it is an early work, and in some respects an immature one.” Every other exclusion appeals to kind, authorship, or material. This one appeals to maturity, and maturity, in a book that proceeds to define tragedy from the mature works, is the criterion that does all the later work.
Was the Exclusion Meant as a Verdict on the Play?
No, on the evidence of the Introduction itself: Bradley defined a subject, the four principal tragedies studied from one point of view, and set everything else outside the lectures for stated reasons of scope, kind, or authorship. The sentence on this play grants its purity as tragedy before noting its earliness;
The verdict on the play’s worth was supplied by the book’s readers, who converted a boundary into a hierarchy because the boundary’s author had defined tragedy inside it. Nowhere in the book is the play ranked beneath the four as a work of art, and its verse is later praised as the benchmark of the early style.
The conversion was natural, and Bradley’s own framing invited it. A critic who entitles his general lectures “The Substance of Shakespearean Tragedy” does not present his four plays as a sample; he presents them as the substance. Readers who learned from the book what tragedy is were bound to ask what the plays outside it are, and the one quality-word in the Introduction, “immature,” gave them their answer. The exclusion’s long effect, a durable sense of the play as a lesser or apprentice tragedy, was thus an accident of the book’s success acting on a single adjective. Bradley cannot be acquitted of the adjective. But the case against the exclusion must begin by separating what he did, draw a line and label one side of it early, from what the century did with the line.
Bradley’s chronology made the line look like a finding of nature. Lecture III divides the tragedies into two groups “separated by a considerable interval”: tragedy written “in the early years of his career of authorship,” pure like this play or historical like Richard III, beside the early comedies; a gap of some half-dozen years given to the histories and the great comedies; then, “from about 1601 to about 1608,” the tragic period, “tragedy after tragedy,” Julius Caesar, Hamlet, Othello, King Lear, Timon, Macbeth, Antony and Cleopatra, and Coriolanus. His own period table places Romeo and Juliet at the end of the First Period, dated to about 1595. The four lectures’ plays are the centre of the second group. So the book studies the mature cluster, and its general theory of tragedy is a theory of that cluster, a fact the next sections keep in view: every test the play is said to fail was calibrated on plays written six to thirteen years after it.
The two-group scheme was not Bradley’s invention, and its ancestry explains its confidence. Edward Dowden’s Shakspere: A Critical Study of His Mind and Art (1875) had taught Victorian readers to divide the career into four periods of spiritual biography: “In the workshop,” the apprenticeship; “In the world,” the histories and comedies of the great decade; “Out of the depths,” the tragic period, where the mind sounds evil and suffering; and “On the heights,” the late romances’ serenity. Dowden’s periods made a method of the metaphor of growth, so that a play’s date became an index of its maker’s inner stature, and earliness a synonym for limitation. Bradley’s chronology is Dowden’s habit disciplined by a finer instrument: the same ascent, the same assumption that the tragic period represents the man at full stretch, the same readiness to read a formal difference as a stage of development. The assumption deserves naming because it survives in the exclusion’s adjective. “Immature” is a Dowden word before it is a Bradley finding, a period judgment wearing the dress of an aesthetic one. When later scholars dissolved the growth metaphor, Brooke above all, the adjective lost its foundation and stood revealed as what it had always been, a date in prose.
Bradley’s Tests for Tragedy: Character, Error, and the Impression of Waste
Lecture I builds the definition from the inside, and it deserves to be stated in its own order, because the exclusion case consists largely of watching the play pass tests its author framed without it. A Shakespearean tragedy, Bradley begins, is pre-eminently the story of one person, the hero, or at most of two, the hero and heroine; and he notes at once the exception that governs this play: “it is only in the love-tragedies, Romeo and Juliet and Antony and Cleopatra, that the heroine is as much the centre of the action as the hero.” The story leads up to and includes the hero’s death; an instantaneous death by accident in the midst of prosperity would not suffice; the tale is one of “suffering and calamity conducting to death.” The suffering is exceptional, and it befalls a conspicuous person: tragedy “is concerned always with persons of ‘high degree’,” kings and princes, or leaders like Coriolanus, Brutus, and Antony, “at the least, as in Romeo and Juliet, with members of great houses, whose quarrels are of public moment.” The play enters his definition at its lowest rung of rank and still enters it.
The two-centre exception deserves its own weight, because it quietly reverses the exclusion’s arithmetic. Bradley’s tragedy is pre-eminently the story of one person; the heroines of the four, Ophelia, Desdemona, Cordelia, Lady Macbeth, are powers inside the hero’s story rather than centres of their own. In the love-tragedies alone the heroine stands as a second centre, and the exception is not decorative: it determines where the waste falls and where the recognition lands. Juliet carries the play’s fourth act virtually alone, performs its most strenuous act of will, and is the only one of the lovers to foresee the tomb while still hoping to cheat it. A definition that admits a second centre only for this play (and for Antony and Cleopatra, which Bradley files among the histories) has already conceded that the excluded work organizes tragedy on a plan its system barely houses. The plan is duality: two centres, two houses, two families of imagery, a tragedy that thinks in pairs. What the lectures treat as an exception to be noted and passed, the later formal critics treated as the play’s principle, and the exclusion looks different once the exception is read as the rule of another order.
The decisive turn comes next. Calamity that merely befalls a man, descending “like lightning” or stealing “like pestilence,” cannot furnish the substance of the story: the calamities of tragedy “do not simply happen, nor are they sent; they proceed mainly from actions, and those the actions of men.” Actions beget actions in an apparently inevitable sequence, and the sufferings are felt “not only or chiefly as something which happens to the persons concerned, but equally as something which is caused by them.” Hence the famous centre: the tragedy “may be said with equal truth to lie in action issuing from character, or in character issuing in action.” The dictum that with Shakespeare “character is destiny” is, Bradley warns, “an exaggeration, and one that may mislead,” since many of his persons would have escaped a tragic end in other circumstances; “but it is the exaggeration of a vital truth.” And the hero “always contributes in some measure to the disaster in which he perishes”: a hero destroyed “simply and solely by external forces” is alien to Shakespeare, and so is a hero who contributes only by acts “in which we see no flaw.”
Conflict gives the action its shape, and here Bradley makes a distinction on which the whole case will turn. The conflict may be outward, between persons or groups: “The love of Romeo and Juliet is in conflict with the hatred of their houses, represented by various other characters.” Or it may be inward, a conflict of forces in the hero’s soul, the struggle that “in the greater plays” engrosses interest as much as the outer war. His historical observation follows: “If further we compare the earlier tragedies with the later, we find that it is in the latter, the maturest works, that this inward struggle is most emphasised,” and the sentence that files the play away: “Romeo and Juliet, Richard III., Richard II., where the hero contends with an outward force, but comparatively little with himself, are all early plays.” The play’s conflict structure is Bradley’s type specimen of the early manner, named in the same breath as the two Richards.
The hero, thirdly, must be exceptional beyond his rank. In almost all the tragic figures Bradley finds “a marked one-sidedness, a predisposition in some particular direction; a total incapacity, in certain circumstances, of resisting the force which draws in this direction; a fatal tendency to identify the whole being with one interest, object, passion, or habit of mind.” This, he says, “is, for Shakespeare, the fundamental tragic trait. It is present in his early heroes, Romeo and Richard II., infatuated men, who otherwise rise comparatively little above the ordinary level.” The trait joins with error: “He errs, by action or omission; and his error, joining with other causes, brings on him ruin.” The fatal imperfection “is never absent,” but it differs in kind and degree: “At one extreme stands the excess and precipitancy of Romeo, which scarcely, if at all, diminish our regard for him; at the other the murderous ambition of Richard III.” Romeo therefore stands inside Bradley’s system of error, at its mildest extreme; the popular summary that Bradley found no flaw in the lovers is a summary of other men’s books.
Around the dominant factor Bradley arranges three subordinate elements, and his care in subordinating them matters to the case. Abnormal conditions of mind, insanity or hallucination, are never “the origin of deeds of any dramatic moment.” The supernatural contributes, sometimes indispensably, but is “always placed in the closest relation with character” and never compels. And chance: Shakespeare “in most of his tragedies allows to ‘chance’ or ‘accident’ an appreciable influence at some point in the action,” where accident means an occurrence entering the sequence “neither from the agency of a character, nor from the obvious surrounding circumstances.” His own list of examples begins with this play and then ranges across the chosen four: “It may be called an accident, in this sense, that Romeo never got the Friar’s message about the potion, and that Juliet did not awake from her long sleep a minute sooner; an accident that Edgar arrived at the prison just too late to save Cordelia’s life; an accident that Desdemona dropped her handkerchief at the most fatal of moments; an accident that the pirate ship attacked Hamlet’s ship, so that he was able to return forthwith to Denmark.” Accident is admitted because it is a fact of life and because the inability of men to control the courses they start is itself a tragic fact. But “any large admission of chance into the tragic sequence would certainly weaken, and might destroy, the sense of the causal connection of character, deed, and catastrophe”; Shakespeare “really uses it very sparingly,” and “almost all the prominent accidents occur when the action is well advanced and the impression of the causal sequence is too firmly fixed to be impaired.” The doctrine, note, is quantitative and positional: accidents are taxed by their size and their lateness, not banned.
Behind the machinery stands the tragic world itself, and Lecture I’s close gives it a metaphysic that the exclusion debate rarely consults. The power manifested in the action is not, for Bradley, a moral order in the edifying sense: Shakespeare deals no poetic justice, since the good and the relatively innocent perish with the guilty, and a spectator demanding deserts distributed will find the tragedies an offence. Nor is the power a blind fate grinding persons down, since the spectacle leaves its witnesses neither in rebellion against a tyranny nor in despair at a chaos. It is an order that shows itself in and through character and deed, an order against which evil, the convulsion’s constant source, acts and in acting ruins itself: the evil will is divided against itself, carries its own destruction within it, and draws from the whole the reaction that expels it at whatever cost to the good entangled with it. Hence the sadness without despair. The waste is real, the recognition of waste is the audience’s, and the order is vindicated only in the sense that evil cannot finally maintain itself inside it. Keep this doctrine beside the play’s close. Verona’s feud is a standing evil of exactly Bradley’s type, self-perpetuating and self-divided, and it destroys itself in the only way left to it, by consuming the heirs through whom it would have continued; the reconciliation of the houses is the order’s reaction, purchased at the price his doctrine predicts, the good destroyed in the expulsion of the evil. No ending in the four performs his metaphysic more diagrammatically. The excluded play is, by the system’s own deepest article, the most orthodox tragedy Shakespeare wrote.
The third subordinate element, the supernatural, completes the inventory, and the play’s handling of it shows the young dramatist already observing the rule Bradley would codify. In the four, ghosts, witches, and apparitions enter the action but are always bound to character, never a substitute for it: the supernatural, in his formula, is placed in the closest relation with the minds it visits. Verona has no ghost and no witch. It has presentiments, and it treats them exactly as Bradley’s rule requires, as states of soul legible to psychology: Romeo’s dream on the way to the feast and his dread of some consequence hanging in the stars (1.4), Juliet’s vision, as Romeo descends from her window, of her lover as one dead in the bottom of a tomb (3.5). Each omen is true and each is earned, the knowledge of temperaments that know their world; Mercutio’s Queen Mab speech even supplies the materialist footnote, dreams as the children of an idle brain (1.4), inside the play itself. A work that naturalizes its supernatural into presentiment satisfies the letter of Bradley’s doctrine more strictly than the tragedies of the ghost and the witches. The inventory is complete: on every element of the system, dominant and subordinate alike, the excluded play can be examined, and on nearly every element it passes.
Finally, the effects by which a tragedy certifies itself. The hero need not be good, but he must have “so much of greatness that in his error and fall we may be vividly conscious of the possibilities of human nature.” With that greatness Bradley connects “what I venture to describe as the centre of the tragic impression. This central feeling is the impression of waste”: pity and fear “unite with, and even to merge in, a profound sense of sadness and mystery, which is due to this impression of waste.” And behind the action stands an ultimate power that is neither a just moral order distributing deserts, for Shakespeare offers no poetic justice, nor a blind fate, for the spectacle does not leave the audience rebellious or desperate. Its mark is that the convulsion’s main source “is in every case evil,” and “in almost every case evil in the fullest sense, not mere imperfection but plain moral evil”: “The love of Romeo and Juliet conducts them to death only because of the senseless hatred of their houses.” Where the evil is not in the hero, the comparatively innocent hero still shows “some marked imperfection or defect, irresolution, precipitancy, pride, credulousness,” and such defects “contribute decisively to the conflict and catastrophe.” The sentence is general, but its second word is the play’s own diagnosis returned as doctrine.
What Makes a Bradley Hero Colossal?
Exceptional stature: the later heroes carry a scale that reminds Bradley of Michelangelo’s figures, “survivors of the heroic age living in a later and smaller world,” huge men in whom desire, passion, or will attains a terrible force. He is explicit that this impression is absent from Romeo, as it is from Brutus and Hamlet;
It belongs to Lear and Coriolanus, is distinct in Macbeth and Antony, and begins with Othello, “the first of these men, a being essentially large and grand.” Colossal scale is the one test in the lecture that is a matter of magnitude rather than of structure, and the one the teenage hero of an early play was never designed to meet.
Such are the tests: rank, a centre, a trait, an error, causation mainly from character, accident kept small and late, conflict ideally doubled outward and inward, evil as the convulsion’s source, greatness sufficient to make the fall a waste. Bradley never applies them to the play as a set; the exclusion rests on the Introduction’s sentence and on the two passing placements, early and outward, in Lecture I. Assembling the application is the work of the next two sections: first, everything Bradley actually wrote about the play across both books; then the tests applied one by one.
What Bradley Actually Wrote About Romeo and Juliet
The book’s own index is the honest map of the play’s presence in it: “Romeo and Juliet, 3, 7, 9, 15; conflict, 17, 18, 34; exposition, 41-5; crisis, 52; counter-stroke, 58,” with “Romeo, 22, 29, 150, 210” entered separately. Read in order, the references show a work used steadily as the standing early example: introduced in the Introduction as pure tragedy; cited in Lecture I for the heroine’s equal centrality, for the lowest rung of tragic rank, for the definition of accident, for the outward type of conflict, for the tragic trait in an early hero, for the mildest extreme of tragic error, and for the doctrine that love is killed by hatred; then analysed in Lecture II for its exposition, its rising and falling fortunes, its crisis, and its counter-stroke; and glanced at twice more, in the Hamlet and Othello lectures, on pages 150 and 210. No other excluded play is woven so deeply into the general theory of the included ones.
The index entry repays a second look for its form alone. Reference works index subjects; Bradley’s index breaks the play into functions, conflict, exposition, crisis, counter-stroke, as though the work were less a title than a repertoire of technical instances, a set of worked examples filed under the operations they illustrate. No other excluded play gets functional sub-entries of this density, and Richard II and Richard III, named beside it in the inward-conflict sentence, appear in the general lectures as illustrations far more thinly. The index is the book’s unconscious table of contents for a shadow lecture course, the course on the early tragedies that Bradley’s scheme prevented him from giving, and its entries keep pointing at the play his Introduction dismissed in a sentence.
The exposition analysis is the warmest sustained attention the play receives, and it is technical admiration. Bradley’s exposition problem is to plant a situation that threatens conflict: “we see first the hatred of the Montagues and Capulets; and then we see Romeo ready to fall violently in love; and then we hear talk of a marriage between Juliet and Paris; but the exposition is not complete, and the conflict has not definitely begun to arise, till, in the last scene of the First Act, Romeo the Montague sees Juliet the Capulet and becomes her slave.” The play opens, he notes, with the arresting short scene his scheme prescribes, a street fight, followed by quieter disclosure; and among his examples of the ominous reinforcement planted in an exposition, the hero made conscious at once of the power that will undo him, he writes: “It is the same with the hatred between the rival houses in Romeo and Juliet, and with Antony’s infatuated passion. We realise them at the end of the first page, and are almost ready to regard the hero as doomed.” His chosen quotation for the device is Romeo’s speech on the way to the feast, the dream reported and dismissed, ending “My mind misgives / Some consequence yet hanging in the stars / Shall bitterly begin his fearful date / With this night’s revels” (1.4). A critic filing a play as immature does not usually exhibit its first act as the pattern of how exposition should be done.
The construction lecture continues in the same register. The play is paired with Hamlet for a refinement of his scheme: in both, “although the hero perishes, the side opposed to him, being the more faulty or evil, cannot be allowed to triumph when he falls.” Its curve is drawn exactly: “The fortunes of Romeo and Juliet rise and culminate in their marriage (ii. vi.), and then begin to decline before the opposition of their houses, which, aided by accidents, produces a catastrophe, but is thereupon converted into a remorseful reconciliation.” The crisis and counter-stroke, the hinge machinery of his construction theory, take the play as a leading instance: “On the marriage of Romeo follows immediately the brawl which leads to Mercutio’s death and the banishment of the hero (ii. vi. and iii. i.),” a counter-blow “at least as exciting as that of the crisis, perhaps more so.” He even registers the play’s one constructional cost with its excuse attached: heroes are kept offstage while the counter-action rises, “Romeo for about 550” lines, “(it matters less here, because Juliet is quite as important as Romeo).”
Beyond the two general lectures the references thin to glances, but the glances are not hostile. Lecture III, surveying the tragic period, praises the early manner by its best exhibit: “The ‘honey-tongued’ sweetness and beauty of Shakespeare’s early writing, as seen in Romeo and Juliet or the Midsummer-Night’s Dream, remain,” even as force and weight are added. In the Hamlet and Othello lectures Romeo appears twice more as a term of comparison, on the pages the index numbers 150 and 210, each time as a measure held up against a hero of the chosen four. The pattern of the whole footprint is worth stating flatly: wherever Bradley needs an early work to define a term, illustrate a device, or mark the mild end of a spectrum, the excluded play is the work he reaches for. Exclusion from the lectures coexisted with employment throughout them, and the employment is the warmer fact. Bradley never warms into a lecture on it, and he never returns to qualify the Introduction’s adjective. His stated reasons for the exclusion, assembled strictly from his pages, are three: the book’s announced scope, four principal tragedies from a single point of view; the play’s position in the early group, before the tragic period whose inward struggles the lectures anatomize; and its conflict type, outward rather than inward. Accident, the reason posterity has most often assigned him, appears in his text as a shared and tolerated feature of the whole canon, this play’s instances named first in a list that continues through Lear, Othello, and Hamlet.
The reasons later tradition assigned him are worth separating from these, because the handoff will need the distinction. Schoolroom Bradley, the Bradley of handbooks and examination rubrics, excluded the play because its catastrophe depends on a miscarried letter, because its lovers are children without a tragic flaw, and because it is a tragedy of fate rather than of character. Each clause simplifies a hedge in the original. The miscarried letter is his own first example of an accident, in a passage whose doctrine expressly admits accidents into every tragedy he honours. The lovers are not flawless in his account: Romeo’s “excess and precipitancy” anchor the mild end of the error spectrum, and precipitancy heads the list of defects that “contribute decisively to the conflict and catastrophe.” Fate, in his system, is the name readers give to the whole tragic order when they isolate one aspect of it; he refuses the word as an explanation even for the four. The tradition did not invent its Bradley from nothing: it took his three structural observations, earliness, outwardness, and the accident he happened to illustrate from this play first, and republished them as a verdict of inferiority. The documents support the observations. They do not support the verdict.
One thing Bradley never did is also part of the record. The second edition of 1905 and the long line of impressions that followed were, by his prefatory note, confined to “formal improvements” and the correction of “indubitable mistakes”; the Introduction’s sentence on the play stands unrevised through them all. And when he returned to Shakespeare in the Oxford Lectures on Poetry of 1909, the play he had left out received, in the lecture on Hegel’s theory of tragedy, the most searching single paragraph he ever wrote about it. That paragraph belongs to the case against the exclusion, and it is time to assemble the case entire.
The InsightCrunch Exclusion Case: The Play Tested Point by Point
The table below, the InsightCrunch exclusion case, sets each of Bradley’s tests beside his own words, the play’s evidence, and a finding. Its purpose is reference rather than rhetoric: the narrative that follows argues the contested rows, but the pattern is visible in the table itself. The play fails cleanly on one test, the scale of the hero; it fails partially on one, the inward conflict; and on the rest it passes, several times on evidence its examiner supplied.
| Bradley’s test | What his book says | The play’s evidence | Finding |
|---|---|---|---|
| A conspicuous person of high degree | Tragedy concerns persons of high degree, “at the least, as in Romeo and Juliet, with members of great houses, whose quarrels are of public moment” | The heirs of Verona’s two great houses; the Prince treats their feud as a public emergency (1.1) | Passes, at the minimum rung he names |
| One centre, or two in a love-tragedy | “It is only in the love-tragedies, Romeo and Juliet and Antony and Cleopatra, that the heroine is as much the centre of the action as the hero” | The action divides between the lovers; Juliet carries the fourth act alone | Passes, under his stated exception |
| The fundamental tragic trait | A “fatal tendency to identify the whole being with one interest, object, passion”; “present in his early heroes, Romeo and Richard II.” | Romeo’s whole being passes from Rosaline to Juliet without interval or reserve (1.5) | Passes, on his own attribution |
| A tragic error, never absent | “At one extreme stands the excess and precipitancy of Romeo”; the error “is never absent” | The secret marriage, the killing of Tybalt, the suicide on unverified news (2.6, 3.1, 5.3) | Passes, at the spectrum’s mildest extreme |
| Catastrophe mainly from action and character | Calamities “proceed mainly from actions, and those the actions of men”; the hero “always contributes in some measure” | The feud’s decisions, Capulet’s forced marriage, Romeo’s revenge and haste drive the action to the final scene | Passes in the main; the last timing is accident’s |
| Accident small and late | Accident is admitted in most tragedies, taxed by size and lateness; his examples begin with the Friar’s message | Friar John’s quarantine and the minute of Juliet’s waking (5.2, 5.3) decide the hour, not the direction | Passes his measure; no heavier than Othello’s |
| Conflict outward and inward | The mature type doubles outward war with “conflict in the hero’s soul”; this play’s hero “contends with an outward force, but comparatively little with himself” | The lovers contend with the houses; Juliet’s potion soliloquy (4.3) is the one great inward struggle | Partial: the genuine deficit |
| Stature on the colossal scale | The later heroes are huge, “survivors of the heroic age”; “We do not receive this impression from Romeo or Brutus or Hamlet” | Two adolescents of no public achievement, known only in love and haste | Fails, with Hamlet for company |
| Evil as the convulsion’s source | “The main source is in every case evil”; “The love of Romeo and Juliet conducts them to death only because of the senseless hatred of their houses” | The feud is the play’s given evil, cursed by Mercutio and sentenced by the Prince (3.1, 5.3) | Passes, in his own sentence |
| The impression of waste | “This central feeling is the impression of waste,” pity and fear merging in sadness and mystery | Youth, beauty, and reconciliation all arrive too late; the fathers’ gold statues price the waste (5.3) | Passes supremely |
| Construction: exposition, crisis, counter-stroke | The play supplies his examples for the exposition’s threat of conflict, the ominous close of Act 1, and the counter-blow on the crisis | Street brawl, dream, meeting (1.1 to 1.5); marriage then brawl (2.6, 3.1) | Passes, as his chosen illustrations |
Three rows carry the argument. The accident row is the first, because the popular case against the play rests on it. Bradley’s doctrine taxes accident by quantity and position, and by that tax the play is a light offender: two accidents, both in the final movement, both small, the undelivered letter and the minute of sleep. Set beside them the accidents inside his chosen four. In Othello the catastrophe is, by his own lecture’s account, worked by an intrigue “aided at every step by fortunate accidents and the innocent mistakes of its victims,” an influence of accident that after the temptation begins “is incessant and terrible.” In King Lear the saving of Cordelia fails by “that insignificant delay” of Edgar’s arrival. In Hamlet the hero is returned to Denmark by a pirate attack Bradley calls an accident outright. If a large admission of chance weakens the causal sense, then Othello, whose plot runs on a dropped handkerchief and a procession of lucky timings, stands nearer the limit than the play of the quarantined friar. Bradley never applies his tax comparatively; applied, it acquits the defendant and surcharges a member of the court.
Why Does the Feud Pass Bradley’s Test for the Source of Tragedy?
Because his test asks what sets the convulsion going, and his own answer for this play is the feud: the main source of tragic convulsion is in every case evil, and “the love of Romeo and Juliet conducts them to death only because of the senseless hatred of their houses.”
The hatred is not weather. It is maintained by named persons in repeated acts, the servants’ brawl, Tybalt’s challenge, Capulet’s tyranny over Juliet’s marriage, until Capulet himself names the lovers “poor sacrifices of our enmity” and the Prince sentences the feud that made them so (5.3). A standing institutional evil that acts through characters satisfies his requirement that calamity proceed from human action.
The character row needs the same care. Strip the accidents away, and what remains is not a happy ending but the feud’s machinery still armed: a secret marriage certain to be discovered, a forced marriage to Paris announced for Thursday (3.4), a banished husband, a daughter who has sworn she will die before the ceremony. The accidents of the fifth act decide when and how the catastrophe arrives; the decisions of the first four acts, the feud kept, the marriage hidden, Juliet cornered, Romeo precipitate, decide that it arrives. Bradley’s own construction analysis concedes the shape: the fortunes decline “before the opposition of their houses, which, aided by accidents, produces a catastrophe.” Aided is the exact word. In his summary of the play, character and institution are the cause and accident the assistant, which is precisely the proportion his doctrine demands.
The construction row deserves a word of its own, because Bradley’s vocabulary of crisis and counter-stroke fits this play with a precision that suggests the play helped him forge it. The crisis, in his scheme, is the scene of opposed forces meeting at highest tension; the counter-stroke is the blow returned, often by the opposing side, that turns the action toward catastrophe. Verona supplies the purest instances of both in the canon: the marriage that completes the rise is answered in the next movement by the street fight Shakespeare places immediately upon it, and Bradley’s own summary binds the two scenes in one breath, the marriage (2.6) and the brawl (3.1) as crisis and counter-stroke in direct succession. In the four, the machinery is complicated by subplots, delays, and divisions of interest; here it runs exposed, and a reader learning Bradley’s construction theory learns it fastest from the play he excluded. A system whose central terms are best illustrated by its excluded instance has a filing problem, not a defendant problem.
Where Does the Play Score Highest Against Bradley’s Own Tests?
On waste, the centre of his tragic impression. No play in the canon wastes so much that is so plainly precious: two young lives of exceptional beauty and courage, a reconciliation between great houses that was available at every moment and arrives only over the bodies, a city taught its lesson at the dearest possible price.
The Prince’s sentence spreads the loss across the whole community, “See what a scourge is laid upon your hate… And I for winking at your discords too / Have lost a brace of kinsmen. All are punish’d” (5.3), and the fathers’ rivalry is converted in a breath into competitive mourning, gold statues raised to children their hatred killed. If the tragic impression is measured by the sense of good destroyed and recognised too late, the excluded play is not the canon’s weakling but its purest concentrate.
The two failing rows are real, and the defence does the play no service by blurring them. The lovers are not colossal; nothing in them suggests the heroic age surviving into a smaller world, and Bradley’s sentence grouping Romeo with Brutus and Hamlet as lacking that impression only softens the point. And the inward conflict, the divided soul that Bradley prized as the mature signature, is genuinely scarce: Romeo never debates his course as Hamlet debates, never watches his own passion with Othello’s horrified doubleness; his struggles are with fortune, the feud, and his own haste, all outward pressures met by an undivided nature. Juliet’s potion soliloquy (4.3), where fear argues with resolve through a catalogue of horrors, proves the young Shakespeare could write inward division when the design called for it; the design of the whole does not call for it.
The scale failure, examined, is the weakest plank in the exclusion, because it is the one test Bradley asserts by metaphor rather than derives by argument. The colossal impression arrives in Lecture I through Michelangelo’s figures, survivors of a heroic age; it is a powerful notation of a reading experience, but it is never cashed out in the currency the rest of the lecture uses, causation, trait, error, and conflict, and it cannot be, since magnitude of soul is a function of what a hero is given to do and to suffer, which is a function of the story chosen. A fourteen-year-old bridegroom in a five-day action cannot exhibit the scale of a king unmaking a kingdom across years of war, and the shortfall belongs to the assignment, not to the execution. Bradley half-concedes the point by his company-keeping, Romeo failing the test beside Brutus and Hamlet, two heroes whose plays stand inside his canon or beside its throne. A test that the author of the system applies so unevenly, waived where the other virtues are inward and invoked where they are formal, is not a test of tragedy. It is a preference for a certain size of subject, and preferences are exactly what definitions are supposed to discipline. What these two rows measure, though, is not tragic power but a particular tragic architecture, the architecture of the 1601 to 1608 group. Before the circularity charge is pressed, though, the play itself should be heard at matching length, since its evidence has so far entered through Bradley’s summaries and the table’s compressions.
Romeo and Juliet’s Own Evidence: Haste, Pattern, and a Distributed Soul
The Chorus announces stars, and the play then spends five acts showing decisions. The Prologue’s “A pair of star-cross’d lovers take their life” (Prologue) states the destination, as Bradley’s exposition analysis saw, so that attention falls on the route; and the route is a chain of human acts performed in haste under institutional pressure. A servant who cannot read carries the guest list to a literate stranger, and the stranger is Romeo (1.2): the machinery of the meeting is social, a great house’s feast and its exclusions, not celestial. The lovers’ first exchange is a sonnet built between two voices (1.5), a form completed only because each supplies the other’s lines; from their first minute the play’s unit of consciousness is the pair. Juliet’s recognition, alone with the Nurse, “My only love sprung from my only hate! / Too early seen unknown, and known too late!” (1.5), is the play’s first inward event, and it is knowledge, not swooning: she names the structure of her situation exactly, love and hate in one object, and the naming governs every choice she makes afterward. Inwardness in this play does not soliloquize at length because it does not need to; it recognizes, and acts.
The balcony scene (2.2) is usually read as rapture and is structured as deliberation. Juliet reasons about names and institutions with a lawyer’s precision: the name is no part of the person, the rose keeps its sweetness under another word, the feud’s categories are conventional rather than natural. She audits the risks of the meeting, proposes the terms of the contract, sets the time and the messenger, and exacts the condition of marriage before she will proceed; the scene’s poetry is the vehicle of a mind arranging a perilous policy at speed. Romeo’s part, by contrast, is vow and hyperbole, feeling outrunning arrangement. The division of labour is the play’s psychology in miniature: her inwardness is practical and analytic, his is lyrical and precipitous, and the catastrophe will exploit precisely that distribution, his haste at the tomb answering her foresight with the potion. A criticism hunting for one divided soul in a single breast misses a design that splits the faculties between two breasts and lets each half fail for want of the other.
The Friar’s entrance states the play’s philosophy of character in its own terms, and Bradley’s system should have recognized a kinsman. Gathering herbs, Laurence reads the vegetable world as a moral anatomy: “Within the infant rind of this small flower / Poison hath residence and medicine power” (2.3), and the lesson is drawn explicitly for man, in whom grace and rude will contend as they do in plants, “Virtue itself turns vice, being misapplied, / And vice sometime by action dignified” (2.3). This is Bradley’s trait-and-error doctrine in botanical dress: a single nature housing opposed powers, disaster arriving when one power is misapplied. The Friar then dramatizes the doctrine by misapplying his own virtue, his benevolent scheming being the rude will in a good man’s habit. When the lovers’ haste is condemned inside the play, it is condemned in these terms, by the herb speech’s logic and by the warning at the marriage itself, “These violent delights have violent ends” (2.6), a sentence the action then verifies as natural law rather than as moralizing. The play is not innocent of a psychology of fault. It embeds that psychology in a counsellor whose failure to govern it is part of the tragedy.
The hinge scene prices the trait exactly. Mercutio dies cursing both houses, and Romeo, reading his own situation with sudden clarity, cries “O, I am fortune’s fool!” (3.1) and then acts, in full knowledge, the feud’s revenge: the killing of Tybalt is the one catastrophe-event in the play that is wholly a chosen act, unassisted by accident, and it is the act that makes all the later accidents fatal. Banishment follows from choice, the forced marriage follows from banishment, the potion from the marriage, the letter’s errand from the potion. Bradley’s accident, when it arrives in the fifth act, arrives at the end of a causal chain whose every link is a decision, which is his own definition of the tragic sequence with the proportions he prescribed. Even Romeo’s self-diagnosis deserves its weight: fortune’s fool is the self-description of a man who experiences his trait as weather. The play knows the difference between the experience and the fact, and the audience is positioned, as in the four, to see both.
Inward struggle, where the design concentrates it, is as strenuous as anything in the later manner; it is simply rationed. Romeo’s collapse in the Friar’s cell (3.3) conducts his self-division antiphonally, the hero raving against his condition while the Friar answers with an itemized philosophy of his blessings, so that the divided soul speaks in two voices and the scene becomes a debate the hero loses to his counsellor. Juliet’s potion soliloquy (4.3) needs no partner. Alone, she works through the terrors in sequence, the fear of waking mad, of suffocation, of the ancestral vault and Tybalt’s ghost, answering each with a reason for proceeding, and drinks: analysis and terror in strict alternation, will subduing imagination by enumeration. Set beside the mature soliloquies, the difference is of placement, not of power. Shakespeare in 1595 distributes inwardness across a soliloquy, a dialogue, a shared sonnet, and a pair of lovers; Shakespeare in 1604 concentrates it in one breast and lets it speak for an act at a time. Bradley’s gradient describes the distribution accurately. Only the inference, that the earlier distribution is the immature one, is his contribution, and it is the inference the century swallowed with the observation.
The Mantua scene (5.1) closes the trait’s arc in Bradley’s own grammar. Romeo receives the report of Juliet’s death, false but believed, and his response is pure precipitancy refined by grief: no verification, no pause, the purchase of poison and the ride to Verona resolved in a single breath, the stars defied in the play’s most famous gesture of self-assertion. The defiance is the error at its extreme of consequence and its minimum of culpability, an act wholly his and wholly founded on an accident of information. Bradley’s spectrum was built for this act: at one end an error that scarcely diminishes regard, at the other an ambition that forfeits it, and between them the whole company of tragic heroes. The final scene then assembles the play’s argument in one tableau, the feud’s children dead by its machinery in its victims’ vault, the counsellor confessing, the fathers bargaining in grief, the Prince distributing the sentence across the entire community. No single breast contains the recognition; the city performs it, choral and public. That is the distributed soul arriving at its destination, and it is a destination the four, for all their inward vastness, do not reach: the tragedy of an institution, recognized by the institution, in the presence of its dead.
The Circle in the Definition: Criteria Drawn from the Four
The exclusion’s deepest weakness is visible in the order of Bradley’s own exposition. Lecture III establishes that the tragedies fall into two groups separated by an interval, an early group and the tragic period of about 1601 to 1608. Lecture I, delivered before that chronology in the book’s arrangement but conceived with it, defines the substance of Shakespearean tragedy from the second group: the inward struggle whose emphasis he expressly calls the mark of “the latter, the maturest works,” the colossal stature that begins with Othello, the error whose extreme form is Macbeth’s ambition or Richard’s villainy. A play from the first group is then found to lack the second group’s signatures, and the finding is reported as a property of the play. The reasoning is not dishonest; Bradley states his scope openly and hedges his generalizations with a scholar’s care. But a definition induced from four instances cannot then sit in judgment on a fifth as if it were a law of the kind. It can only report a difference, and the difference, in this case, is the difference between 1595 and 1604.
The circularity shows in the treatment of inwardness. Bradley’s gradient runs from outward conflict in the early plays to inward conflict in the mature ones, and he reads the gradient as growth. Yet the inward struggle is not absent from the early work by incapacity: Juliet alone onstage with the vial (4.3) debates herself through imagined suffocation, the waking among new-dead corpses, and the sight of Tybalt’s ghost, and arrives at action by an act of will as strenuous as any in the canon. What the early play lacks is not the power but the allocation: its design spends inwardness in one great scene and keeps its heroes, as Bradley himself says in the Hegel lecture, concentrated each in a single power. A definition that counts the allocation as immaturity has confused a distribution with a deficiency. Nor is the mature pattern as universal inside the four as the definition requires: of Lear, Bradley writes in the construction lecture that after the first act “Lear suffers but hardly initiates action at all,” and that the play must be read, constructionally, through the villains who initiate. The hero driven from without is a structural fact within the most honoured of the four; the lovers driven from without were filed outside the definition for the same fact.
Style carries the same confusion one level down. Bradley’s chronology lecture treats the early manner generously, the honey-tongued sweetness that remains even as force is added, yet the growth narrative underneath the compliment assumes that lyric sweetness is a stage on the way to tragic weight. For this play the assumption inverts the means and the end. Lyric is not the decoration of the lovers’ world; it is their cognition, the medium in which they perceive, deliberate, and bind themselves, in exchanged sonnets, in argued aubades, in oaths sworn and unsworn by the moon. A tragedy whose persons think in lyric forms will necessarily conduct its inward life in those forms, publicly and musically, rather than in the private prose of self-interrogation that the later plays develop for older and lonelier minds. Levin’s formalism, when it arrived, simply took the style as the thought. What Bradley registered as an early manner awaiting maturity was a complete instrument tuned to a different music, and the tuning is the meaning a definition by inwardness cannot hear.
Accident shows the same pattern in reverse. The doctrine taxes it, the examples distribute it evenly across early and late plays alike, and the Othello lecture, written from inside the canon, finds accident “incessant and terrible” in the very play whose hero is the first of the colossal men. A property that varies independently of the classification cannot be evidence for the classification. What actually distinguishes the play in Bradley’s pages, when his scattered remarks are assembled, reduces to two observations: its hero is young and uncolossal, and its conflict is fought outwardly. Both are true. Both are descriptions of a kind, the love-tragedy of Shakespeare’s first period, whose centre is a pair and whose antagonist is a social order. Neither is a measure of tragic worth unless the kind has already been defined as lesser, which is the point at issue.
What Would the Play Have Needed to Enter the Book?
A later birthday and a divided hero, on the evidence of the criteria as Bradley applies them. Written in the tragic period, with a protagonist of public stature whose soul is torn between the love and a counter-claim he half acknowledges, the same story would have met every test he states:
The trait, the error, the causation from character, the convulsion from evil, the waste. What it would have lost is its actual design, in which two undivided natures strike an undivided institution and break. The counterfactual exposes the definition’s bias: it does not ask whether a play achieves tragic effect, but whether it achieves the effect by the mature period’s machinery.
Bradley’s hedges deserve their due before the opponents take the floor, because the hardest version of his position is stronger than the schoolroom’s.
One hedge deserves to be turned against its author before the opponents speak, because it concedes the whole taxonomy question. The four are “the four principal tragedies,” and principal, examined, can only mean the principal tragedies of the tragic period: no criterion of principal rank is offered that does not already presuppose the period scheme, since by influence, by stage history, and by the esteem of two centuries the lovers’ play had at least as strong a claim to the adjective as Macbeth. Even Bradley’s own chronology is tendered with scholarly hesitation, his period tables marking their terminal dates with question marks, the first period closing at a queried 1595, the whole grid an avowed approximation. A grid offered with question marks hardened, in the definition’s hands, into a wall with a door, and the play was left on the far side of the door. The distinction that survives scrutiny is the one this article keeps returning to: Bradley’s description of the difference between the early and the mature tragedies is exact and remains useful, while the conversion of that description into a standard of admission is the error, his own in the adjective, the century’s in everything built on the adjective. Description is not rank, and a period is not a court. He never said the play was not a tragedy; he called it a pure one. He never said its hero lacked the tragic trait or a tragic error; he assigned both. He never said its accidents exceeded the licence he grants the four; his examples put them in the same class. He never even said the book’s four were the four best plays; he called them the four principal tragedies and defined his point of view. The exclusion as Bradley left it is a modest thing: a scope note with an unfortunate adjective. The exclusion as the century received it is a doctrine: that the play is a lesser tragedy because it is a tragedy of accident and youth. Answering the doctrine requires critics who attacked its three supports, the fault, the form, and the kind; and they arrived in that order’s reverse, form first in the theatre, then fault and kind in the study.
Answering Bradley: Dickey, Levin, Snyder, and Brooke
The theatre answered first and without argument. While the study was absorbing Bradley’s framework, the stage went on treating the play as one of the supreme acting tragedies in the repertory, as it had throughout the period the exclusion governed. Harley Granville-Barker, the actor-manager whose Prefaces to Shakespeare subjected the plays to a practitioner’s scrutiny Bradley never attempted, gave the play a preface of his own, reading it as a complete tragic design whose swiftness is its meaning: a thing built for speed, doubling, and lyrical intensity, to be played fast and whole or not at all. The practitioner’s evidence matters because Bradley’s criteria are all reader’s criteria, drawn from the study of character in the closet. A design that coheres in performance, at tempo, before an audience that feels the catastrophe as engineered rather than accidental, is evidence of a kind the lectures never sought. Jill Levenson’s research for the Oxford edition quantifies the stage’s dissent: in the second half of the eighteenth century the play received 399 London performances and eclipsed Hamlet itself. The wilderness the play is said to have wandered was a wilderness of one faculty, the academic; the playhouse never received the sentence.
The stage’s evidence includes a famous tampering that cuts both ways and therefore persuades. David Garrick’s adaptation of 1748, the version that taught the play to the eighteenth century, altered the close so that Juliet wakes before Romeo’s poison finishes its work, granting the lovers a conscious farewell in the tomb. The alteration confesses that Shakespeare’s timing struck even his greatest theatrical champion as a cruelty of mechanics; five generations of audiences nonetheless received the play, in this or kindred forms, as a supreme tragedy, and the farewell scene’s pathos depends entirely on the design Bradley filed as immature, the pattern of arrivals a minute apart that the tomb concentrates. Later landmarks in Levenson’s census tell the same story in changing styles: Charlotte Cushman’s Romeo in 1845 and 1846, a woman’s assumption of the hero that held two capitals; the Gielgud production of 1935, with Gielgud and Laurence Olivier alternating Romeo and Mercutio as if to display the play’s two energies in two bodies; Peter Brook’s swift, youthful staging of 1947; Franco Zeffirelli’s of 1960, which founded a film’s naturalism of age. The practitioners keep rediscovering one fact: played at its own tempo, the play’s causation reads as fate engineered by character, which is why Granville-Barker’s gospel of speed became the practitioner’s orthodoxy.
What Did the Stage Know That the Study Forgot?
That the play’s causation is theatrical before it is biographical. In performance the catastrophe does not feel like a letter gone astray; it feels like a machine of haste closing, scene by scene, as proposal follows brawl and potion follows forced marriage, with every expedient invented under pressure by people acting in character.
Granville-Barker’s preface builds its reading on pace: play the verse at speed, keep the doubling and the patterning visible, and the audience experiences design, not drift. The study, reading slowly for character, met the accidents one by one and taxed them; the stage, playing at tempo, meets the system that generates them.
Franklin M. Dickey’s Not Wisely But Too Well: Shakespeare’s Love Tragedies (1957) attacked the doctrine at its moral root. Dickey’s case is historical: the Elizabethan culture that produced the play possessed a settled vocabulary for the lovers’ condition, and the play itself speaks it. The Friar who marries them warns them in the act of marrying, “These violent delights have violent ends / And in their triumph die, like fire and powder, / Which as they kiss consume” (2.6), and the herb speech that introduces him is a lecture on the grace and rude will warring in man as in plants (2.3). In the moral physiology of the period, passion of this velocity is incontinence, a genuine disorder of the soul, and a dramatist formed by that culture did not need his lovers to be innocent in order to pity them. On Dickey’s reading the play is a tragedy of character after all, because the character trait Bradley minimized, the precipitancy he placed at the spectrum’s mild end, was in its own age a named and serious fault with consequences the plot merely executes.
Adjudicating Dickey against Bradley: Dickey wins the historical point and loses the proportional one, and the exchange clarifies both. He proves that the lovers’ haste could register, for the first audiences, as fault rather than as charm, which destroys the handbook claim that the play offers no flaw for a catastrophe to grow from. But Bradley had already located the flaw and weighed it; his judgment was that precipitancy “scarcely, if at all, diminish[es] our regard for him,” and the play’s own proportions support the weighing, since the catastrophe’s decisive machinery, the feud, the forced marriage, the quarantine, is not precipitancy’s product. Dickey corrects the tradition’s Bradley more than Bradley. What his book really demolishes is the fate-versus-character binary the handbooks built on Bradley’s foundation: a play can hold its lovers morally answerable and still kill them by a system, and this one does.
Dickey’s method is worth a sentence of its own, because it models the documentary discipline this article has tried to apply to Bradley. He recovers the period’s moral physiology from its own literature, the sermons, conduct books, and medical commonplaces in which immoderate love figures as a disorder of the humours with a natural prognosis, and he reads the play’s imagery and its counsellor’s speeches as that doctrine in dramatic form. The Friar’s herb lecture stops being scenery on this reading and becomes the play’s diagnostic instrument, and the warning at the marriage becomes a prognosis the plot fulfils. Whatever reservations attach to parts of Dickey’s case, the method permanently raised the cost of the fate reading: after 1957, a critic who called the lovers faultless had to explain away the play’s own moral vocabulary rather than merely repeat the Chorus’s stars.
Harry Levin’s essay “Form and Formality in Romeo and Juliet” (1960) changed the ground entirely, and it remains the strongest single answer to the exclusion because it declines Bradley’s unit of analysis. Where Bradley asks what the hero’s character contributes, Levin asks what the play’s forms contribute: the sonnet the lovers share at their meeting, trading a devotional form between them until it closes in a kiss (1.5); the aubade argued in the language of formal debate (3.5); the set speeches, laments, and formal antitheses that pattern the whole; the day-and-night imagery system that keeps the lovers’ private weather at war with the public calendar. On this reading the play’s unity is not the unity of a character but the unity of a design, and its tragedy is the tragedy of forms colliding: comedy’s forms, sonnet, wit-combat, and marriage plot, driven into tragedy’s terminus. The full account of Harry Levin’s ‘Form and Formality’ (1960) belongs to its own article in this series; here the point is jurisdictional. Bradley’s tests are all tests of a hero. Levin exhibits a play whose tragic coherence lives where Bradley never looked, in pattern, and a coherence of that order cannot be refuted by the absence of a divided soul.
The shared sonnet of the first meeting shows the method in its smallest compass. Two strangers, masked, in a hostile house, speak fourteen lines that neither could speak alone: the pilgrim-and-saint conceit passes quatrain for quatrain between them, the argument about hands and lips conducted entirely inside the form’s rules, until the form completes itself in the kiss it has been negotiating. Bradley’s criticism has no instrument for this event, since nothing in it is character in his sense, no trait is revealed that was not the situation’s, and the inward states are indistinguishable from the verse that performs them. Levin’s instrument measures it exactly: here is meaning carried by form, the play’s whole erotic theology, worship, pilgrimage, sin purged by contact, compressed into a rite the lovers improvise and instantly understand. A tragedy that can do this at its first meeting does not lack an inner life. It conducts its inner life in the open, in pattern, where a psychology-centred criticism was trained not to look.
Susan Snyder’s The Comic Matrix of Shakespeare’s Tragedies (1979) completed Levin’s jurisdictional move by naming the design’s genre. The play, Snyder argues, is built on the matrix of romantic comedy: young lovers, blocking elders, witty servants, a resourceful friar, a marriage as the goal; and its tragedy consists in that matrix being broken and inverted at the midpoint, when the comedy’s energies are killed with the comedy’s prince of wit. The killing of Mercutio in the street brawl (3.1) is the hinge on which the whole design turns, as the article in this series on Mercutio’s Death as the Play’s Hinge sets out in detail; after it, the comic devices return as their own dark doubles, the secret marriage becoming the forced marriage, the potion a rehearsal of death, the tomb a parody of the bridal bed. For the exclusion debate the consequence is direct. What Bradley registered as the absence of mature tragic machinery is the presence of a different machinery, deliberately assembled: the play means its audience to feel one genre’s expectations being executed by another, and the feeling is the tragedy.
The matrix explains even the play’s most painful defection. The Nurse, comedy’s go-between and the lovers’ one adult ally inside the Capulet house, counsels Juliet in the crisis to marry Paris and forget the banished husband (3.5): on Snyder’s model this is not a character inconsistency to be apologized for but the comic world withdrawing its protection, the machinery of intrigue confessing that it cannot operate in the world the hinge has made. Comedy’s agents either die, like Mercutio, or defect, like the Nurse, or arrive too late, like the Friar; the genre itself deserts the lovers scene by scene, and the audience watches a form being dismantled. Bradley, whose system had no variable for the genre of a play’s materials, could see the resulting structure only as an absence, the mature machinery not yet installed. The wider treatment of that doubleness, The Genre Problem: A Comedy That Turns Tragic, traces the generic argument across the whole series.
Nicholas Brooke’s Shakespeare’s Early Tragedies (1968) supplied the verdict’s scholarly form. Brooke studies six plays, Titus Andronicus, Richard III, Romeo and Juliet, Richard II, Julius Caesar, and Hamlet, under a thesis aimed straight at the Bradleyan inheritance: the emphasis belongs on “the variety of the plays,” a variety “too often obscured by the belief in a single ‘tragic experience’.” A single tragic experience is exactly what Lecture I constructs, and exactly what the early plays, read without the mature template, refuse to exhibit. Brooke’s Romeo and Juliet is a formal achievement of its own kind, its stage pictures and emblematic patterning doing the work that inward soliloquy does elsewhere. His later treatment of the play’s tragic form, the subject of Nicholas Brooke on the Tragic Form in this series, extends the argument. Adjudicating the whole line of opponents against the position they answered: Levin, Snyder, and Brooke win, because they do not plead for an exception to Bradley’s rules but exhibit the object the rules failed to describe. Dickey wins a point inside the rules. Granville-Barker and the stage win the evidence of effect. Bradley retains one unanswerable observation, which the verdict below keeps: the play does not contain, and does not want, a Hamlet.
The Exclusion’s Century: Classrooms, Knights, and Bradley’s Own Return
The doctrine’s transmission ran through the classroom, where nuance is the first casualty. H. B. Charlton’s Shakespearian Tragedy (1948) carried a Bradley-derived framework into the postwar universities as a teachable system, and the examination culture that followed reduced the system to a pair of boxes: tragedy of character, tragedy of fate. Generations of students met the play through the second box. The reduction was not baseless, which is why it lasted: the Prologue itself announces “star-cross’d” lovers, and a fate reading has the Chorus’s authority behind it. But the binary attributed to the excluded play exactly the structure Bradley’s doctrine forbids, a catastrophe proceeding from no character at all, and it attributed the judgment to Bradley, who had taken care to assign Romeo an error, a trait, and a share in his own ruin. The classroom thus defended the play against a critic who had never made the charge, and attacked it with a label its supposed author had refused. Bradley’s real position, three structural observations and an adjective, vanished between the two errors.
The reckoning with Bradley himself came from an opposite direction, and it shows the exclusion’s strangest consequence. L. C. Knights’s pamphlet How Many Children Had Lady Macbeth? (1933), reprinted as the opening essay of Explorations (1946), attacked the whole character-criticism tradition at its Bradleyan root: a play, for Knights, is a poem, a dramatic poem whose meanings live in its language, not a little world of persons whose biographies a critic may extend offstage. The famous title is itself a small injustice of the kind this article has been tracking, because Bradley never asked the question; his note on Macbeth’s family argues, on the text’s evidence, “He has no children.” A. D. Nuttall would later call Knights’s reasoning on such points coarse. Adjudicating the quarrel: Knights wins the methodological caution, permanently; no serious critic now reconstructs a hero’s offstage life as Bradley sometimes did. He loses the caricature, and he loses it on the same ground the exclusion loses, the documents, which show a subtler Bradley than either his disciples or his assailants used. And the paradox completes itself: Knights’s demolition of Bradley’s method left Bradley’s canon untouched. The generation that learned to distrust character criticism learned it while studying the same four plays, and the play outside the door stayed outside it, now excluded by habit after being excluded by argument.
Knights’s front was one of two. From the modernist side, T. S. Eliot’s essay “Hamlet and His Problems” (1919) had already declared the most Bradleyan of subjects, Hamlet’s character and its motives, to be a critical mirage, proposing instead the objective correlative and calling the play an artistic failure, a judgment possible only against the Bradleyan centrality of Hamlet it despised. Between Eliot’s aesthetics and Knights’s verbal analysis, the mid-century discipline rebuilt its methods while keeping its syllabus, the precise combination that froze the exclusion in place: the reasons for doubting Bradley multiplied, the table of contents that embodied his judgment went unexamined, because every syllabus needs plays and the four were already bound, edited, and examined. Methodological revolutions are cheap; canons are expensive. The play’s exclusion survived the death of its rationale by some forty years, outliving even the generation that had killed the rationale, because institutions revise their arguments annually and their reading lists by the decade.
The last word in the century belongs, fittingly, to Bradley, and it is the paragraph the exclusion’s critics rarely quote. In the Oxford Lectures on Poetry (1909), expounding Hegel’s theory of tragedy, Bradley confronts the class of tragedies Hegel’s scheme cannot house: those where destruction comes by accident, or where the hero’s aim, though justified in itself, collides with no equally justified aim. Hegel’s fanatic, who identifies himself wholly with one end, is doomed rightly in collisions of right with right; but “Romeo is not a son or a citizen as well as a lover, he is lover pure and simple, and his love is the whole of him,” a passion wholly particular, in whose pursuit no universal right inheres, and yet the deaths do not strike an audience as mere meaningless accident. Bradley expounds Hegel’s rescue with evident sympathy: where the suffering is to be justified, “circumstance and accident are so depicted that they are felt to coincide with something in the hero himself, so that he is not simply destroyed by an outward force.” The condition, applied to the play, is met before it is stated, “And so in Romeo and Juliet we feel that the rose of a love so beautiful is too tender to bloom in the storm-swept valley of its birth”: the accidents are felt as the climate of the lovers’ own natures, haste, secrecy, and absolute commitment being precisely the qualities that a storm-swept valley destroys. A critic who can write that sentence has, in substance, answered the objection his exclusion came to stand for. The play’s accidents, by Bradley’s own later test, coincide with something in the hero. What remains of the exclusion after 1909 is only the Introduction’s filing, unretracted and, in the impressions, unrevised.
The recovery, when it came, proceeded by changing the questions rather than by re-arguing the old ones. Editors gave the play the scholarly apparatus once reserved for the four: Levenson’s Oxford edition treats its two early quartos as independent witnesses to a mobile text and gives its introduction to the play’s narrative sources, its stage history, and its “artistic experimentations with poetry, style, rhetoric, and dramatic form,” experimental being the word that finally replaces immature. The classroom’s fate-versus-character binary survives in schoolrooms, but the research literature has filed the play where Brooke put it, among formally distinct early tragedies whose differences are the subject. The exclusion’s century thus ends not with a reversal, no council voted the play into a book printed in 1904, but with the dissolution of the category error that sustained it: “Shakespearean tragedy” stopped being the name of four plays and became again the name of a field.
What the dissolution leaves behind is instructive for any reader still meeting the play through a syllabus. The modern scholarly consensus does not hold the play to be a flawless maturity of the 1604 kind; it holds the 1604 kind to be one kind. Study of the early tragedies as a group, the line Brooke opened, treats the play’s formal system as the achievement it is, and the newer historicisms have restored what Dickey began, the Elizabethan moral vocabulary in which haste and incontinent love were analysable faults rather than charms. The adjective “immature” survives in the literature almost exclusively as a dating shorthand, a remark about chronology carrying no sentence on worth, which is where Bradley’s sentence, read whole, had put it in the first place. The recovery, in short, is not the play’s promotion into the book. It is the discipline’s return to the book’s own first half-sentence, “a pure tragedy,” with the second half restored to its proper office as a note on dates.
The Verdict: Not a Lesser Tragedy but a Different Kind
The case can now be closed, and the findings stated plainly. Bradley excluded Romeo and Juliet from a four-play study for reasons of scope, chronological grouping, and conflict type; he called the play a pure tragedy in the same sentence; he gave its hero the fundamental tragic trait and a named tragic error; he admitted its accidents under a doctrine that tolerates larger ones in Othello and later ones in Lear; he used its exposition and construction as models; and in 1909 he supplied, through Hegel, the very principle by which a tragedy of accident acquits itself, and applied that principle to this play in a sentence of genuine critical beauty. Against this record, the tradition’s verdict, a lesser tragedy of flawless children destroyed by fate, is not Bradley’s at all. It is the sediment of his success, and it should be returned to its actual authors, the handbooks.
One defence of Bradley remains in circulation and should be adjudicated on the record, since it is the defence his most careful readers offer: that he excluded the play from a study, not from the canon, and that intentions govern the case. As a statement about the Introduction, the defence is true, and this article has built on its truth. As a statement about the exclusion, it fails on the evidence of the century, because a published definition does not remain its author’s property. Bradley defined “the substance of Shakespearean tragedy” in general lectures detached from any course’s local needs, in a book issued by a trade publisher and reprinted for schools; the defining was a public act with foreseeable public effects, and the effects, the fate box, the flawless children, the apprentice sneer, followed predictably from the one unhedged word he allowed himself, “immature.” Intention acquits the man of malice. It does not acquit the filing of consequence, and it is the filing, as an institution in the discipline’s memory, that stands accused here. The verdict therefore distinguishes, as the evidence requires, between Bradley the critic, whose pages this article has used as its chief authority for the play’s defence, and Bradleyism, the doctrine the century manufactured from his table of contents.
What survives of the exclusion is a true observation about kind. The play’s tragedy is not enacted inside a single divided consciousness; it is enacted between two undivided consciousnesses and a divided city, and its instruments are form, pattern, tempo, and institution rather than soliloquy and self-knowledge. Its catastrophe has a social author, the feud, that the chosen four lack: Hamlet’s Denmark, Othello’s Cyprus, Lear’s Britain, and Macbeth’s Scotland are disordered by their heroes, while Verona is disordered before its heroes act, and their innocence of the disorder is the point. A criticism that can only honour the interior architecture will always underrate a play whose architecture is civic and formal. Bradley built that criticism better than anyone, and his book remains, as its readers have always known, the deepest account of the four plays it treats. The exclusion is its limit made visible, the place where a system built in one room of the house mistakes the room for the house.
There is a final irony in the record, and it belongs to the play rather than to its critics. Standing outside the Bradleyan canon, the play was spared the long mid-century of character autopsy that the four endured; no generation of students was required to decide whether Juliet was “really” in love or to reconstruct Romeo’s childhood, because the machinery of that criticism had never been installed on it. When the discipline’s attention returned, the play was therefore available, comparatively unencumbered, for the formal, theatrical, and feminist readings that renewed it, its criticism younger than its years. Exclusion was a loss the play could afford and a gift it never asked for. The book that left it out remains indispensable about everything it contains. This article’s finding concerns only what it does not: outside its door stands a pure tragedy, early as Bradley said, and in the respects that matter most to his own system, very far from immature.
The practical residue is a reading discipline.
There is also a general lesson, and the exclusion is the best documented case study of it in English criticism. Critical definitions are period instruments: they are built, as Bradley built his, from the works nearest the critic’s deepest experience, and they fail exactly where that experience runs out, at the boundary of the sample. The failure is not a disgrace, since nobody’s experience is the whole field; the disgrace is only in the transmission, when a definition’s heirs forget the sample it was built from and wield it as a law of nature. Bradley did not forget; his Introduction states the sample in its second paragraph. His heirs forgot for him, and the play paid for their forgetting in fifty years of condescension. A reader who learns to ask of any canon, Bradley’s or its successors’, what it was sampled from, has learned the exclusion’s permanent use. Treat the exclusion as a dated hypothesis about 1595, not as a ranking of plays; read the play’s accidents by Bradley’s own tax, small and late and felt as climate; read its hero’s error where Bradley put it, at the mild end of a spectrum that still counts it decisive; and read its unity where Levin and Brooke taught, in form and variety, as well as where Bradley taught, in character. Readers assembling the evidence for an essay on the exclusion, or for the wider case this article has weighed, can keep Bradley’s texts, the lectures’ scattered references indexed, and the critics’ answers in one ordered file with VaultBook, the local-first vault for research notes and sources. The play outside the door has had the longer life. It never needed admission to the book; it needed, and finally received, critics willing to describe the play that is actually there.
Frequently Asked Questions
Q: What does the InsightCrunch exclusion case set side by side, and what pattern does it expose?
The InsightCrunch exclusion case sets each of Bradley’s stated tests for tragedy beside three things: his own words in Shakespearean Tragedy, the play’s evidence, and a finding. The pattern it exposes is lopsided. The play passes the tests of rank, centrality, the tragic trait, tragic error, evil as the convulsion’s source, construction, and above all the impression of waste, several times on evidence Bradley himself supplied. It fails the colossal scale outright and the inward conflict partially. The exclusion’s traditional ground, accident, turns out to be the row where the play is least vulnerable, since Bradley’s doctrine admits accidents into every tragedy he honours and taxes them only by size and lateness.
Q: Which four plays stand at the centre of Shakespearean Tragedy?
Hamlet, Othello, King Lear, and Macbeth, in that order. Bradley’s Introduction announces the design directly: “I propose to consider the four principal tragedies of Shakespeare from a single point of view.” After two general lectures on the substance and construction of Shakespearean tragedy and a third surveying the tragic period, the book gives two lectures each to Hamlet, Othello, and King Lear and its tenth lecture to Macbeth, followed by roughly a hundred pages of notes pursuing textual and factual questions. Every other tragedy Shakespeare wrote is outside the plan: the histories as a separate class, Timon as partly another’s work, Titus as preceding any characteristic tragic conception, and Romeo and Juliet, uniquely, as pure tragedy but early and in some respects immature.
Q: Where had Bradley delivered this material before it became a book?
In university lecture rooms across three institutions. His preface explains that Shakespearean Tragedy is “based on a selection from materials used in teaching at Liverpool, Glasgow, and Oxford,” and that he had not hesitated to retain the lecture form, so the book’s chapters are lectures in print, numbered and titled as such. Bradley taught at the University of Liverpool, then held the chair of English language and literature at Glasgow, and was elected Professor of Poetry at Oxford in 1901, holding the chair until 1906. The book appeared in 1904, during the Oxford tenure, which is why its authority arrived wearing academic dress: these were the lectures of the Professor of Poetry, worked up for the press.
Q: Which other tragedies did Bradley pass over alongside this one?
He set aside the whole remainder of the tragic canon, for differing reasons. Richard II, Richard III, Julius Caesar, Antony and Cleopatra, and Coriolanus are classed as tragic histories, works bound to their chronicle sources and deviating from the standard of pure tragedy. Titus Andronicus is omitted because it predates Shakespeare’s possession of a style and a tragic conception of his own, whenever exactly it was written. Timon of Athens is omitted because much of it is another writer’s work and its conception probably not Shakespeare’s. Romeo and Juliet is the only play excluded with a remark on its quality as tragedy, “a pure tragedy, but it is an early work, and in some respects an immature one.”
Q: What exactly does Bradley call the play in his Introduction?
He calls it “a pure tragedy, but it is an early work, and in some respects an immature one.” The sentence is the whole of the formal exclusion, and its halves must be kept together. The first half admits the play to the class the book defines; the second assigns it to the early period of Shakespeare’s career and qualifies its maturity “in some respects,” respects the Introduction does not specify. Later tradition kept the adjective and discarded the admission, which is how a scope note became a verdict. Bradley nowhere expands the sentence into a charge: the book contains no passage arguing that the play fails as tragedy, and its scattered references, catalogued by its own index, use the play steadily as an authority on exposition, construction, conflict, and error.
Q: What must a tragic hero contribute to his own disaster in Bradley’s scheme?
He must contribute in some measure, by an error of action or omission that joins with other causes to produce the ruin. Bradley’s hero “always contributes in some measure to the disaster in which he perishes”; a hero destroyed solely by external forces is alien to Shakespeare, and so is a hero whose contribution is invisible. The error expresses the fundamental tragic trait, “a fatal tendency to identify the whole being with one interest, object, passion, or habit of mind,” and it is “never absent,” though its gravity ranges across a spectrum. Romeo stands at the mild extreme, where the error is “excess and precipitancy,” while Richard III’s murderous ambition marks the other end.
Q: How much accident does Bradley permit inside a tragedy?
A measured amount, provided it stays proportionate and arrives late. Accident, in his technical sense, is an occurrence entering the action “neither from the agency of a character, nor from the obvious surrounding circumstances.” Shakespeare, he writes, “in most of his tragedies allows to ‘chance’ or ‘accident’ an appreciable influence at some point in the action,” and uses it in fact “very sparingly.” The limit is functional: “any large admission of chance into the tragic sequence would certainly weaken, and might destroy, the sense of the causal connection of character, deed, and catastrophe.” He adds the positional rule that “almost all the prominent accidents occur when the action is well advanced,” after the causal impression is fixed beyond impairment.
Q: Which accidents inside his four chosen plays does Bradley name himself?
Three, in the same passage that names this play’s two. For King Lear, “an accident that Edgar arrived at the prison just too late to save Cordelia’s life.” For Othello, “an accident that Desdemona dropped her handkerchief at the most fatal of moments.” For Hamlet, “an accident that the pirate ship attacked Hamlet’s ship, so that he was able to return forthwith to Denmark.” His Othello lecture goes further, observing that Iago’s intrigue is “aided at every step by fortunate accidents and the innocent mistakes of its victims,” the influence of accident there being, after the temptation begins, “incessant and terrible.” The four plays he honoured are therefore not accident-free; his doctrine taxes accident rather than prohibiting it.
Q: What error does Bradley assign Romeo at the mild end of his spectrum?
“Excess and precipitancy.” Surveying how the tragic error differs in kind and in its effect on an audience’s regard, Bradley writes: “At one extreme stands the excess and precipitancy of Romeo, which scarcely, if at all, diminish our regard for him; at the other the murderous ambition of Richard III.” The placement matters because it refutes the handbook claim that Bradley found the lovers flawless victims. Precipitancy also appears in his general list of the defects shown by comparatively innocent heroes, “irresolution, precipitancy, pride, credulousness,” defects which “contribute decisively to the conflict and catastrophe.” On Bradley’s own account, then, Romeo errs, his error is named, and it is assigned decisive weight in the machinery of the ending.
Q: Why does Bradley treat this play’s conflict as outward rather than inward?
Because its hero contends against an external order rather than against a division in himself. Bradley distinguishes conflict between persons or groups from conflict within the hero’s soul, and observes: “The love of Romeo and Juliet is in conflict with the hatred of their houses, represented by various other characters.” Grouping the play with the Richards, he writes that in “Romeo and Juliet, Richard III., Richard II., where the hero contends with an outward force, but comparatively little with himself, are all early plays,” and that the inward struggle is emphasised most in “the latter, the maturest works.” The observation is structural, not moral: Romeo’s nature is single and unhesitating, and the resistance he meets is Verona itself.
Q: What does Bradley name as the centre of the tragic impression?
The impression of waste. Pity for the hero and fear for his stature, he argues, “unite with, and even to merge in, a profound sense of sadness and mystery, which is due to this impression of waste”: “This central feeling is the impression of waste.” The hero must possess “so much of greatness that in his error and fall we may be vividly conscious of the possibilities of human nature,” so that the catastrophe registers as the destruction of immense human value. Measured by that centre, the excluded play scores at the canon’s maximum: youth, beauty, courage, and a city’s reconciliation all destroyed or purchased too late, the waste priced in the closing scene by the Prince’s sentence and the fathers’ rival statues.
Q: How often does the play surface inside the lectures on the four chosen plays?
Rarely, and only as a term of comparison: the book’s index sends the reader to pages 150 and 210 of the Hamlet and Othello material for Romeo, and the play’s substantial footprint lies elsewhere. The index entry reads “Romeo and Juliet, 3, 7, 9, 15; conflict, 17, 18, 34; exposition, 41-5; crisis, 52; counter-stroke, 58,” which places its real presence in the Introduction and the two general lectures, where it serves as the standing early example for doctrine. Lecture III also praises the early style by it: “The ‘honey-tongued’ sweetness and beauty of Shakespeare’s early writing, as seen in Romeo and Juliet or the Midsummer-Night’s Dream, remain.” Its exclusion from the four play lectures is thus complete, even while the general theory is built partly from it.
Q: Did Bradley return to the play in the Oxford Lectures on Poetry?
Yes, in “Hegel’s Theory of Tragedy,” and the return is substantial. Exposing Hegel’s scheme, Bradley asks how a tragedy whose hero pursues no universal right, and whose end comes largely by accident, can still satisfy; his example is this play: “Romeo is not a son or a citizen as well as a lover, he is lover pure and simple, and his love is the whole of him.” The Oxford Lectures appeared in 1909, five years after Shakespearean Tragedy. Bradley never rewrote the earlier book’s Introduction, and the exclusion stands in every impression; but the later lecture gives the excluded play the most searching paragraph he ever wrote about it, and the paragraph points in the opposite direction from the exclusion it never formally retracts.
Q: What test does Hegel’s theory, in Bradley’s exposition, apply to a tragedy of accident?
The test of coincidence between the accident and the hero. A tragedy in which the hero perishes by mischance, Bradley expounds, justifies its suffering only where “circumstance and accident are so depicted that they are felt to coincide with something in the hero himself, so that he is not simply destroyed by an outward force.” He then applies the test to the excluded play and passes it in a figure: “And so in Romeo and Juliet we feel that the rose of a love so beautiful is too tender to bloom in the storm-swept valley of its birth.” Haste, secrecy, and absoluteness are the lovers’ own qualities, and the valley’s storms destroy exactly those qualities; the accidents therefore express character rather than replacing it, which is Hegel’s condition as Bradley endorses it.
Q: How did L. C. Knights attack Bradley’s method in 1933?
In the pamphlet How Many Children Had Lady Macbeth? (1933), reprinted as the first essay of Explorations (1946). Knights argued that a Shakespeare play is a dramatic poem whose meaning resides in its verbal texture, and that Bradley’s character criticism, treating the figures as real persons with lives extending beyond the text, asked the wrong kind of question altogether. The attack defined the anti-Bradleyan turn in Shakespeare studies: after Knights, reconstructing a hero’s motives as biography became methodologically suspect. Yet the canon Knights’s generation studied was still Bradley’s four, so the methodological revolution left the exclusion standing, an outcome the documents make easy to trace and hard to justify.
Q: Did Bradley ever ask how many children Lady Macbeth had?
No. The question is Knights’s coinage, chosen as the emblem of criticism that treats dramatic persons as real people with offstage biographies; it is not a quotation from Bradley. Bradley’s actual note on the subject, in the Macbeth material of Shakespearean Tragedy, argues from the text that Macbeth is childless: “He has no children,” a reading of the play’s evidence rather than an inquiry into a biography beyond it. The distinction matters for the exclusion debate, because it shows the anti-Bradleyan tradition simplifying its target exactly as the pro-Bradleyan classroom simplified the exclusion. A. D. Nuttall later described Knights’s reasoning on such points as coarse, and the documentary record supports the complaint in this instance.
Q: What case does Nicholas Brooke’s Shakespeare’s Early Tragedies make against a single tragic pattern?
Brooke’s book (1968) studies six plays, Titus Andronicus, Richard III, Romeo and Juliet, Richard II, Julius Caesar, and Hamlet, and argues from their differences. Its announced emphasis is on “the variety of the plays,” a variety “too often obscured by the belief in a single ‘tragic experience’.” A single tragic experience is precisely the construct of Bradley’s first lecture, induced from the four mature plays and then used to measure the rest. Brooke reads the early tragedies as distinct formal achievements, each with its own kind of coherence; in the lovers’ play, emblematic patterning and stage picture do the work that inward soliloquy does in the later manner. The exclusion dissolves under this method, because the measuring instrument is withdrawn.
Q: What did the exclusion do to the play’s place in the classroom?
It filed the play under fortune. Through Bradley-derived teaching, above all H. B. Charlton’s Shakespearian Tragedy (1948), students inherited a framework of character tragedy against fate tragedy, and the play, its Chorus announcing “star-cross’d” lovers, was assigned to fate. The label taught the play as the exception that proved the mature rule: charming, lyrical, and structurally unserious. Yet the stage history gives the classroom’s verdict no support: Jill Levenson’s research records 399 London performances in the second half of the eighteenth century alone, when the play eclipsed Hamlet. The gap between the play’s academic standing and its theatrical standing, sustained for decades, is the exclusion’s measurable legacy, and its closure in modern editions and scholarship is the legacy’s end.
Q: Did Bradley soften the exclusion in later impressions of the book?
No. Shakespearean Tragedy went through a second edition in March 1905 and repeated impressions, the thirteenth recorded by 1919, and Bradley’s prefatory note confines his changes to “formal improvements” and “the correction of indubitable mistakes.” The Introduction’s sentence on the play, pure tragedy but early and in some respects immature, stands unrevised throughout. His one substantial later engagement with the play, the Hegel lecture in the Oxford Lectures on Poetry of 1909, qualifies the exclusion’s spirit without touching its letter: it finds, for this play, the coincidence of accident and character that his system requires of a justified tragedy. The filing was never reopened; only the thinking moved.
Q: How can the exclusion be used in an essay arguing that the play is a different kind of tragedy?
Use Bradley as the strongest opposing witness and concede his two true findings: the hero is uncolossal, and the conflict is outward. Then show, from his own pages, that the remaining charges fail on his evidence: the error is named, the accidents are taxed lighter than Othello’s, the exposition and construction are his models, and the impression of waste is the play’s supremacy. Finally, relocate the play’s unity where Levin and Brooke place it, in form, pattern, and generic design, so the conclusion follows: the exclusion measures the distance between two kinds of tragedy, the tragedy of the divided soul and the tragedy of undivided lovers against a divided city, and difference is not deficiency.